

**When the Earth Trembled: Towards a Theory
through the Narrative Politics of a Liberation
Movement and Lessons for Today's Global
Struggles**

Haider A. Khan

Dedicated to the memory of my fallen comrades whose loss I feel constantly and whose ultimate sacrifice in the cause of genuine freedom for the oppressed keep me steadfast in the fight for freedom .

To the women whose role in the liberation struggles has so far been underestimated

Table of Contents:

Chapter 1: Introduction:

Constructing a Polyphonic Narrative of People's Struggles

1968-69: Students-Workers-Peasants Fight Together in East Pakistan—People Unite

Annex 1.1 The struggles of peasants and workers in East Bengal/Pakistan---very brief historical background

Chapter 2:

Background: False Dawn of August 1947 and March Towards the Six and Eleven Points

Annex 2.1:

Towards a Post-Bakhtinian Theory of the Polyphonic Prose-Poetry of Revolutionary Mass Movements

Annex 2.2:

Another Way to Theorize the “Event” of Revolutionary Process: Event Beyond Badiou (EBB) --
-from the Concept of Badiouan Event to the Concept of *Eventualizing Dynamics or Dyneven*

Chapter 3:

The Beginning of the Final Chapters of Pakistan: The Great Uprising---Phase 1 December 6, 1968 to January 24, 1969

Chapter 4:

Jan. 25 to Feb.23

Chapter 5:

AL Takes the Lead from March 1969 as Eventualizing Dynamics Evolves and Unfolds Further

Chapter 6:

1970

Chapter 7:

The Polyphony of Climactic Eventualizing Dynamics The November Cyclone and its Political Aftermath: The elections---Promises of Jan. 3 Mass Meeting Machinations of Bhutto, Yahya and the Military Heightened ED from March 1 to March 7, 1971 and from March 7 to the Liberation War

Chapter 8: Conclusions:

Towards a New Theory of Mass Movements for the 21st Century: Unfolding Eventualizing Dynamics, Polyphonic Possibilities

Bibliography and Conversations

Introduction:

Constructing a Polyphonic Narrative of People's Struggles

1968-69: Students-Workers-Peasants Fight Together in East Pakistan—People Unite

The great writer, Mahmudul Haque has left for succeeding generations a fictional account that reflects powerfully the exciting days of 1971 lived through the sensuous experience of various young characters in his unforgettable novel *Life, My sister (Jeevan Amar Bone)*. His key protagonist *Khoka* is initially an indifferent, self-involved hedonist---quite a bit like Camus' Meursault in *The Stranger*. Towards the middle of this novella, we are allowed a glimpse into the inner worlds of *Khoka* and his friends. In the scene translated below, *Khoka*'s friend *Murad* who is more in tune with the times, wants to go to the place in Dhaka where many public meetings are held. During the early 1971, the place was even more lively than usual. But *Khoka* is initially not only indifferent but he actually expresses hostility and cynicism. Here is the relevant part¹:

... let's go towards the outer stadium---

“That part is being mobbed. Public meetings, running around every which way, people playing or just milling about having fun---the whole ground is like the oozing monsoon mud. Even a son of a bitch who has just learned to talk, is giving a speech. No wonder, they say... Bangals are groupies. Just like some are addicted to seeing games in the afternoon, some are addicted to meetings. They squat down with a fistful of peanuts breaking the shells making a ‘*putur putur*’ noise, and putting the nuts in their mouths listening to lectures. When someone commands them to raise their hands, they do so without asking any questions. When commanded to give slogans, they obey. Nothing upstairs, I guess.”

Murad was not impressed. “Wanna go to the *Ramna* restaurant?” Surprisingly, *Khoka* agreed.

Ramna restaurant was wall to wall people. The two sat down on chairs on the wooden platform over the lake. Many of the people were acquaintances. Eyes met eyes; smiles were exchanged. There were many groups with much heated arguments flowing like fountains.

Pravat Gonzales and *Yasin* were about to leave, having finished their *adda*. Catching *Khoka*'s eye they came back.

Yasin said, “Where do you hang out? I hardly see you anymore!”

Khoka shot back, “You haven't gone back to *Ichapura* yet?”

¹ All the following translations are by the present author from the original *Bangla* novel.

“Hang your *Ichapura*! When all the people are fleeing from Dhaka, I came from the village to Dhaka. Let me see if I luck out.”

“All the big plays are in Dhaka now...” Murad said. “The whole world is watching us in Dhaka. The streets are full of those wearing blue with twenty pockets!”

Gonzales sighed audibly and said, “I have been here since noon. My very vertebrae hurts. I don’t feel so well.”

Yasin grabbed Gonzales by the hand and made him sit down again. Yasin said, “Come on brother, sit down. I’ll have to leave eventually also; but right now, you are our only hope.”

Gonzales replied, “It is hard to discuss here who will protect whom. We cannot be sure that we will have to start running covering our heads any time now. The news from inside is really horrible.”

Khoka said, “All your news comes from foreign sources. We are lucky that you had that job as a clerk in the consulate. Otherwise, what would have happened to our country?”

Gonzales shot back, “The situation is really serious. Don’t make fun of me.”

Here we have a very realist approach to novelization with a bit of Bakhtinian parodic Menippean moment thrown in for effect.² I should mention here that we also find in this novel the echoes of what I have termed polychronotopia going beyond Bakhtin’s exclusively literary, novelization concept of chronotope.³

Among the four friends there is a Christian, Pravat Gonzales who is a low-level clerk in a foreign---perhaps American--- consulate and can supply what Yasin thinks is reliable information. It is also significant that Yasin is connected to his village, *Ichapura* but has deliberately chosen to stay in trouble-filled Dhaka. We will see later in our analysis that young people, particularly students from a new middle class---largely rooted in rural areas played a major role in the initial phases of the great rebellions that started in December 1968.

Yasin sounded depressed. “You don’t need to perforate the diplomatic bags to know that our country is going from bad to worse. You can know it just if you keep your eyes and ears open. Oh! How the dogs bark at night. Makes me think that there will be many deaths.”

Murad commented, “Dogs bark in our neighborhood too. Yours is just a ridiculous superstition.”

² It may be recalled that Bakhtin had theorized from the linguistic parodic patterns of protest of the oppressed and thus developed his concept of the carnivalesque which, as I will demonstrate through my historical narrative and analysis is relevant for the revolts in East Pakistan. In addition, in his great book on Dostoyevsky, he was the first literary theorist to propose a polyphonic approach to novelization and the dialogical principle. These are also examined inter alia and applied to my analysis of the great uprisings chronicled here.

³ See my discussion of the relevance of Bakhtin and the need to go beyond Bakhtin in Annex 2.2 in this book. I have also discussed these in several of my literary criticism pieces.

Yasin became angry. "You just want to have a pointless argument! You speak out just to protect your territory. How could you know that this is a superstition? Do you have any real experience of your own?"

Murad replied, "People of this country will not progress even with education; all are walking backwards. All of you—whenever I see you--- remind me of this fact."

Yasin became angrier and said, "You have to no idea what the cries of dogs might mean."

"I said it before, half old wives' tales, half Pythagoras---that's the kind of intellect you all have. How many people in our country really believe that man reached the moon? Mental slavery is our eternal habit."

Gonzales stood up and said, "I cannot sit here any longer. I have some work to do. See you again soon...."

The author now cuts to the natural setting outside presenting a bit of semi-surrealist prose:

The evening had set in. Night has quite come yet; a kind of grey with dark blue hue---the sky will soon be surrounded in darkness. Far away, blood-colored smoke is pushing upwards. Like a fisherman's throw-net it is spreading slowly all over. Some eerie haunted part in the depth of the earth is sending forth these elements---now like pillars that will impale the sky mercilessly. Khoka sees a Parthenon being built in front of his eyes.

But Khoka's surrealist reverie is broken by all-too-prosaic Yasin who is a realist through and through:

"Somewhere there is a conflagration----" Yasin said as if he was hypnotized.

"Where do you think?"

"Cannot be sure---"

But the author wishes to keep the surrealist mode going in order to show the premonitions of things to come:

On all sides the blue darkness is moving like a drop scene of muslin, fluttering at times. Among tall trees and folded garden shrubs sighing faintly, some weightless gypsy dancer seems to be dancing all over the place. Frogs jumping in water on the roof, the concert of crickets all these ordinary sounds dress up and give meaning to this evening. One feels inside that just as the curtain lifts, the mysterious gypsy dancing will throw a goat-child on the wooden stage.

Yasin brings us back to the sordid reality:

"Murad, I am exhausted. Don't like this anymore."

"You are like this often."

"No, this time I feel as if I'll die suffocating."

"Perhaps it's that fire. I have no reaction to such things," Murad said. He continued, "Whatever is inevitable, will happen no matter how nervous we feel."

Yasin thought and said in a broken voice, “The gun shops have been looted. Prisoners are escaping. Fire here, fire there. Looting. These are not good signs.”

“As I just said, all events are leading to the same place---you’ll see if you just think a bit.” Khoka reclined in his seat and said, “I am totally fed up. Tell me everything.”

Murad had a sudden glow in his face and his eyes. Khoka was sizing him up, Murad could tell. He was on his guard, but he found Khoka’s eyes speaking a complex mist-surrounded language. “Do you recall the story of Hitler’s setting fire to the Reichstag? He did it to save himself from looming disaster.” Murad paused just a little. “Behind all these weird events recently there is an invisible hairy hand that smells of alcohol and gunpowder. Trying to stop the violence, I saw a lot of broken skulls. Everyone is on their guard now. Did you ever think that so many people will find their true identity so quickly? We have never felt so much solidarity. Amazingly, all the people in our land have become one. Those who want to cling to power must destroy this fortress of unity. They will manufacture situations that will justify this hateful repression. For the whole year we hear, ‘Yahya be careful!’ The people in power know that it’s not just a slogan. They know that what is sauce for the goose is also sauce for the gander. They are preparing and waiting. When time and the opportunity are right, they will pounce like hyenas.”

Yasin added, “Really, our capacity for thought has disappeared. We are just repeating whatever we hear whenever we hear anything.”

Khoka asked Murad in a disinterested voice, “Suppose all the demands are accepted?”

Murad answered most emphatically. “Never. They cannot accept the demands. As I said, all events are leading to the same outcome. Do you think from the experience so far that they have the capacity to march in step with the times? They played at conspiracies in the name of politics and thus lost whatever brains they had. Our local Quislings are also scared shitless. I am telling you, all of them will fall. Not one will survive. This is the magic of our alphabet. It started with Ayub Khan. This military rule. Sometimes with the mask of elections; at other times as naked repression. But now this is ending. Now this ghostly sacrificial ritual has come to the letter Y. Then Z, the sole of Chinese shoes, Zulfiqar Ali. That’s the end of the game. This is your book of music.”

Khoka said nothing. Just kept looking at the darkening evening silently.

Then we are back again to surrealistic images echoing the poems of the great Bangalee poet, Jeevananda Das:

The wind had started its dance over the water. A cat from the pages of Bangla poetry is grabbing the darkness with its paws like collecting small balls, keeping the darkness hidden there. Again, as if reciting the line, ‘come, the rainy season is here,’ it jumps in joy. As if a gypsy is dancing running from one end of the garden to the other, collecting those small balls again. Just like gathering the ice balls from a hailstorm during

his childhood. Why doesn't childhood come again and again? Actually, life itself is nothing but permanent childhood. Humans have no other capital. They live on the capital of their childhood. It is a strange life. Step by step these people make themselves small. Decline and fall in their very blood.

Yasin leaves the scene:

At some point, Yasin also got up and said, "Because of all these, my wedding had to be postponed...shit! The hell with these mass movements. The people just chose this time to give their mandate... I am leaving."

Khoka's subsequent mental peregrinations lead nowhere:

Khoka indulges in forward looking architecture building a mental plinth for the future, "I hope these ghostly ghastly spirits will never possess me." He refuses to stir up the oozing ugly poison inside his soul. How about keeping a mistress? How about making Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir our ideal idols? But how to acquire a French temperament? You can't do it with deltaic agriculture and cultivating jute. We are all imposters...living on the capital of 21 February. If we dissect the whole land with a tractor, we still will not find a real sophisticated thinker. All the so-called intellectuals are uncouth imposters. We need the sophistication of the ancients; we need the eyes of Max Ernst. Instead we go after our servant girls whenever there is an opportunity. In elite parties the suited and booted crowd scratch their behinds, burping loudly looking askance. They buy books about B-movies playing at the Naz cinema and display it in their showcases along with the shells from Cox's Bazaar and plastic toys in their drawing rooms. All people in this country are fake, all imposters who stand and wipe the sweat from their necks and spit their paan-colored spits with a *pich pich* sound.

Murad keeps staring at him silently. Khoka feels uneasy. His eyes like a light-winged butterfly fly about here and there---on the trees, on the leaves, in the womb of dreams.

All is a dream. We are born within a dream, we shout and scream within that dream, the glass breaks making a shattering noise...*jhan jhan*...The thick cream over the surface of milk trembles...*tir tir. Tir tir*...trembles the youthful hymen. We suck on breasts within that dream. We collect hailstones. We make garlands with *bakul* flowers. In that dream, Onju falls in the big pond. Within the same dream, Monju jumps to catch her. In that dream, Neela *Bhabi* becomes a showcase for glass bracelets. Inside that dream, Rajeev *Bhai* tries to grab hold of a rhythm. In that dream a Fiat flies about becoming a storm. In that dream Belley tears up her blouse. In that dream she gathers lipstick. In that dream Lulu Choudhury pulls someone by the ear. Inside that dream, Modigliani hurls many colors. In that dream, Ardhendu the revolutionary burns his entire face. In that dream, Matiur becomes a Robin. Inside that dream, Priti the revolutionary pours poison inside her own throat. In that dream, Parthenon plays a rhythm going *gong gong*. Inside that dream, sins transform into virtues. Inside that dream, Attila comes riding on his horse. Inside that dream, darkness screams wildly. Inside that dream, looking at the dream landscapes, we become dreams ourselves.

These are the things Khoka can imagine now.

Like a fly trapped inside a round transparent glass chimney, these dreams go round and round. Very near, by the lake, a few white swans; Khoka feels like these are in his dream. Black snow, blue moon, green sun, blood-rain, flesh-rain--- each a swan. Breasts, hails, pond, glass showcase, torn blouse, lipstick, hypostyle hall, poison, robin, all just feathers from the swan.

Khoka is in such a trance that an entire cigarette burns completely, silently between his fingers.

I, too, am a dream---like the swastika, crucifix and the star of Suleiman, I, too, am a dream. Khoka imagines on a bridge suspended between the well-preserved past and an uncertain future, like an abandoned infant swaddled in dirty clothes, he is engrossed in playing all the time.

But the present-absent intellectual finds his reference in literature:

“Murad, have you read *Le Horla*?”

“No. Why do you ask?”

“Never mind. There is a copy in my room. Read it. For the last few days my mind repeats *Le Horla... Le Horla... Le Horla... I don't get it.*”

“Sometimes you say such weird stuff!”

Finally, Khoka reveals his true inner anxiety and the conversation with Murad takes a new turn:

“I think what you think is right. Something terrible is about to happen.”

“They will thrash us like threshing rice paddy, that's all”, Murad said laughing.

“No, much more than that. Perhaps none of us will live; we'll all become bad dreams....”

Without any reason, Murad started to laugh even more than before and said, “Which one do you want? That millions of us will die with only a few of us alive, or just a few of us dying with the rest alive and unharmed?”

“No, I don't want either.”

Murad stopped; thought a little. Lit a cigarette. Then said, “Our country is on the road to become another Indonesia...”

“You have a great quality, Murad. You take everything lightly. But the very core of my heart and soul is trembling inside me....”

“Don't know about qualities---,” Murad flicked ashes off his cigarette. “I hate business as usual. I want change. Such a change that will break into smithereens all that is, will change everything. No difference between humans and the moss floating on water---I hate all these! We *Bangalees* have a tradition of changing

our thoughts with changing times. We are not to be slighted. We need to hit them hard just like the blows coming from the very devil.”

“So, we want to change our skins and become new like the snakes?”

“Don’t know if we want to be like the snakes,” Murad becomes hard-faced. “But we want change...that’s what makes us human. From change to growth. We *Bangalees* have a tradition to change and grow with the changed times; we are not to be trifled with.”

“Do you understand the difference between change and transformation?”

“What is the difference according to you?” Murad narrowed his eyes.

“Gregor Samsa became transformed into a worm.”

“You mean to say that you are suspicious of people who want to change our society. You are just like those in power who want to keep their position and fish in troubled waters. You have a few manias. One of them is to let yourself drown in the nightmarish hell.”

“Why are you looking at everything just with your eyes...?”

“And you are seeing everything with your ears...”

Khoka became impatient and shot back, “As if you never think of these bad stuff! What is the difference between them and us? Is it only that they wear khakis and we were loin clothes? Or is it that they are in boots and we have just sandals? If these are the only differences, then if necessary, we’ll wear khakis, get rifles. But we are not really like them. We cannot do what they can. At least we should not be able to do those. We should shrink and shiver in shame if we think that we can be like those Punjabi soldiers. But why? Violence, herd behavior, looting, murder, rape---these have no national origins---is that why? No, not that. We are humans. We are not thoughtless, heartless robots. Are you listening to me?”

Here Khoka shows his hidden depths. Both Khoka and Murad are well-read and at bottom thoughtful persons. The conversation goes on:

“Yes, I am listening!” Murad nodded. “Every communal riot reminds us of what material we are made.”

Khoka ignored Murad’s words completely. He said instead, “What do we say? We say they are all animals. It is not so hard to become fully animal from being half an animal in one leap---actually it is rather easy. We, the band of half animals are eager always to become fully animals. We look for the right environment of rot. Whenever the opportunity comes, we roar out expressing our animality. But I am saying that they are each a robot separately---not just an animal. If need arises, we can become fully animals from being half animals. But can you imagine that we could become robots?”

“I would rather that you stopped, Khoka! It is giving me the chills! Your habit is to drink from the skull what can be drunk from just a glass. You are a leader of the Bujingo gang; you convert willfully a cup of tea into a drink of hemlock.”

“Am I speaking such rubbish?”

“You always see everything in a crooked way. You twist every word and expression. Andolon(movement) is Andolon, period!” Murad interjected forcefully, “And why do you bring up the subject of robots again? I have heard this from you so many times that modern man is a robot...”

Khoka interrupted, “Do you remember Titan from Robertson’s story? Do you think it is just science fiction? What then is signified by *titanic*?”

Murad continued, “Whatever is happening here, or is about to happen, is not unthinkable, or unprecedented. It follows the logic of history. You cannot stop the fiery wrath of the masses now by manipulating them with lies and half-truths. In today’s world people want self-determination. They are forever on their guard. They will retaliate against all powers that stand in the way of their autonomy; all powers that want to thwart the masses’ move towards independence.”

Khoka was quick to retort, “These words are from the dustbin. You people mouth the same clichés year after year. At least you didn’t refer to Latin America. Don’t get too excited about the masses and self-determination. You just painted a picture mimicking the hired reporters of newspapers or the hired guns among the politicians. When you speak of today’s masses, you just want to separate a few among them like slicing a melon. Do you mean to say that these people today are so different from people yesterday? Do you really have some deep basis for this distinction between today’s people and yesterday’s? Where did you get this sharp sense of the distinction between yesterday and today?”

Murad was not a party to be overcome so easily. He shot back, “You just want to scare me with paranoid tales of ghosts and demons. Isn’t that the case? Contrariness is in your blood. You know and understand everything just like us. But you pretend not to and shift the burden to our shoulders.”

“A five-hundred-ton cobalt bomb can turn the whole planet into a Hiroshima in the blink of an eye. Is this human? Just because Russians had a revolution overthrowing the Tsar way back when, today’s Russians cannot be thought of as revolutionaries. Today in this Ramna restaurant will soon become yesterday. These relativities you must accept. But human beings are not from yesterday or today. All are human, all too human.” Khoka continued.

Murad became impatient. “Kindly keep your dissertation on relativity on hold for a while. There is no real point under the current circumstances to these pseudo-philosophical argumentations. You can close your own doors and practice voodoo...”

“You twisted my words again. OK, maybe that is for the best...” Khoka grumbles.

“Hearing about robots gives me the creeps! Perhaps I will not be able to talk with you about what I really came here today to discuss.”

“What did you want to discuss?”

“No, let this go for today. I am not feeling so well today anymore. This place does not have the right atmosphere with these open sewers like an infected wound! We should have sat down somewhere else....”

“Oh! This involves even the environment...what’s the matter?”

“Please don’t force me...” Murad said helplessly. “Nothing is normal for me today.”

“You are spoiling your sleep tonight for my sake?”

“But you cannot sleep at night at all...”

“Come off this playacting. Say what you want without all these games.”

“Well, if you insist. But if you hear this, you’ll be depressed. Still I need to tell you. That is why I wanted to come to you.”

“OK, OK! Go ahead.” Khoka looked at Murad with his big, sad eyes. Murad seemed tired. Little by little the mental stress is leading to a breakdown.”

“But you’ll feel sad, Khoka. No need to hear this...”

“Stop this whining. Tell me all.”

“Promise me that you won’t hate me after you hear this.”

“What’s the matter? Is it syphilis?”

“What nonsense!”

“Is syphilis nonsensical? Didn’t Baudelaire have it?”

“But I am not Baudlaire.”

“You never know. You may become Baudelaire after all. Don’t you realize after all this rapping that there is no difference between you and Baudelaire? If this is too hard and abstract look at some concrete things. This is perhaps easier for you. You do the same things as Baudlaire did. You write poetry. You have gone to the red-light areas at least a few times. You drink. You are even trying out translation. You just don’t have Baudelaire’s Venus who will suck you dry. But you can manage that. I can guess from your present state that those are things that attract you. Day by day you are looking the part too. Have you found someone? I know you like them to be big size and you like to have a lot of them. You don’t want a boat; you want a huge steamer. Why are you so shyly silent? Out with it!”

Murad said nothing. He just stared at Khoka with a strangeness matching the eyes of someone hypnotized by candleflames. As if he, the hunted was facing a hunter; his face was the face of one who is paralyzed from head to toe, one who can not bear the burden of his own weight.

“Let’s hear it. Out with it, now.”

“I know that you don’t want to hear it....”

“Bullshit!”

“I don’t like the feel of anything anymore. Let’s go. It is late. Ranju will worry about you.”

A complex distance separates them, becomes impassable. The tabletop, pack of cigarettes, ash tray, teacup all disappear. Between two friends, across the table there lies a cold steel blade of the sword.

Khoka paid the bill and came out. Before getting on a rickshaw, Murad said not a single word. A silent walk. Khoka kept on talking gesturing incessantly. Like a madman playing pingpong with darkness.

“See you again-----” Murad said, getting on a rickshaw.

Khoka, too, got on a rickshaw. Pulled down the hood. Darkness everywhere. Crickets crying. The night has become the Titanic sunk long ago. Soft breathing of the angelfish can not leave any marks on its body. Murad loves Ranju. But Ranju knows not even “L” of love. Poor thing! After a debate with himself, Khoka laughed out loudly. *Rakkhosh*---Monster!

I have made an attempt to enter into my account of those tumultuous days and nights from December 6, 1968 to March 25, 1971 via this imaginative scene because the times really were surrealistic with the monsters as well as dragon slayers. Or, I could present the narrative that follows in a mythopoetic form. Even the driest, most strait-laced factual account must confront the manifest surrealism and mythopoesis of this period in East Pakistan-Bangladesh. But to be sure, the whole world rose up during the late sixties with young people seeing and--- even more importantly--- showing glimpses of a new world.

Indeed, like Wordsworth’s description of his own mental state during the French Revolution in his *The Prelude*:

*“Bliss it was in that dawn to be alive
But to be young was very heaven.”*

Marred was this vision indeed by the arrogance and impetuousness of youth of the late 1960s, and their inexperienced romanticism untested in the crucible of fierce reality; but the heroism of the youth was also both real and surreal at the same time.

As the Indian global history scholar Srinath Raghavan describes the global situation in 1968-69 relying on the pioneering work of others---particularly, Jeremi Suri---there were more than twenty countries where the students picked up the banner of revolt in the name of peace, justice and protecting human dignity:

Nineteen sixty-eight was a year of global tumult triggered by student protests. The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) observed that “youthful dissidence, involving students and non-students alike, is a world-wide phenomenon. It is shaped in every instance by local conditions, but nonetheless there are striking similarities.” It went on to note, “Student protest is visible, highly vocal, increasingly militant and feared

by many to be interconnected world-wide . . . Student Power is no longer a chimera.⁴

The paragraph below reflects the current consensus regarding the 1960s student uprisings:

The upheavals of 1968 at once reflected and accentuated the incipient process of globalization, but they were also shaped by the other historical currents washing through the Sixties: The Cold War and de-colonization. The uprising in [East] Pakistan mirrored, in many respects, the movements in other parts of the world. First, in [East] Pakistan as elsewhere, the roots of the student movement lay in the expansion of higher education over the past two decades. The number of colleges affiliated with these universities also rapidly increased. Dhaka University, for example...⁵

There were several other dimensions as well:

Second, the student movement had gathered steam from earlier protests over educational issues. The Education Commission constituted by Ayub Khan had decided in 1962 to extend undergraduate education from two to three years, to tighten the grading criteria, and to provide only one opportunity for failed students to make good. The students felt that these steps would not only delay their entry into the employment market but also undermine their career prospects. This led to wide- spread protests in both the eastern and western wings, especially in East Pakistan. Since the mid-1960s, students had also been chafing at the government's interference in the functioning of universities and the ser- vile acquiescence of the university authorities. By 1968, reform of the university was as important to Pakistani students as to their counter- parts elsewhere.⁶

There was also an economic dimension:

⁴ Raghavan, 1971:15

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid. 16.

The postwar economic performance of Western Europe, Japan, and the United States had both benefited the Sixties generation and drawn their ire. As the West German student icon Rudi Dutschke observed, “Not until 1964–65 when the growth of industry suddenly sank from 6–8% per annum to 2.5–4% per annum did we begin to realise that capitalism had not eliminated its inherent contradictions.” Pakistan, too, had experienced an economic boom under Ayub Khan. Much of this impressive growth, however, benefited Pakistan’s small private sector. This was not an unintended consequence: Ayub’s economic policies—designed and implemented with Western assistance—were aimed at fostering the bourgeoisie. Between 1963 and 1968, the absolute number of impoverished people rose from 8.65 million to 9.33 million. Consciousness of this disparity grew after the revelation by the chief economist of the planning commission that a mere twenty-two families owned or controlled 66 per cent of the country’s industrial wealth and 87 per cent of banking and insurance. Among the student protesters, “22 families” became a favored slogan.⁷

There was also a generational dimension, but this should not be overemphasized for East Pakistan as Raghavan tended to do in his book. True that young students did not have the commitment to Pakistan in the same way some of the parents still did. But what is more true is that regardless of generation young and old in East Pakistan of all generations were largely disillusioned and no longer believed the slogans of the Ayub regime such as the so-called decade of development under Ayub Khan’s dictatorship under the guise of a sham “basic democracy”.

Thus, it is more accurate to say as Raghavan does later, that:

The students were also acutely alert to the fact that the authoritarian, military-bureaucratic regime was being propped up by the Cold War alliances in which Pakistan was entangled.⁸

Indeed, looking backwards at those tumultuous times, one is struck by the leaps in critical consciousness of young people almost everywhere in the world. In East Pakistan as in Vietnam or Palestine this leap in consciousness was also matched by immense political and moral

⁷ Ibid.16

⁸ Ibid. 17

courage. The young people in East Pakistan in particular vindicated Fanon's theses on revolt of the slaves against the masters, even though the chief Master, General Ayub had a completely hypocritical tome with the grossly deceptive title, "Friends not Masters" ghost-written for him.

However, one can also put too much emphasis in these dialectics of incipient globality and comparatively less emphasis on domestic contradictions. This is indeed a major weakness of Raghavan's treatment. In contrast, this book will not ignore the external factors but will emphasize in detail the domestic, internal contradictions as primary and determinant in the last instance. This thesis also implies that the goals of the revolution in Bangladesh are still unreachd. But what was accomplished by 1972 and then lost in 1975 and subsequent years was by no means trivial. At the end, the liberation of Bangladesh was the achievement of an entire people where the young took the initial courageous steps against tremendous odds. Indeed, their attitudes were death-defying with complete contempt for their oppressors. What follows is a tale of the courage and heroism of an entire people from all walks of life, ultimately. But the initial credit belongs to the young students, workers and peasants.

During the process of writing this book I became acutely aware of the lack of a coherent theoretical framework for describing such movements phenomenologically. The accounts become either journalistic with an implicit empiricism, or they impose a rigid ideological straitjacket on the movements of a living history. Even the great book by John Reed about the October revolution is not free from this defect. I found the solution initially in extending some Bakhtinian concepts related to the dialogical principle. But at the end I had to develop a broader and deeper framework rooted in the historical experience of revolutionary anti-imperialist struggles during the cold war. Hence, my concept of the *polyphonic prose-poetry* of revolutionary mass movements (PPP of RMM).⁹

However, the theoretical problem does not end with the invention and development of the PPP of RMM. This solves the problem of giving a foundation for the description made vivid in a (post-)Sartrean manner via this phenomenological foundation.¹⁰ But the deeper problem of finding a political ontology appropriate for such movements remains. Here, too, I wrestled first

⁹ For details please see the Annex 2.1 in this book with further references cited there.

¹⁰ Here I have been mindful of the poststructuralist criticisms of phenomenology and of Husserlian type of phenomenology in particular. The careful reader will also notice my critique of structuralism founded on a Saussurean sharp distinction between the signifier and the signified.

with a Deleuzian differential ontology, only to find it inadequate to the task. Next I tried Badiou's ontology of events which I had critiqued sympathically before. Building on my former critique, I was finally able to develop the concept of eventualizing dynamic (or DynEven). The main insight I arrived at eventually revolved around recognizing the fuzzy dynamics of events that led ontologically to a dynamic development of Eventualization. That is to say, a number of fuzzy even inchoate (micro) events lead up to the revolutionary nodal point(s) which comprise the *Eventualizing Dynamics (ED)*, or *Dyneven in an acronym*. The idea of *Dyneven* combines dynamism, unevenness of development and the ontology of the Event to emphasize a creative flow that is definitely uneven but quite forceful even as the force field fluctuates (Dyne is one of the units of force in physics) in order to distinguish my *continuity- with- contradictions* leading to a *dialectical qualitative leap* towards fundamental systemic change in line with the current mathematics of the dynamic systems theory among other things.¹¹

Annex 1.1 The struggles of peasants and workers in East Bengal/Pakistan---very brief historical background

The history of peasants' and workers' struggles in today's Bangladesh predates the founding of Pakistan. Without repeating that history, here I want to sketch very briefly the early struggles from 1948 quickly and then move to the struggles from 1966 onwards.

After the so-called independence as the East wing of Pakistan, the peasant movements did not stop. Rather from 1949 onwards, mainly under the leadership of the communists, the East witnessed Hajong rebellion, movements by the lowercaste peasants, other poor peasants particularly in the Northern districts including indigenous groups like the Santals. Along with this the development of industries in Chittagong, Dhaka-Narayanganj area and Tongi created a small but militant industrial working class. To this could be added the lower level public employees and poor teachers and other low-income white collar workers. Thus the social basis of the worker-peasant-student-lower middle class unity was being prepared by a historical process.

It should be recalled that on the day of the first provincewide action on the 6-points, the workers joined with demands of their own. The first martyr of the 6-point movement was a worker from

¹¹ See the Annex 2.2 of this book for an elaboration and further references.

Tejgaon industrial area, Mr. Mono Mian. As we will see in the following chapters, increasingly workers and peasants got involved---particularly starting in 1968-69. So much so that a new technique of struggle of the poor workers and in some instances poor peasants called Gherao (surround) developed and was used quite effectively against the exploiting classes. The 11-point demands developed in early January 1969 reflected some of the demands from the workers and peasants. The testimonies of poor peasants I collected during several field research trips in rural Bangladesh---particularly in the 1990s and early 2000s, confirm the participation of poor peasants. The testimonies gathered by other researchers and collected in various books by Prof. Atiur Rahman, Afsan Chowdhury, documents of liberation war volumes and sources in the archives of the liberation war museum in Dhaka also corroborate my own findings. For workers, the statements by Comrade Mohammad Toaha, Abul Bashar, Haider Akbar Khan Rano, Kazi Zafar Ahmed, Rashed Khan Menon and others confirm my findings regarding the groundswell among the workers and the lower middle class during the late 1960s.

It was the political genius of *Bangabandhu* to realize that without the worker-peasant support a militant movement for autonomy would be impossible. With his organizing skills, *Bangabandhu* was able to take the AL leadership much closer to the people than the older leadership after the parting of their ways with Bhashani would have been able to do. Herein lies the foundations of the great historic leadership of *Bangabandhu* in the liberation movement.

Chapter 2:

Background: False Dawn of August 1947 and March Towards the Six and Eleven Points

In order to understand the context of the great revolt of the masses from 1968 onwards fully, we have to present--- albeit briefly--- the historical context that led to the opportunity for a democratic election in 1970 and then the liberation war in 1971 after the great noncooperation movement in March that year. For this we have to begin with the beginnings of inequality in a strange country called Pakistan with two parts separated by 1400 Kilometers of enemy (Indian) territory. As is well known, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, or as he was known throughout the 1940s, 50s and 60s Sheikh Mujib or just Mujib who was given the title *Bangabandhu* (the friend of Bengal) by the people of East Pakistan during a particularly important phase of the struggle for liberation in 1969, was the first Prime Minister (1972-75) and then President (1975) of Bangladesh, played an important role along with the other progressive forces and leaders in fighting for the democratic rights of the people right from the beginning of his political life in the 1940s. After 1947, he joined those who realized that the dawn of the so-called independence from the British was indeed a false dawn. His active role in the Bangladesh Liberation movement has led many to dub him as “Father of the Nation” since 1971-72. A charismatic leader and undoubtedly an anti-imperialist, it is not always recognized that in his own way, *Bangabandhu* Mujib was an advocate of democratic socialism, which he believed to be the best solution to poverty and unemployment. Having been jailed multiple times throughout his fight for the independence of East Pakistan, what would later become Bangladesh, *Bangabandhu* Mujib became a political icon and figure of inspiration for his people.

As my discussion of his activities leading to three of his most significantly substantive and inspiring speeches in my previous book has shown, he was then and can be again an inspiration for the oppressed people demanding justice and human rights everywhere. Below I present in the briefest possible outline the contours of the post-1947 history of East Pakistan that will lead us to a deeper look at the events and processes at work from 1968 through 1971. Inter alia, we will also have more than a glimpse of both the role of the broad left and progressive forces and of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s gradual development as a political thinker and practitioner leading upto the events of 1969-70 and his pre-election speech of October 28, 1970.

At the dawn of the so-called independence of Pakistan, a prescient progressive Pakistani poet saw through the illusion and emphasized the need for unceasing struggle of the people for real freedom. The poet was none other than Faiz Ahmed Faiz, who captured the essence of that moment in 1947 in a poem ‘Freedom’s Dawn (August 1947)’:

*Ye dagh dagh ujala, ye shab-gazida sahar
 Wo intizar tha jis-ka, ye wo sahar to nahin,
 Ye wo sahar to nahin jis-ki arzu lekar
 Chale the yar ke mil-jaegi kahin na kahin
 Falak ke dasht men taron ki akhri manzil,
 Kahin to hoga shab-e sust mauj ka sahil,
 Kahin to jake rukega safina-e-gham-e-dil.
 Jawan lahu ki pur-asrar shahrahon se
 Chale jo yar to daman pe kitne hath pare;
 Dayar-e-husn ki be-sabr khwabgahon se
 Pukarti-rahin bahen, badan bulate-rahe;
 Bahut aziz thi lekin rukh-e-sahar ki lagan,
 ...
 Subuk subuk thi tamanna, dabi dabi thi thakan.*

*Suna hai ho bhi chuka hai firaq-e-zulmat-o-nur
 Suna hai ho bhi chuka hai visal-e-manzil-o-gam;
 Badal-chuka hai bahut ahl-e-dard ka dastur,
 Nishat-e-vasl halal o azab-e-hijr haram.
 Jijar ki ag, nazar ki umang, dil ki jalan,
 Kisi pe chara-e-hijran ka kuchh asar hi nahin.
 Kahan se ai nigar-e-saba, kidhar kho gai?
 Abhi charagh-e-sar-e-rah ko kuchh khabar hi nahin;
 Abhi girani-e-shab men kami nahin ai,
 Najat-e-dida-o-dil ki ghari nahin ai;
 Chale-chalo ke wo manzil abhi nahin ai.*

This malformed daybreak,
 night’s fangs have mangled cruelly our dawn —
 This is not that long-awaited break of day.
 Not the clear beginning for which those comrades
 Set out, convinced that in heaven’s wide realm
 Somewhere must be the stars’ ultimate halting place,

Somewhere the corner of night's slow-washing tide,
 Somewhere a resting place for the ship of heartache.
 When we started, we dear comrades, taking youth's hidden
 Pathways, how many hands grasped our sleeves!
 From beauty's homes and their windows
 Soft arms called us back, flesh cried out to us;
 But dearer was the lure of dawn's bright cheek,
 Closer her shimmering robe of fairy rays;
 Light-winged that longing, feather-light that toil.
 But now, word goes, the birth of day from darkness
 Is done, wandering feet stand at their goal;
 Our leaders' ways are altering....¹²

Faiz then asks despondently a few lines later,

Where did that fine breeze, that the wayside lamp
 Had once felt, blow from? where has it gone?
 Night's heaviness persists still...¹³

He then invites all of us to face the truth and march forward in the teeth of bitter oppression towards genuine freedom:

...the hour
 Of mind and spirit's liberation has not struck;
 We must go on; we have not yet reached our goal.¹⁴

Just like Faiz, it also did not take long for the most conscious Bengali leaders and student activists in Muslim league to realize that the West Pakistani leaders did not care about the problems and concerns of the East Pakistanis. In 1949, progressives led mainly by activists like Bhashani, Mujib, Shamsul Haque and others from East Pakistan broke away from Pakistan Muslim League.

¹² Faiz Ahmed Faiz, English translation by Haider A. Khan

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

Together they founded the Awami Muslim League with Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani as the founding chairperson. The official date for the founding of the All Pakistan Awami Muslim League is given as 23 June 1949. However, the preparation for a progressive movement for justice and self-determination by those who would become the pioneers of Bengali national liberation began almost immediately after the founding of Pakistan and the emergence of deep differences between the progressives in East Pakistan and the central leaders of ML from West Pakistan with a few conservative supporters in East Pakistan. Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani and Shamsul Huq were elected the first President and General Secretary of the party respectively, Aatur Rahman Khan was elected the Vice-President, and Yar Mohammad Khan was elected as the treasurer. Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani was sympathetic to the communists and other left forces and a staunch opponent of US foreign policy during the cold war. We will see that this will be one factor that will lead to his breaking with H.S. Suhrawardy who joined the Awami League in 1953.

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Khondaker Mushtaq Ahmad and A. K. Rafiqul Hussain were elected the party's first Joint Secretaries. But it was Sheikh Mujibur Rahman who played the leading role among the younger tier of AL leaders. It is important to realize that *Bangabandhu* Mujib and others like him supported the human rights of all people in Pakistan against the powerful feudal establishment that formed the ruling clique of the ruling party, the Muslim League. Therefore, it is not surprising that he became the General Secretary of the party within four years in 1953.

The Council Meeting of the AL was significant in at least two respects. The first was the proposal by Maulana Bhashani for dropping the word 'Muslim' from the party's name so that it could be open to all denominations in a democratic secular manner. The second revolution regarding the electoral procedures was brought forth by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. According to Kamruddin Ahmad's recollections in his autobiography, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman added further:

“In 1949 this party was formed in an effort that combined the popular forces and the intelligentsia in order to fight against oppression and injustice. We are united in our view that Awami League should lead all opposition forces according to these principles.

We must be ever vigilant so that we the intelligentsia do not become alienated from the people as befell the conventionalists in France.”¹⁵

It is remarkable that the young AL leader was referring to an intricate period of the great French revolution. The conventionalists he referred to were most probably the left-center coalition that called itself the National Party during the first phase of the French revolution.¹⁶

In events leading up to the events on 21 February 1952, the progressive organizations of East Pakistan including the forces close to the semi-underground Communist Party,¹⁷ Awami Muslim League and its student wing played an important part in the Bengali Language Movement. On 21 February, 1952 Pakistani police fired upon thousands of students and other protesters. Their only crime in the eyes of the Pakistan rulers was demanding that Bengali be declared an official language of Pakistan. The martyrs from the Bengali Language Movement include Abdus Salam, Rafiq Uddin Ahmed, Abul Barkat and Abdul Jabbar. The events of 1952 generated energy among the people in today's Bangladesh and made it possible for bold young leaders like *Bangabandhu* to evolve. Indeed, these critical events can be and have been interpreted by historians as a crucial turning point in the history of Pakistan and the Bengali speaking people. Ultimately though not just by itself there will be more powerful movements that led to the elections of 1970 and the liberation struggle for Bangladesh. *Bangabandhu* Sheikh Mujib will eventually become the key leader of the people in the liberation struggle.

It should be emphasized here that already politically aware Bengalis were realizing that in supposedly independent Pakistan there was in fact an internal colonial system. Although East Pakistan contributed more to building national wealth, it was the ruling elite from West Pakistan

¹⁵ Ahmad, 1979:4

¹⁶ The "National Party", representing the center or center-left of the assembly, included Mirabeau, Lafayette, and Bailly

¹⁷ The history of the communist parties in India and Pakistan since 1947 is complex. CPI held its second congress in 1948 in Kolkata. B.T. Ranadive was elected the general secretary. His thesis which determined the strategy and tactics of CPI subsequently was for an armed revolution immediately. Subsequent events showed that this line was ultraleft and adventurist. This line was adopted in Pakistan, particularly in East Pakistan. Many activists fought heroically but the movement was defeated. In 1948 CPI had already formed two fraternal parties---one in India and one in Pakistan. The latter was for all practical purposes an underground party facing repression. Given the huge geographic distance between the two wings of Pakistan, in 1956 the Eastern Wing members formed the Communist Party of East Pakistan. Earlier, the party had formed a student wing called the East Pakistan Student Union (EPSU) which played a progressive role throughout the many struggles in East Pakistan.

that appropriated this wealth. In the 1950s, a group of Bengali economists advanced the thesis of two economies based on their observations and systematic data collection. Professor Nurul Islam who later became the first Deputy Chairperson of the Bangladesh Planning Commission writes:

The idea that Pakistan consisted of not one, but two economies was advanced for the first time in 1956 as the basis for the formulation of development plans for Pakistan at the Special Conference for Economists of East Pakistan on the draft first Five-Year Plan of Pakistan (1956-1960). This conference was held at Dhaka at the end of August 1956. The main idea of the concept was elaborated in the Report of the Special Conference of Economists of East Pakistan on the Draft Five Year Plan which was submitted to the Pakistan Planning Commission on September 1, 1956. The following quotations from the report are self-explanatory: ‘For purposes of development planning, particularly for the creation of employment opportunities, Pakistan should be conceived as consisting of two economic units.’...‘The problem of planning in Pakistan is best approached by considering the basic characteristics of the two wings, particularly the heavy pressure of population in East Pakistan, the comparative lack of employment opportunities and the high degree of immobility of labour between the two wings.’¹⁸

That report went on to add:

The primary requisite for planning in our opinion is a complete zonal breakdown of statistics, namely national income, balance of payments and financial resources---internal and external.¹⁹

The report was prepared and signed by ten Bengali economists. The conference approved it without dissent. However, the subsequent events demonstrated that such rational planning was beyond the political capacity of the West Pakistani leaders. Their political imaginary of a state based on religious solidarity among unequal groups could not accommodate an objective analysis of economic, political and cultural domination of the West over the East. Even in 1966

¹⁸ Nurul Islam. “The Two Economies Thesis: Road to the Six Points Programme”. *The Daily Star*, 22 June 2014; also, Nurul Islam. *Bangladesh--- The Making of a Nation: An Economist’s Tale* (Dhaka: UPL) 2003.

¹⁹ Nurul Islam added with a note of sadness both the names of all the signatories and noted that he was the only one alive in 2014. He wrote in 2014: “I was the youngest member of the group having returned from Harvard only a year before in 1955 and having joined as an associate professor in the same year. The authors were M.N. Huda, Mazharul Huq, A. Razzak, Nurul Islam, A. Sadeque, A. Farouk, A.N.M. Mahmood, Md. Safiullah Muhammad Hossain and Shafiqur Rahman. I say with great sadness that I am the only surviving member among the signatories.” During my conversation with Dr. Huda at Cornell in 1978, I was able to get the same story from him. Dr. Huda was one of the first---perhaps the first---Bengali economist to get his Ph.D. from the world-renowned Cornell Department of Agricultural Economics.

as a more clear-sighted economist from the West, Dr. Mahbub ul Haq would admit, the disparities were not only there but were growing.^{20 21}

Without rehearsing the painful events leading up to the dismantling of the flawed 1956 constitution that denied--- indeed obliterated--- the fact that East Pakistan had the majority of voters, I note here simply the declaration of the Martial Law in October 1958 and the ascendance of General Ayub Khan from West Pakistan to political power through his 27 October coup.

Through his so-called Political Parties Elected Bodies Disqualification Ordinance (EBDO), Ayub banned overnight all major political parties in Pakistan. Most senior politicians, including the leaders of all progressive parties and all top leaders of the Awami League, were arrested and lawsuits were fabricated against many.

In farcical dictatorial move in 1962, Ayub Khan presented a new undemocratic constitution. Following the advice of his American consultants he devised an electoral college. His propagandists called it 'Basic Democracy'. Veteran politicians like Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, Nurul Amin, Khwaja Nazimuddin, Maulvi Farid Ahmed and Hamidul Haq Chowdhury organized a National Democratic Front against Ayub Khan's military-backed dictatorship. Their ultimate goal was to restore elective democracy.²²

²⁰ Later when I was a Ph.D. student at the Cornell University in Ithaca, NY, I had the opportunity to meet Dr. Haq for the first time in 1978 and immediately asked him about the two economies thesis. Subsequently, we became personally and professionally quite close. In 1978 and in many subsequent meetings, he always told me with great sadness in his voice that not addressing the legitimate demands of Bengalis led ultimately to the demise of united Pakistan. I might add that Mahbub ul Haq Bhai, as I came to address him was a great lover of left-wing Urdu poets like the great Faiz Ahmed Faiz and deeply cared about social and economic justice. I spent many evenings with him in Washington DC, reciting Faiz's poems. I especially enjoyed singing Faiz Ahmed Faiz's ghazals for Mahbub ul Haq Bhai.

²¹ However, Prof. Nurul Islam who is the unimpeachable authority on the negotiations with the West Pakistanis and for whom I have the highest respect personally and professionally, wrote to me after reading the above note that during the debates with the West Pakistanis Dr. Haq opposed quite strongly the Bengali positions and proposals. To err on the side of charity with respect to Dr. Haq in the later years when he spoke with me, one could say that he might have realized after the creation of Bangladesh through war and destruction, what a grave error it was on his part and other Pakistanis to take the position they did earlier. It is impossible to say for sure because he never made a direct confession. My conclusion is that based on all available evidence. I would accept Prof. Islam's characterization of the debates during the 1950s and 1960s.

²² See Mahmood, Akhtar. 2019. An unlikely partnership: *Bangabandhu* and Suhrawardy, Dhaka Tribune, December 6.

https://www.dhakatribune.com/opinion/op-ed/2019/12/06/an-unlikely-partnership-bangabandhu-and-suhrawardy?fbclid=IwARInatE_XqVaQY7c76D3-GE-VT8SmCAEL3Pd3GQFNuadeoBdjme2RusB2H0

During this period in contrast with these traditional politicians, Sheikh Mujib was in touch with student activists and other left-wing leaders because he realized that without mass movement organized and led by activists of mass parties no gains were possible. It was during this time that he met secretly with leftists to discuss not only the autonomy of East Pakistan but, if necessary and possible, its ultimate political independence. However, he understood that this would not be the right strategy for the early 1960s. Therefore, he focused his energies on reviving AL as a proper mass political party. It was under his leadership that AL was revived immediately after the death of Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy. Mujib and his followers rebuilt AL in especially rural East Pakistan.

The working committee of the AL met under its then chairman Maulana Abdur Rashid Tarkabagish who was from Pabna. *Bangabandhu* Sheikh Mujibur Rahman fought for the line of reviving the AL in that important meeting. He said: “The Awami League faces now a historical national mission. Only the Awami League can accomplish this task. Our final word is the liberation of the *Bangalee* nation. We must be ready to fight for a long time for accomplishing this mission.”²³ During this time NAP under the leadership of Maulana Bhashani was also engaged in a similar discussion and debate. In fact, NAP was revived next month on March 1, 1964.

Facing internal opposition, *Bangabandhu* chose the path of open democratic discussion and decision making. From March 6, 1964 in Green Road, Dhaka the party held a three days long conference. Some representatives from West Pakistan also participated in this conference. As a result of this open debate, the AL became better organized as a proper mass political party. At the same time, *Bangabandhu* became the acknowledged leader of the AL and argued that there was systemic discrimination against the East Pakistanis.²⁴

The ideas of older economists like Prof. M.N. Huda, Prof. Nurul Islam, Dr. Sadeque and especially young economists like Professor Rehman Sobhan who advanced the thesis of internal

²³ Mazharul Islam, *Bhasha Andolon o Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib* (Dhaka: Agamee Prokashoni) 1993:211; Abdul Haque. *Lekhoker Rojnamchay Char Doshoker Rajniti-porikroma 1953-1993.* (Dhaka: UPL):86-87

Intelligence Branch Report, F/N 606-48 PF-part-25

²⁴ See Mahmood, Akhtar. 2019. An unlikely partnership: *Bangabandhu* and Suhrawardy, Dhaka Tribune, December 6.

https://www.dhakatribune.com/opinion/op-ed/2019/12/06/an-unlikely-partnership-bangabandhu-and-suhrawardy?fbclid=IwARInatE_XqVaQY7c76D3-GE-VT8SmCAEL3Pd3GQFNuadeoBdjme2RusB2H0

colonialism on the basis of two economies helped the cause of clarifying the nature and goals of the autonomy movement tremendously. Sheikh Mujib's influence based on this thesis and his dedication to the cause of autonomy made him immensely influential both within and outside the AL.

Prof. Islam (2014) gives a most intriguing account of his being able to test the two economies thesis and the political use of it as well. Here are his account and analysis:

I had an opportunity to test this framework in the course of the preparation of the report of the Prices Commission appointed by the government of Pakistan in February 1960 to investigate the rapid and high rise in prices during 1959-60. I was the only economist member from East Pakistan. The concept of Two Economies essentially postulated that all economic issues such as the rise in prices had to be looked at and analysed separately for East and West Pakistan. The degree of inflation was much higher in the East than in the West; the reasons for inflation and ameliorative measures needed were also different. I met stiff resistance from the West Pakistan members of the Commission. This novel way of looking at the economic issues in Pakistan was anathema to them -- it smelled of separatist tendencies. I was obliged to submit a supplementary and separate note of my own to the Commission's report.

The next step was to raise this concept directly with the highest political authority in Pakistan, President Ayub Khan. In May 1961, a group of economics professors of Dhaka University were invited by him to discuss face-to-face the problems of underdevelopment in East Pakistan and interregional disparity and possible remedial measures. The group consisted of M.N. Huda, A.F.A. Hussain, Abdullah Farouk (in the absence of Mazharul Huq) and Nurul Islam. At the end of a long and surprisingly frank exchange of views we were requested to submit a written memorandum incorporating our analysis and recommendations. The memorandum was submitted to him in June 1961. As the youngest member of the group, the task of drafting the report was given to me. After it was agreed to and approved by the group it was sent to President Ayub Khan's secretary. Since I am the only surviving member of the group, it is my duty to remind the younger generations of the contributions of my departed colleagues.

The most important features of the memorandum (the entire document is reproduced in my book *Bangladesh-Making of a Nation*) were expansion and detailed elaboration of the suggestions made in the earlier report of East Pakistan economists. The main analysis and recommendations of the memorandum were as follows: At the heart of the concept of Two Economies was the immobility of labour between the two wings of Pakistan. Therefore, investment in one wing did not create employment

opportunities in the other wing since investment in one wing did not enable labour in the other wing to take advantage of opportunities in the former. This was aggravated by the limited mobility of capital and very high cost of transportation. Moreover, in many cases the cost of goods imported from another wing was higher than the import cost of very similarly priced goods from abroad because of the very high cost of transportation from the other wing.

To select investment projects on the basis of their returns, irrespective of their geographical location, would result in low investment for East Pakistan and widening disparity. This was because economic returns in many cases were high in West Pakistan because of its built-in advantages in respect of physical and social infrastructure which were inherited from pre-independence days, and this was not sought to be balanced or offset by increased investment in East Pakistan in the post-independence years. Worse still, after independence the bulk of the non-development expenditures of the central government as well as overwhelming proportion of large defense expenditures were spent in West Pakistan, which added heavily to the imbalance in infrastructure. The multiplier effects of such expenditures increased income and resources, which in turn fueled private and public investment in West Pakistan. The latter, in turn, was actively promoted in the West by the discriminatory allocation of foreign exchange earnings and foreign aid to the West as well as by a liberal supply of credit to the private sector in the West.

Therefore, the development policy on the basis of Two Economies concept required that the objective of income generation and employment should be considered separately for East and West Pakistan. Accordingly, the following concrete suggestions were made:

Independent quantitative targets for the growth in income and employment should be articulated for the two regions. Two separate regional plans should be formulated to meet independent targets for each wing.

The estimation of comparative costs in the two regions should be made in the dynamic context and therefore should include or encompass the indirect effects of the future development of social and physical overhead capital. Similarly, the costs of production of commodities in the East that were traded with the West should be compared not with the absolute costs in West but with the landed costs in East of imports from West.

In addition, the cost comparisons between East and West should be modified or adjusted wherever necessary to take into account the pressing need for expanding employment opportunities in East.

Finally, there should be a constitutional provision which should make the equal development of both wings of Pakistan, let us say within a period of 20 years or so, the major responsibility of the central government. To achieve such a goal, it was further recommended that the proportion of total investment in East should increase from 30% in 1960-65 to 60% in 1975-80.

The strategy of the report was to take Ayub Khan at his word about his interest in accelerating development in East and reducing interregional disparity, and to suggest to him as the head of the central government the ways in which his government could attain such an objective.

The next step was to suggest that if Ayub Khan decided that the central government should take no such responsibility, a satisfactory solution would be to separate the resources of the two regions and let them develop on the basis of their own resources. For this alternative scenario the following specific suggestions were made: The centre would have the responsibility of only three functions -- defense, foreign affairs and some aspects of inter-wing communications.

The monetary and credit policies of each region would be conducted by the local board of directors of the State Bank of Pakistan even though the same currency would be there.

All government revenues as well as domestic and foreign exchange resources should accrue to the respective regions in which they originate. The two regions would contribute to the expenses of the central government according to the ability to pay and benefits derived from central expenditures.

The report concluded by saying that if the above suggestions were accepted an expert group could work out the details. It added that "the present group is also studying this problem and might be in a position to submit a paper on the subject as and when required."

There was no response from Ayub Khan's secretariat to the report, and it transpired that it was sent for examination by his trusted advisers, the planning and finance ministers. The latter branded this group as either misguided dupes of politicians or, worse still, motivated by crass ambitions for political power. They, therefore, advised Ayub Khan to pay no attention to the report.

It should be noted, however, that comparable suggestions, specially about the severely restricted functions of the central government, had been made since mid- fifties. For example, the United Front Party in its Twenty One Point Program suggested a central government with three subjects only -- defense, foreign affairs and currency.

To refer back to our memorandum to Ayub, it needs to be stressed that it was not considered a secret document even though it was submitted by a small group of economists. The members of the group were left free to share the reports with interested persons of their choice. As a result, a large number of economists of the time came to know of its basic contents and main recommendations, if not all the technical details. Following the above-mentioned East Pakistan economists' report of 1956, which was widely publicized in the press and on the platform, the Two Economies thesis and inter-regional economic disparity were the most dominant themes in discussions about the economic development of East in public forums of all kinds comprising economic journalists, informal economists and public intellectuals. This memorandum with its detailed arguments and recommendations added powerful ammunition to this public discourse on East –West economic relations.

As far as I was concerned, I must record that in the first place not only had I shared the report but had also discussed in detail the full contents of the document -- all the arguments and recommendations -- with my close friend and colleague Rehman Sobhan in the course of writing the report as well as the preparation of the final report. We were both engaged in public discourse on the subject. The main contents were also conveyed by me to various professional colleagues who were engaged in writing or discussing this subject.

Secondly, I distributed copies of the report to the East Pakistan members of the Ayub cabinet to mobilise their support for its recommendations. The two cabinet members from East who were very interested in our memorandum were Justice Ibrahim and A.K. Khan. Justice Ibrahim, who was the vice chancellor when I was professor, was so interested that he sent to Ayub Khan a memo incorporating the suggestions of the report.

Thirdly, while the memorandum was submitted in May/June 1961, Ayub appointed a Finance Commission in October of the same year to recommend (a) division of sources of revenue between the centre and the provinces and (b) the allocation of central revenues including taxes, foreign aid and domestic borrowing between the two regions. I was appointed a member of the Commission, and was the only economist as well, as the non-official member of the Commission from East. As it was evident that the contents of the memorandum were germane to this task, I shared the report with the East Pakistan members of the Commission. Mr. D.K. Power, as the additional chief secretary (development) of East Pakistan, was, so to speak, the leader of the East Pakistan contingent of the Finance Commission. He took serious interest in it.

In the meanwhile, the economists of East Pakistan -- many of whom were by then cognisant of the contents of the memorandum to Ayub -- continued to carry on the public discourse about the detailed policy implications of the Two Economies thesis along the same lines. For example, an East Pakistan group known as the National Association for Economic and Social Progress, consisting of, among others, Rehman Sobhan, Kamal Hossain, Mosharraf Hossain, etc. wrote in 1966 -- one year after the submission of the above memorandum -- a pamphlet entitled *The Challenge of Disparity*. It was drafted by Rehman Sobhan and contained almost the same central features as the memorandum.

As the struggle for regional autonomy, in which *Bangabandhu* Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was deeply engaged since the early fifties, gained momentum, he launched his full-blown Six Points Program in 1966. This included political as well as several economic components, as described above, and thus in fact proposed a very loose confederation of East and West Pakistan with a strong potential for a breakup. The rest is history.²⁵

The key political step taken in 1964 by *Bangabandhu* was the revival of the AL against the opposition of older leaders and even Rashed Suhrawardy, the son of the great leader H.S. Suhrawardy.²⁶ Rashed Suhrawardy came to Dhaka from London and supported those who were against reviving the AL as a mass political party.²⁷ The persistence of *Bangabandhu* with support from some senior leaders such as Maulana Abdur Rashid Tarkabagish and younger leaders like Tajuddin along with even younger student leaders and their support base, the student activists

²⁵ Nurul Islam. "The Two Economies Thesis: Road to the Six Points Programme". *The Daily Star*, 22 June 2014; also, Nurul Islam. *Bangladesh-- The Making of a Nation: An Economist's Tale* (Dhaka: UPL) 2003.

²⁶ This step also gave *Bangabandhu* and the AL to contest the flawed so-called "Basic Democratic" elections on a principled basis by outlining the key demands for economic, social and political justice in the AL election manifesto. A young professor named Rehman Sobhan was involved in working out the main points in this manifesto. Therefore, 1970 manifesto of the AL and *Bangabandhu's* very substantive and principled speech on October 28, 1970 had deep historical roots that really reflected popular aspirations and demands for justice. To quote from a letter to the author on January 5, 2020:

"It is interesting that you cited his pre-election speech of October 1970 where I was involved in the drafting. Interestingly, he made another such public statement on the eve of the 1964 Presidential Election under Ayub Khan, challenging the dictator's claims of developmental success. He had invited me to help him prepare this statement though I was then only 29 years old. In both the 1964 and 1970 speech Tajuddin Ahmad was an important contributor."

²⁷ M.H. R. Talukdar ed. *Memoirs of Huseyn Shahid Suhrawardy*, (Dhaka: 1078) p. xv
See also Kamruddin Ahmad, *Sociopolitical history of Bengal and the Birth of Bangladesh*, (Dhaka: 1975); Shamsul Huda Harun. *The Making of the Prime Minister H.S. Suhrawardy* (Dhaka: Institute of Liberation Bangladesh and Bangladesh studies) 2001; Oli Ahad. *Jatiya Rajniti 1945 theke 1971*. (Dhaka: Khoshroj Kitab Mahal) 1997.

themselves led quickly to a revival of the AL on a more progressive basis than under Suherawardy and his older followers.

The students will time and again prove to be one of the key motive forces of progressive movement in East Pakistan under the military dictatorships. Prof. Rehman Sobhan has given us a fine account of his own experience in Dhaka University in the early 1960s under the heading Engagement with Student Activism. Under this heading he writes:

I was exposed to the ways in which national politics impacted on Dhaka University. During the period of martial law, political activism remained stifled and the politicians also remained silent. In such circumstances, some of us teachers; who wrote and spoke publicly on the political economy of Pakistan, were accorded a degree of political visibility that served to project our voices into the political domain. Once my writings on the political economy of Pakistan began to appear in the newspapers and I also addressed some seminars on such issues, not only political activists but some of my students sought me out to discuss the policy and political implications of my work.

Conversations with my students originally tended to be of a more academic nature but, occasionally, acquired a topical dimension as the political climate became more restive. Up to the end of 1961, the policy agendas of the regime had faced little challenge in any part of Pakistan. The once restive students had remained largely passive in the absence of any external political stimuli. By this time, Ayub was preparing to present his constitution to the country that had aroused debate and consternation on account of its undemocratic character. At that stage, the regime demonstrated no apprehension that dissent would move outside the academic arena and into an activist phase.²⁸

The students proved their boldness throughout the 1960s. Those years culminated in the mass uprising of 1969-70 as we will see in the subsequent chapters. Here we can recall the celebrations of Shahid Dibosh on 21 February under the repressive conditions in 1959, 1960 and 1961 mainly under the leadership of progressive student leadership. The movement against the Sharif Commission Report was also student-based and student-led. Perhaps the most dramatic

²⁸Sobhan, Rehman, *Untranquil Recollections: The Years of Fulfilment*. (New Delhi: Sage, 2016), pp 236-37; Rounaq Jahan (1972) was an early scholarly analysis of the problems of national integration in Pakistan during the 1950s and 1960s.

event demonstrating the courage of students against an autocratic system during this period was the convocation on 22 March, 1964.

On 22 October, 1962 Ayub Khan had appointed Monem Khan, a third-rate country lawyer as the governor of East Pakistan because Monem was loyal to his master and completely unprincipled in carrying out Ayub's orders.²⁹ In fact Monem's repressive tactics were as rigid as they were cruel. He created a right-wing hooligan "student" organization which called itself the National Students Federation or the NSF. In order to respond effectively to the terrorism of the NSF, the progressive student organizations—the Students' Union and the Students' League in particular--- began to coordinate their opposition to the Ayub regime more closely. It was under these circumstances that the then obedient pro-Monem Khan Vice Chancellor of Dhaka University, Dr. Osman Ghani invited his boss, the governor and chancellor, Monem Khan. This invitation only heightened the already aggrieved student community's pent up resentment against repression.

The students declared publicly that they would not take their degree certificates from the governor. Mr. Rashed Khan Menon, the Vice President of DUCSU and Ms. Matia Choudhury, the General Secretary of DUCSU were the key signatories of this declaration. Other key leaders from the student residence halls also signed this document. On 21 March, Saturday when the DUCSU officials were holding a meeting discussing whether to boycott the graduation ceremonies, armed hooligans from the NSF carried out violent attacks on the attendees to this meeting.

Ignoring the sentiments and demands of the great majority of the DU students, the authorities built a huge tent for the graduation ceremony on the grounds of the science building, the Curzon Hall. The ceremony began on Sunday, 22 March under strict police security. Helmeted security forces surrounded not only the graduation tent but also the nearby student residence halls.

The event began as scheduled with the Chancellor, the Vice Chancellor, the DU academic council and professors marching to the venue and taking their seats on the dais. As was customary, verses from the holy Qur'an were recited in order to begin the event. This was

²⁹ Earlier Monem's dogged loyalty to Ayub was rewarded when Ayub chose Monem as the Health Minister of Pakistan. See Rafiqul Islam(2016):97

followed by the speech from the VC who had already earned a reputation for being an “Ayub-Monem Man”. This, too, passed without any problems. So far, so smooth.

Next in the order of the program was the actual distribution of diplomas. As soon as Monem Khan stood up to do his part, the scene transformed.

All students got up and chanted in unison: “Monem Khan, go back! Monem Khan, go back!”

Following previous orders, the police moved in. Armed with riot sticks, they started to beat up the students brutally. In self-defense, the students picked up their chairs to block the riot stick charges. The whole scene became one of flying missiles with foreign guests and other dignitaries lying on the stage covering their heads in order to protect themselves with one exception.

The exception was the governor. Providing some comic relief unintentionally, he had grabbed a police helmet. Proudly wearing this protective helmet, he was seen to be directing the police carrying out this mayhem. The following day all the major English and Bangla Dailies published pictures of our helmeted hero.

Afterwards, the police attacked the students in their dormitories. Many innocent students were arrested. All student leaders were asked to surrender as warrants for arresting them were issued liberally. In order to prevent a mass students’ movement, the government closed 1400 schools and 74 colleges province wide. But this movement did not stop. In fact, it worked among other things as a catalyst for the autonomy movement and the famous six points and eleven points charters later in the 1960s.

By 1966, *Bangabandhu* turned the situation around in a direction that the activist students would welcome. At this time, he held many powerful leadership positions within the Awami League including the posts of joint secretary, general secretary and president. Working with dedicated pro-autonomy intellectuals like Prof. Nurul Islam and Prof. Rehman Sobhan among others, as the President of the AL, in 1966 Sheikh Mujib announced a six-point program that--- combined with the later 11-point program of other progressives--- would culminate in a movement not just for political autonomy but also for substantive social and economic justice for all. Here it should also be mentioned that contrary to some dogmatic leftist’s characterization of

Mujib as a bourgeois leader, from the beginning of his political career in 1940, *Bangabandhu* always fought for the interests of the lower strata in society. His approach was like his mentor Surawardy's to practice parliamentary democracy. But like his other mentor Maulana Bhashani he believed in engaging with the masses in bold forthright manner. However, a party like the AL led by various members of the intermediate classes representing many different interests presents unavoidable contradictions. We will discuss many of these in the context of the challenges *Bangabondhu* would face from 1972 to 1975 when we discuss the third speech in a later chapter. My purpose here is to underline the democratic and economic justice elements in *Bangabondhu's* thinking and political program in a complex and contradictory set of historical processes.

In order to show that programmatically by 1969 when the 11-points were formulated and were accepted almost immediately by *Bangabondhu* even from his captivity, it is sufficient to present the two sets of overlapping and complementary demands.

In their briefest formulation, the six points simply demanded the following:

1. Pakistan must have a federal system of government, parliamentary in form based on adult universal franchise;
2. The federal government will deal with Defense and Foreign Affairs. All other subjects will be handled by the provinces with full autonomy;
3. There will be two convertible separate currencies for East and West Pakistan. Alternatively, under the same currency there must be firm safeguards against flight of capital between the two wings;
4. Power of taxation and revenue collection will be vested in the federating units---not in the center;
5. There shall be separate accounts for foreign exchange earnings of the two wings. The financing of the federal government will be met by the two wings in equal or some other proportion mutually agreed upon by the two wings;
6. There shall be self-sufficiency in defense matters. An ordinance factory and military academy shall be set up in East Pakistan. The naval headquarters shall be set up in East Pakistan.

So, these were the essential six points. It is firm on inter-wing equity but does not mention class divisions and economic and other forms of exploitation within each wing. Nor does it discuss the role of state in equitable (or following Sen and others' development of the modern human capabilities theory, the human capabilities-enhancing) development. It also does not mention the socio-economic demands of students, peasants and workers. 11-points filled in these lacunae and thus was a more adequate program for the needs of ordinary people. By accepting the 11-points without reservation, *Bangabondhu* demonstrated ---unlike Suhrawardy--- that he was committed to a principled democratic socialist or social democratic path with strategic clarity but tactical flexibility.

Here it is also pertinent to mention the role of Tajuddin Ahmad as an organizer and as a close partner of *Bangabondhu* since 1948. Prof. Rehman Sobhan has given the best summary account of this remarkable relationship:

From as far back as 1948 Tajuddin had developed a close working relationship with *Bangabondhu*. When *Bangabondhu* eventually assumed the Presidency of the AL in 1966, in the wake of Suhrawardy's death in November 1963, his trusted colleague Tajuddin who strongly supported the six points program, was elected as the General Secretary of the party. Tajuddin was by temperament a worker and an activist, his political intelligence, commitment and organizational skill were exceptional, but he never aspired to use this to seek elevation to the highest rank of public office. It was this quality which specially attracted him to *Bangabondhu* and made them natural political allies whose diverse complementary talents could be melded to produce a unique political partnership which was of vital significance in mobilizing the nation behind the struggle for self-rule.

Tajuddin, as the General Secretary of the AL, played a crucial role in reorganizing the AL which had for the period 1966-68 been exposed to ruthless repression by the regime of Governor Monem Khan, with workers from the lowest tier to the highest echelons of the party in jail. He worked tirelessly to reconstruct the AL into an election fighting machine which could deliver *Bangabondhu*'s message of Six Points to every corner of Bangladesh. *Bangabondhu* provided the inspiration for the party to launch and sustain the struggle. But *Bangabondhu* in turn, needed a person with the political skills, capacity for creative thinking, dedication to the cause and above all, complete confidence that he would never betray him, to handle party affairs.

Bangabondhu invested Tajuddin with the authority to interact with his intellectual advisers to prepare the AL's manifesto for the 1970 election and to work with them in detailing the negotiating position of the party for preparing a constitution based on Six Points. At a later stage, Tajuddin was involved by *Bangabondhu* in all his political negotiations with Yahya and

Bhutto. Finally, *Bangabondhu* entrusted Tajuddin to assume the day to day responsibility of running the administration of an independent Bangladesh during the crucial month of March 1971 when *Bangabondhu* effectively ruled the country. These major responsibilities invested in Tajuddin by *Bangabondhu* indicated his deep confidence in him and made it evident that in his absence Tajuddin could be trusted to deputize for him.

For all his unique qualities, Tajuddin was a person of great modesty and humility. During the nine months of the liberation war when *Bangabondhu* was incarcerated in Mianwali jail in West Pakistan by the Military junta, Tajuddin was compelled to assume leadership of the first government of an independent Bangladesh based in Kolkata which oversaw the direction of the Liberation War. He took on this task with reluctance since he never aspired to elevate himself above the other AL leaders who served as *Bangabondhu*'s lieutenants. For those who had, up close, witnessed the interaction of *Bangabondhu* with Tajuddin and other close colleagues, there was never any doubt as to who was the most talented among them and who *Bangabondhu* could trust to deputize for him if he was not to be on the scene. It was fortunate for the direction of Bangladesh's liberation struggle that Indira Gandhi also recognized these qualities of Tajuddin and accepted him as the leader of the Bangladesh interim government.³⁰

These two great leaders worked together for many decades and as we shall see in our analysis of the March 7 speech, *Bangabondhu* relied on Tajuddin with complete confidence particularly during the non-cooperation movement during March 1971.

Because of Sheikh Mujib's bold leadership with able lieutenants like Tajuddin and support from all progressives in East Pakistan, the Ayub regime arrested him and his supporters accusing them of conspiring with India to break up Pakistan. For a while, it seemed that this tyrannical move by an illegitimate and oppressive regime might succeed. However, the heroic mass movement that took shape from December 1968 onwards and culminated in the most powerful mass rebellion in Pakistan in the early months of 1969 led to the release of Sheikh Mujib in February.³¹

³⁰ Rehman Sobhan, *Sustaining democracy in Bangladesh: The political legacy of Tajuddin Ahmad* (Dhaka: Dec., 2019):3-4

³¹ It is also pertinent to mention here the sacrifice of Begum Mujib. The unfinished autobiography of *Bangabondhu* acknowledges this. One can also listen to HE Hasina Wajed's following most moving tribute to her mother: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HKJ1ZJyFUh0> Inter alia, her interview in English by David Frost which also shows flashbacks of her father's earlier interview and past events reveals HE Sheikh Hasina's human side. I have been surprised by the inability of some to understand both the grief of a daughter and the contributions of a great mother, wife and freedom fighter.

Here it is pertinent to give credit to Maulana Bhashani--- who remains a controversial figure in South Asian politics to this day---for initially leading the movement against the *Ayubshahi* or the Ayub dictatorship. After visiting PRC in early 1960s and discussions with Mao, Bhashani had infamously proclaimed “do not disturb Ayub” policy. However, by the time of the Agartala Conspiracy trials and especially with the first stirrings of the student mobilizations against Ayub in 1968, Bhashani took the leading role in organizing protests. Thus, it was he who led the protests on Dec. 6, 1968 and proclaimed his determination to free Mujib and all other political prisoners. Outside of organized student movement part of which his student followers also led, Bhashani was the key leader of the movement until Mujib’s release on February 22, 1969. We will describe and analyze the events from December 6, 1968 onwards and show how the polyphony of a genuine liberatory mass movement developed in East Pakistan in the chapters that follow.

Annexes to Chapter 2

Annex 2.1:

Towards a Post-Bakhtinian Theory of the Polyphonic Prose-Poetry of Revolutionary Mass Movements

Mikhail Bakhtin became recognized in the west as a theorist of novelization long after his death in the USSR. He was partly a victim of the rigidity of mediocre Stalinist party hacks who controlled the literary norms from the 1930s onwards in the former USSR. Although he was able to live in Moscow and publish with some belated recognition in the USSR in the post-Stalin period, the Euro-American literary criticism welcomed his views only after both structuralist and poststructuralist schools in the west had run into dead ends from the late 1980s onwards.

My purpose here is not to explicate Bakhtin's literary theories for which there are several good book length expositions but rather to combine and extend the idea of a dialogical approach to discourse and the idea polyphony in discourse to a somewhat novel concept of the *polyphonic prose-poetry* of revolutionary mass movements (PPP of RMM).

This will also show us how to go beyond the structuralist distinction between metaphor and metonymy proposed in Roman Jakobson's brilliant work. The text of my own book will be a running argument and demonstration of the proposition that during a revolutionary mass upheaval metonymies in both language and real-life run against one another in rapid succession and metaphors merge with metonymies to make dialectical leaps in imagining new possibilities that were absent even a few months or even weeks and days ago. These novel emergences can create a new type of polyphony that arises from the masses themselves during these extraordinary periods in history. Ontologically, I have modified Deleuze's valuable contributions that emerge from a critical understanding of Spinoza and Bergson that he acknowledges. What Deleuze and the postmodernists and poststructuralists alike fail to realize is the deeper possibilities for transformations beyond the bourgeois social formation once the dialectical approach of Marx and his method of a fundamental critique of bourgeois political economy and society is grasped properly, particularly from a close reading of *Capital*. Here I will deal with the semiotic aspects emerging from my own critique of the 20th-century thinkers, but the origins of my own critique can be traced back to Marx's analyses in the *Grundrisse* and *Capital*.

In the justly famous “Conference on Style” in 1958 Jakobson presented his “Closing statement: Linguistics and Poetics” which was published in 1960 under the title, “Style in Language.” Coming from the Prague School, Jakobson based his analysis on the Saussurean theory of language and French structuralism. The idea that language was a system of signs with signifiers and signified in a chain which consisted of metaphoric and metonymic plays came from Jakobson. At the same time, Jacques Lacan was both arriving at and departing from this structural analysis of the unconscious which in his reading of Freud, was structured like language. Later Derrida in his critique of structuralism will arrive at a similar deconstructive gesture where interpretation and meaning can be constantly displaced and decentered.

Let us start with Jakobson’s initial distinction following his and his Prague school colleagues’ early advances over Saussurean structuralist linguistics.

Already in 1928, Jakobson, Vilem Mathesius, Nikolaj S. Trubetzkoy and S.I. Karcevskij had departed radically from the classical structural position of Ferdinand de Saussure. They claimed that the methods developed by the Prague school for studying the function of speech sounds could be applied both synchronically to a language at a point in time, and diachronically, that is dynamically, to a language as it changes over time.

Consistent with this position, Jakobson would argue in the 1950s :

“...It is the structural analysis of language in the process of development—the analysis of children's language and its general laws—and of language in the process of disintegration—aphasic language—which enables us to throw light on the selection of phonemes, the distinctive features, and their mutual relations, and to get closer to the main principles of this selection and of this interdependence so as to be in a position to establish and explain the universal laws which underlie the phonological structure of the world's languages...”³²

In other words, Jakobson suggests that culturally interconnected signs can be used to reconstruct systems of relationships rather than studying isolated signs. Thus, Jakobson follows Saussure and develops a structuralist approach to language as a relational system or structure that can give priority to the determining power of the language system (a principle shared by post-structuralists). They seek to describe the overall organization of sign systems as “languages,” a

³² Jakobson, 1960

general semiotic system in many areas besides the narrow definition of a language formed from utterances. Examples of such extensions are Claude Lévi-Strauss and myth, kinship rules, and totemism; Jacques Lacan and the unconscious; Roland Barthes and Greimas and the "grammar" of narrative. Roman Jakobson explains, "...It is once again the vexing problem of identity within variety; without a solution to this disturbing problem there can be no system, no classification..."³³

Although Lacan early on and post-structuralism with Derrida's seminal works in the late 1960s broke with the rigid universalism of structuralism, they remained text focused. The same can be said of Bakhtin. However, in contradistinction with both the structuralists and the post-structuralists. Bakhtin's novel theory of prose form of novelization introduced a plurality of voices, speech patterns and chronotopes along with heteroglossia. This polyphonic approach, I have argued, brings us closer towards bridging the gap between the heteroglossia and heteroformism of a radical mass movement and textuality.³⁴ Furthermore, it also allows us to bridge the gap between prose and poetry during such revolutionary moments. The roles performed by metaphor and metonymy in isolation merge just as an enormous polyphony emerges from multiple mass voices and actions.

We can pass from Jakobson's insights about the sound potential of language to a general semiotics of socio-political movements in a radical way---much more radical than either the anthropological structuralism of post-WW2 France, or the text-centered decentering of deconstructive post-structuralism.

As Jakobson pointed out:

In short, only minimal phonic means are required in order to express and communicate a wealth of conceptual, emotive and aesthetic content. Here readers are directly confronted with the mystery of the idea embodied in phonic matter, the mystery of the word, of the linguistic symbol, of the Logos, a mystery which requires elucidation. Of course, we have known for a long time that a word, like any verbal sign, is a unity of two components. The sign has two sides: the sound, or the material side on the one hand, and meaning, or the intelligible side on the other. Every word, and

³³ Jakobson, 1990.

³⁴ See my Paz's Poetics: Textuality, Sexuality, Politics, The Denver Quarterly, Summer, and Khan (1992; 1998; 2009;2016)

more generally every verbal sign, is a combination of sound and meaning, or to put it another way, a combination of signifier and signified.³⁵³⁶

In conclusion, we can use Bakhtin's own words substituting our construction of the theoretical concept of the PPP of RMM for his idea of literary prose. In this way, we are also able to close the gap between language and revolutionary practice during these special and rare periods of society-wide upheavals:

The possibility of employing on the plane of a single work [and socio-political movement] discourses of various types, with all their expressive capacities intact, without reducing them to a single common denominator---this is one of the most fundamental characteristics of ...[the PPP of RMM]. Herein lies the profound distinction between the prose style and poetic style [in ordinary non-revolutionary moments].³⁷

From this point in Bakhtin, I am pointing out, we can go beyond Bakhtin with the possibility of this revolutionary fusion, the actuality of this fusion as the PPP of RMM. For the activist-artists of revolutionary moments, "the world is full of other people's words...." Indeed, such actors must work "...with a very rich [polyphonic]...palette..." using the PPP of RMM during these rare but special episodes of history enacted by the revolutionary masses. Understanding this fusion through a revolutionary narrative form can save us from confusion. The genius of the masses along multiple dimensions at some crucial potential turning points in history is never to be underestimated. It is a major thesis of my book that 1969-70 and 1971 in East Pakistan

³⁵ See also Harris, Roy. *Saussure and His Interpreters*. New York: New York, UP, 2001., Jakobson, R. *Remarques sur l' évolution phonologique du russe*, 1929.

Jakobson, R. *Kharakteristichke yevrazi-yskogo yazykovogo soyuza*, 1931.

Jakobson, R. *Kinder-sprache*, 1941.

Jakobson, R. *Aphasie und allgemeine Lautgesetze*, 1941.

Jakobson, R. *Preliminaries to Speech Analysis* (with G. Fant and M. Halle,), 1952.

Jakobson, R. "Closing Statements: Linguistics and Poetics." Thomas A. Sebeok, *Style In Language*, MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1960.

Jakobson, R. *Selected Writings*, VII. Edited by S. Rudy, 113-121, The Hague: Mouton, 1985.

Jakobson, R. *Style in language*, Ed. by T. Sebeok, Wiley New York 1960, pp. 350-377

Jakobson, R. *Essais de linguistique générale*. Vol.2, *Rapports internes et externes du langage*, Les Editions de Minuit Paris 1973

Jakobson, R. *On Language*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Russian Language Project, 1990.

Jakobson, R. "Lectures on Sound & Meaning," in *On Language*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990.

Jakobson, R. "Lectures on Sound & Meaning," in: *On Language*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990.

³⁶ Jakobson, 1990

³⁷ Bakhtin(1984) pp.200-1

brought forth this fusion. Another important component of the PPP of RMM particularly in the context of the struggles in Bangladesh is an extension of the Bakhtinian idea of the chronotope. I should mention here that we also find in the development of the revolutionary process through the real movements of people and ideas a compression of time and space and of the coexistence of several distinct layers of chronos in particular. For this reason, I have developed a concept going beyond the Bakhtinian chronotope. This concept needs a new name. I have termed this *polychronotopia* in order to pinpoint the multiplicity of events and processes along with the ideas and practices during revolutionary moments. Clearly, such a concept goes far beyond Bakhtin's exclusively literary, novelization and static single layered concept of chronotope.³⁸

³⁸ See my discussion of the relevance of Bakhtin and the need to go beyond Bakhtin in Annex 2.2 in this book. I have also discussed these in several of my literary criticism pieces.

Annex 2.2:

Another Way to Theorize the “Event” of Revolutionary Process: Event Beyond Badiou (EBB) ---from the Concept of Badiouan Event to the Concept of *Eventualizing Dynamics or Dyneven*

There is another equally productive and complementary theoretical approach I have been trying to develop by taking Badiou’s *Being and Event* seriously as a starting point. We can see *Being and Event* as a continuation of his attempt--- beginning in *Théorie du Sujet*--- to reconcile a notion of the subject with ontology. The criticism of post-structuralist (PS) work which I began with in Annex 2.1 is that the PS focuses perhaps too much on semiotics and language ultimately getting trapped in the straitjacket of language. Badiou, by his own admission, tries to break out of contemporary French philosophy’s fetishism of language. Thus he arrives, in *Being and Event*, at the point where he can combine rigorous mathematical formulae with his readings of poets such as Mallarmé and Hölderlin and religious thinkers such as Pascal. He also draws upon both Anglo-American-European ‘analytical’ and European ‘continental’ traditions.

Clearly, two elements mark the thesis of *Being and Event*: the place of ontology, ‘being *qua* being’ (being in itself), and the place of the event (as a rupture in being) through which the subject finds realization and reconciliation with truth. This situation of being and the rupture which characterizes the event are thought in terms of set theory of the axiomatic Zermelo–Fraenkel rigorous axiomatic variety. A formally weak point here is the axiom of choice. Badiou elides the thorny issues that the axiom of choice raises. Thus, while I, too, use the axiomatic approach in my previous formal work, I jettison this particularly troublesome axiom. I also formalize in the more natural framework of fuzzy set theory which is a more lifelike perceptual setting to begin in looking for rupture.³⁹

Instead of reproducing the formal critique of Badiou which the nontechnical reader will not find helpful, I offer here a brief---perhaps too brief---one paragraph summary of my own

³⁹ Khan 2004; Lin and Khan 2009; Khan 20xx

EBB formulation of the rupture/event. The rest of the book itself will be a concrete illustration of the paragraph that follows.

The key point is that a number of fuzzy even inchoate (micro) events lead up to EBB which I will call the *Eventualizing Dynamics (ED), or Dyneven for short which combines dynamism, uneven and event to emphasize flow that is uneven but forceful (Dyne is one of the units of force in physics)* in order to distinguish my *continuity- with- contradictions* leading to a *dialectical qualitative leap* towards fundamental systemic change in line with the current mathematics of the dynamic systems theory. Thus, my concept of ED as the name suggests is more dynamic, less mysterious---one could even characterize Badiou's Event as mystifying given his rather arbitrary use of set theory without an explicit dynamics---and ultimately relatively more adequate for explaining novel socio-economic-political developments over historical time in real human societies.

In my more dynamic formulation of functionals that form an infinite set, I examine rigorously the fundamental break or rupture with the ontological-historical status quo. Under congeries of concrete conditions in an overdetermined revolutionary situation, the *hegemony* of the ruling class/elite in *the Gramscian sense* breaks down. In an overdetermined revolutionary situation the semiotics terms change radically. When a sufficient number of these (micro) events coalesce together, we have the necessary conditions for the (macro) Event as such. However, for a transformation of the potentiality and virtuality of microevents to become an actuality further conditions leading to a set of minimal sufficient meshwork must develop. The first chapter hints at this development in March 1971 in East Pakistan. Other examples from the 1960s and other historical slices of time can easily be found.

The network to meshwork transformation is describable by a complexity-based neural network model formally. This is done in Khan (2004) and Khan (2017 and 2020a,b). The intuitive idea here is that even in the face of severe political, economic and cultural repressions, the objective development of minimally sufficient meshwork can lead to the Event---characterized by among other things, an explosion of popular will for liberation, a mass mobilization with a contempt for death. This is exactly what happened after March 7, 1971 when East Pakistan was already being transformed into Bangladesh---symbolically through a new flag, national anthem and other transformative semiosis and substantively through the noncooperation movement and virtual day-to-day autonomy of the *Bangalees* and their allies.

.

Chapter 3:

The Beginning of the Final Chapters of Pakistan: The Great Uprising---Phase 1 December 6, 1968 to January 24, 1969

From September 1967 to October 1968, the Ayub government tried to get the nation excited about Ayub's so-called "Decade of Development". It was clearly a propaganda ploy much aided by "experts" from the US in particular. Unfortunately for Ayub and his imperial masters, this showcase of capitalist development failed to fire the imagination of the ordinary citizens. In Gramscian terms, the attempt to build hegemony in modernizing capitalist terms failed to catch fire. In fact, only months after the official completion of Ayub's decade of success, popular unrest broke out in both wings of Pakistan. Here, I will focus mainly on East Pakistan with references to developments in West Pakistan where necessary.

What was surprising even to the popular parties including the Awami League was the sudden *volte face* of Maulana Bhashani with respect to his earlier "Don't disturb Ayub" policy. Within the communist party the split along Moscow-Peking lines had taken place already by 1967. NAP, the mass leftist party was also divided along these lines. It is noteworthy that both the NAPs and all the fragmented communist parties and groupuscules were ostensibly anti-imperialist. But they failed to unite even on this minimalist basis. However, the students in both wings were already moving on their own against the dictatorship. By November 1968 there were already student demonstrations in Peshawar and Rawalpindi against Ayub's rule. Bhutto was arrested at about the same time---12 November--- under the repressive defense of Pakistan rules. His arrest catalyzed the student unrest. Apparently, during this period Bhashani also decided that Ayub must go.

Just a day before Ayub's visit to Dhaka, on Dec. 6, 1967 the NAP (Bhashani) executive committee met and decided to observe an "Anti-Repression Day" on the same day. A procession was led directly from the executive committee meeting towards the Government House. After surrounding the Government House and giving militant slogans, the procession gathered in front of the *Baitul Mokarram* Mosque. Before these events, in the open meeting at the Paltan Maidan where Bhashani was joined by student leaders like Haider Akbar Khan Rano and labor leaders like Comrade Selim, the latter had requested Bhashani to announce a work-stoppage and strike

for December 7. Bhashani had not said anything perhaps because earlier NAP had announced the call for a *hartal* on Dec. 12. But after his evening prayers at the mosque Bhashani announced that there would be an all-around *hartal* the next day in front of the large crowd.

The *hartal* on December 7 was quite successful. Bhashani showed his incredible presence of mind and incomparable courage once again that day in front of *Baitul Mokarram* Mosque. There was a crowd of a few hundred just before the mid-day prayers surrounded by the police and the EPR forces. Bhashani immediately made up his mind to hold the funeral prayers for the martyrs of the movement. The police did not interfere with what was ostensibly a sacred event. After the prayers Bhashani announced that section 144 that forbade public gathering will be broken right then and there.

One non-Bengali soldier advanced towards the aged Maulana with his rifle. Bhashani shouted in Urdu “Khamosh!(Halt!)”. At the same time, the venerable aged leader grabbed the soldier’s rifle firmly with his right hand. An officer realized the gravity of the situation immediately and ran to remove the soldier.⁴⁰

Up until that time, the Maulana had been an enigmatic leader. His behavior is still shrouded in mystery. But we can try to trace his and his party’s behavior under the Ayub regime up until that crucial December day.

Like the cases of other important political leaders in East Pakistan who could be identified as potentially or actually oppositional, Ayub’s coup was followed by Bhashani’s arrest. After 45 months of brutal military rule, Ayub decided to rule the country under a thin civilian cover. Therefore, the martial law was withdrawn and on March 1, 1962 a constitution was promulgated by Ayub without any prior democratic deliberation whatsoever. The elections for the national and provincial assemblies were boycotted by both the AL and NAP. When the sessions began on June 8, 1962, Bhashani was still in jail. He was finally released several months later in November, 1962. Immediately, his party, the NAP called an emergency meeting on November 16. But quite mysteriously, the Maulana himself failed to show up choosing to remain in Santosh, Tangail.

⁴⁰ The author was an eyewitness. Photographs that were published later confirm this event. This and many other subsequent events bear testimony to the two theories of mass irruptions advanced in Annexes 2.1 and 2.2. See also Rano(2005):159-60.

It was not clear then but became so later when in March,1963 a special emissary from Ayub led the Maulana to a meeting with Ayub in Rawalpindi. The minutes of this meeting if they ever existed were never released. But we do know that after his meeting with Ayub, Bhashani also met with the then governor of West Pakistan.

The subsequent events allow us to infer at least a part of what must have transpired. In October of the same year Bhashani joined the Pakistani government delegation that attended the celebrations of the anniversary of the Chinese revolution. After returning from China, Bhashani described his experiences to the reporter in the weekly Janata. According to this source, Bhashani had several long sessions with Zhou En-lai and Mao himself. This is also corroborated by his biographer Syed Abul Maqsd.⁴¹ Accordingly, we can infer that Bhashani was chosen by both the Chinese and Ayub to smooth the emerging relations between these two states. Since the Sino-Soviet split unbeknownst to the fraternal parties had already progressed behind the scenes, that might explain why Mao and Zhou chose the noncommunist Bhashani over the representatives of the EPCP who were following the Moscow line then.

However, Bhashani's moves alienated him from a segment of NAP leadership and the pro-Moscow communists. This is further corroborated by the then emerging radical student leader who became an important voice for the internationalist left, Tariq Ali. In this conversation with Ali,⁴² Bhashani freely admitted that Mao had urged him not to take too tough a line against Ayub in the greater interest of an international coalition against imperialism. Strange as it may sound, the publicly available evidence supports this since Bhashani urged the NAP to follow a policy of "Don't disturb Ayub" until 1968.

Within less than two years after Bhashani's trip to China both the EPCP and NAP were divided along the lines of following either the Moscow or the Peking (Beijing) line. Thus, the potentially most important left organizations were much reduced in their numerical strength and scope for action. The followers of the Peking line would have many further divisions mostly along sectarian lines.

However, by the end of November, 1968 after large scale demonstrations against Ayub in West Pakistan, it became clear to all center-left political elements in East Pakistan that the Ayub

⁴¹ Maqsd(1994):Chapter 1

⁴² Tariq Ali(1970):Chapters 1 and 2

regime could be vulnerable. It is in this context that it is best to view Bhashani's leadership in December 1968.

To continue with our narrative, Bhashani had already called for a countrywide strike on 12 December but Comrade Selim of the scooter drivers' organization and others had urged him at the meeting in the *Paltan Maidan* to declare a general strike on the following day. As I described earlier, Bhashani kept all in suspense until the last minute and finally agreed, The students, small shopkeepers and scooter drivers took an active part in setting up pickets, and the mobilization was almost spontaneous. This supports our previous thesis that the country, particularly the Eastern part was ready to move beyond Ayub's sham democracy through direct popular mobilization from below as a part of the *Eventualizing dynamics (ED)*.

I have already described Bhashani's encounter with the military and the police. There were clashes with the security forces in other parts of Dhaka on 7 December as well.

At one stage the police opened fire on the demonstrators killing two shop employees in the *Nilkhet* area. A large number of demonstrators were wounded in many different spots of the city and many were arrested. I was part of the demonstration in the *Nilkhet* area since it was close to where we lived and saw some of this firsthand including the shooting incident. Haider Akbar Khan Rano has described the scene at the Press Club where the journalists and others who were skeptical just a day ago were now bursting with fiery new born enthusiasm.⁴³

Bhashani declared a province-wide strike on 10 December in order to protest against the killings, beatings and arrests on the 7th, The strike did well in areas such as Chittagong, Khulna and other *Mufassil* towns. A debate on these incidents took place in the Pakistan National Assembly, and the leader of the opposition---by strange irony, it was now Nurul Amin---criticized forcefully the government's use of force.

Further actions took place after December 8. A series of strikes were called. The public responded well, and strikes were observed in Dhaka and other areas of the country. Bhashani declared two more on 10 and 12 December. The Awami League had already declared a countrywide strike on the 13th. All political parties supported it except the Bhashani NAP for fear of letting the leadership role slip. Ironically, this led to the opposite result. Supported by the other forces and the majority of the people, the strike call for the 13th was a great success. Again, this proves our thesis that an ED- or Dyneven-like situation was about to develop, and the

⁴³ Rano (2005):161

great polyphony of a genuinely mass revolutionary movement was in the making. In fact, the polyphony will soon sound its multi-voiced call to most sectors of population. The Awami League and non-Bhashani NAP led strike had been so successful and complete that Ayub Khan had to postpone his scheduled departure for West Pakistan on December 13.⁴⁴

Following these developments, Bhashani--- who after all was a shrewd leader--- realized that he could not control the urban masses and decided to shift his focus to the countryside. The ultra-left and rather infantile pro-Peking communists concluded that Bhashani was going to follow their lead and surround the cities from the countryside according to their mechanical “Maoist” formula. This adventurist political line was wildly romantic and thoroughly unrealistic. Bhashani was more sensible and called merely for strikes in country markets or *Hat Hartals* on December 29.⁴⁵

We can get a glimpse of how the general strike of December 13 looked to a prescient reporter. Here is a vivid description from the *Dainik Pakistan* published on the following day:

From early morning all shops, markets and transports were under lockdown...From the previous night the police and EPR forces kept the city under strict surveillance with the Inspector General and his subordinates leading their forces. Many were arrested for just gathering on the roads. Yesterday, Air Marshall Asghar Khan himself went on an inspection tour of Dhaka. After his Friday prayers at *Baitul Mokarram*, he gave a short speech. On his way back the overzealous police sprayed so much red colored water that the marshall himself had red patches on his trousers. In their confusion, the police arrested his secretary Colonel Mokhtar Hossain from in front of the Press Club on Topkhana Road....From Narayanganj our staff reporter reported that all satellite towns near Dhaka and workers in factories also observed complete strike.⁴⁶

As mentioned before, the movement initiated by Maulana Bhashani and the pro-Peking NAP on 6 December faced some difficulties in Dhaka and other urban areas. For one thing, after four consecutive strikes within a span of a week, people in cities and towns were temporarily exhausted. But politically the more important reason was the sectarianism of pro-Peking NAP and pro-Peking Communist Party. As I mentioned, during the last strike called by the AL and

⁴⁴ Sarkar(2009); Rano(2005)

⁴⁵ See Sarkar(2009): Umar, Vol.2(2006):145

⁴⁶ The Dainik Pakistan(The Daily Pakistan), December 14, 1969

other parties, the pro-Peking elements boycotted these actions. Consequently, they became isolated from the urban masses politically. With vastly more experience in mass movements than the young sectarian pro-Peking ultra-left communists. Bhashani decided to shift his political action to the countryside where he had considerable influence among the peasantry. Nevertheless, history shows that his declaration of the *hat hartal* for 29 December, 1968 was announced seemingly without much forethought. His NAP and EPCP partners did not feel particularly enthusiastic about the *hat hartal* program of action. In fact, the EPCP Central Committee issued a seemingly strange circular to the members not to take any risks in organizing that type of rural *hartal*. This clearly showed tensions brewing between Bhashani and his leftist partners. But in spite of this tension, the *hat hartal* was unusually successful in many rural areas of East Pakistan. This lends further support to our hypothesis of an ED in the theoretical sense, developed in the Annex 2.2. The underlying reason for this success unexpected by the ultra-leftists who thought they could just use Bhashani for their own purpose was that the peasants were in fact being oppressed in so many concrete forms by the landlords, the money lenders and the state that they were waiting for some kind of mass action backed by an experienced and trusted leader like Bhashani. In fact, in many instances, they did not wait for directives from leftists or Bhashani. Looking at the newspapers in late December 1968 and January 1969 confirm that without being led by any political party, the peasants were attacking and killing *jotedars* and *mahajans* (landowners and moneylenders) as well as gangs of cattle lifters in many areas in the countryside.⁴⁷ It is not surprising then that under such circumstances, the *hat hartal* call given by Bhashani fell on quite fertile soil prepared by the evolution of the objective socio-economic-political relations in the countryside. With minimal political leadership from NAP the *hat hartals* were observed in most areas quite peacefully, but in the *Hatirdiya* Bazaar near Narsingdi and in Narail in the district of Jessore, there were violent clashes with the police who opened fire on unarmed people with several deaths and other nonfatal injuries.

After reports of the *Hatirdiya* and *Narail* incidents began to appear in the Dhaka newspapers⁴⁸ and along with reports of *hat hartals* in other areas of the province many in the urban areas began to put pressure on the leadership of their parties. It was then that other political

⁴⁷ See issues from Dec. 20, 1968 to January 15, 1969 of the *Dainik Ittefaq*, *Dainik Pakistan*, *Dainik Purbodesh*, *Dainik Sangbad* and the Pakistan Observer.

⁴⁸ See issues from Dec. 30, 1968 to January 4, 1969 of the *Dainik Ittefaq*, *Dainik Pakistan*, *Dainik Purbodesh*, *Dainik Sangbad* and the Pakistan Observer.

parties, including the Awami League, began to issue statements against police brutality and think about further actions. Among other political entities, the *Krishak Samity*, NAP and the Dhaka Bar Association denounced the police actions and demanded judicial enquiries. Thus Bhashani's somewhat impulsive unilateral decision leading to the incidents of 29 December and related developments revealed that, particularly the peasants, were ready to move into action and the prospects for building a mass movement combining both the rural and urban sector populations were ripe.

The AL showed its political maturity when with most leaders of the League in prison it still joined the Democratic Action Committee (DAC) formed on 8 January, 1969 while the NAP (pro-Peking) and the Pakistan People's Party, led by Bhutto, remained out of the alliance. DAC was a mild non-radical alliance with the PDM leader of West Pakistan, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan as its chairman. Among the other partners of this alliance were the National Democratic Front (NDF), led by Nurul Amin, NAP (pro-Moscow), and the Council Muslim League (CML). Some reactionaries were also a part, for example the Jamaat-i-Islami led by the dogmatic and anti-people Golam Azam who would later betray the Bangalees and sell out to the military dictatorship. Less reactionary was the Nizam-i-Islam, led by Mr. Mohsenuddin (Dudu Mian) and Farid Ahmad. Other centrist forces included the pro-PDM Awami League leader Abdus Salam Khan, and Justice Syed Mahbub Murshed who was not in any party. On the left, Muzaffar Ahmad of the pro-Moscow NAP joined with the blessing of the pro-Moscow CP.

However, the next phase of the movement would be led not by this eclectic and feeble coalition but by the radical students affiliated mainly with the Communist Party (both pro-Moscow and Pro-Peking) and the Awami League. Given the strength and intensity of the mass rebellions, a section of the pro-Ayub National Students' Federation would also break off and join the radicals who formulated in early January 1969 an 11-point list of demands that incorporated both the 6-points and more radical demands to serve the interests of students, workers and peasants. At this point, the question that is natural to ask is, why would students get so heavily involved? In addition to what we saw in chapter 2 and earlier in this chapter, the student grievances that existed particularly for those in East Pakistan need to be recognized.

In fact, the situation in this regard was grasped by the more perceptive elements within the state apparatus. As stated in a Report of the Commission on Student Problems and Welfare published by the Ministry of Education Government of Pakistan (1969), we find:

At the time of Independence i.e. 1947-48, East Pakistan was far advanced in all fields of education- but after seventeen years of an unrealistic educational policy, the position at present has deteriorated, considerably. East Pakistan is lagging behind West Pakistan in every field of education. The government's partisan policy is mainly responsible for it. At present the number of persons in East Pakistan having education between the sixth class and the ninth class is 1,469,000, whereas in West Pakistan it is about 17 lakhs. The number of intermediates from East Pakistan has been decreased to 52,793, while in West Pakistan it has increased to 902,371. The number of graduates in East Pakistan has now come down to 28,070, whereas ten years ago the number of graduates in East Pakistan was 41,480, Conversely, in West Pakistan it has increased at the rate of 21.3 per cent and reached 54 thousand. Ten years before in West Pakistan the number of graduates was 44 thousand and was even less at the time of Independence. Similarly, the number of post-graduates in East Pakistan has been decreased by 12 per cent and the present number has come down to 7,146, while the number in West Pakistan has increased at the rate of 68.6 per cent per year. The present figure comes to 24,324. In West Pakistan, higher female education has increased by 7 times more than that in East Pakistan. This "statistics of disparity" has revealed the selfish designs of the present self-made rulers who have planned a long-term curb on educational growth in East Pakistan.⁴⁹

Neither the 6-point program nor the lukewarm 8-point program of DAC spoke to these issues. Therefore, it is not surprising that students who were now galvanized made a dialectical leap on their own and arrived at a program that addressed among other issues, the urgent educational problems and disparities. This is another piece of evidence in favor of our concept of *Eventualizing Dynamics during the struggles themselves* beyond Badiou's abstract⁵⁰ and one-sided formulation of Event.

⁴⁹ Report of the Ministry of Education, 1969:7-9.

⁵⁰ Here I criticize Badiou's concept of the Event as abstract in the same sense that Hegel criticizes in his Philosophy of Right Kant's idea of "Abstract Rights".

The students also showed much political maturity by negotiating among themselves and incorporating the 6-points in a principled manner. The complete program was presented at a press conference on 6 January, 1969.⁵¹ Later on February 14, the DUCSU called a student meeting and the demands were read out in front of the students who gathered outside of the Arts Building. I was fortunate to be present at this later meeting thanks to the invitation of a fellow activist who was at the Dhaka University at that time.

The following is a summary of the historic 11-Points Demands of Progressive Students of East Pakistan in 1969:

1. The first point was the state of the entire educational system. The demands of the students were also included in this first point.

In fact seventeen items were presented in the first point, including the expansion of school and college education by increasing the number of schools and colleges and technical institutions, the reduction of school and college fees by 50 per cent, a food subsidy for the dining halls and canteen expenses, the introduction of education in the mother tongue at all stages, free and compulsory education up to class eight, the expansion of female education an increase in the number of medical, agricultural, and technical colleges, universities, travel subsidies to students in all forms of transport as was being extended to students in West Pakistan, a guarantee of jobs, the cancellation of the black university ordinance and a guarantee of the autonomy of the universities and other educational institutions and the scrapping of the National Education Commission Report and the Report of the Hamodur Rahman Commission

The other points were:

⁵¹ This date is given by Umar(2006). It also accords with my own recollection. But Sarkar(2009) mentions January 4 which seems a bit too early. Wajed Mian in his book gives January 5 as the date of the press conference where DUCSU unveiled the 11-points. However, I have not been able to find documents that support this date either. I am inclined to trust my memory in this case corroborated by Umar(2006). The 15 volume liberation war documents carries the 11-points in volume 2(pp.409-412) only mentions January, 1969 but gives no specific date. My own recollection is that I heard it at a student meeting of DUCSU on January 6, 1969.

2. Direct election on the basis of adult franchise for establishing parliamentary democracy and ensuring the freedom of speech and of the newspapers.
3. Full autonomy for East Pakistan within the framework of a Federal Constitution.
4. Sub-federation in West Pakistan with regional autonomy for all provinces including Balochistan, North-West Frontier Province and Sind.
5. Nationalization of banks and insurance companies, the jute trade and big industries.
6. Reduction of rents and taxes on peasants, remission of all area rents and loans, abolition of the certification system, etc.
7. Guarantee of fair wages and bonus for Workers and provision for their education, housing, medical facilities; withdrawal of all anti-worker black laws and the granting of the right to strike and form trade unions.
8. Flood control and provision for proper use of water resources in East Pakistan.
9. Withdrawal of the Emergency Ordinance Security Act and all Preventive Detention Acts.
10. Abrogation of SEATO, CENTO and Pak-American military pacts and formulation of a nonaligned and independent foreign policy.
11. Release of all students, workers, peasants and political leaders and activists from various jails of the country, and withdrawal of all warrants of arrest and cases; including the Agartala Conspiracy Case.

This Eleven-Point program was formulated and placed before the student community and the people in-general as a basis for a broad-based democratic mass movement by a political student Alliance called the 'Student Action Committee' (SAC). In the formation of its alliance the different factions of the East Pakistan Communist Party played an effective role. Thus the two groups of the East Pakistan Students' Union and the student group of the pro-Six-Point Awami League, the Students' League, constituted the main strength of this alliance.

The document which was formally circulated in January 1969 was signed on behalf of the alliance by the following: Abdur Rouf (President of the East Pakistan Students' League), Khaled Mohammad Ali (General Secretary of the East Pakistan Students' League), Sharfuddin Ahmad (President of the East Pakistan Students' Union), Shamsudduha (General Secretary of the East Pakistan Students' Union), Mustafa Jamal Hyder (President of the East Pakistan Students'

Union), Dipa Datta (Assistant Secretary of the East Pakistan. Students' Union), Tofail Ahmed (Vice-President of the Dhaka University Students' Union [DUCSU]), and Nazim Kamran Chowdhury (General Secretary of the DUCSU). Apart from these student leaders, the General Secretary of the Students' Union (pro-Peking group), Mahbubullah, was a leading member of this alliance.

As Umar(2006) puts it:

The Eleven Point program can be easily seen as a much more democratic program than the Six-Point program of the Awami League in that it contained certain specific demands of the peasants and workers, and it demanded the abrogation of all military pacts and alliances with imperialist countries. It also demanded the annulment of all black laws like the Public Security Act and the release of all political prisoners detained without trial under such undemocratic Acts.⁵²

Umar (2006 Vol.2) presents an insightful analysis of the 11-point program including its origins. It is pertinent to quote his analysis here:

This Eleven-Point programme was formulated and placed before the student community and the people in general as a basis for a broad-based democratic mass movement by a political student alliance called 'Student Action Committee' (SAC). In the formation of its alliance the different factions of the East Pakistan Communist Party played an effective role. Thus, the two groups of the East Pakistan Students' Union and the (student group) of the pro-Six-Point Awami League, 'the Students' League,' constituted the main strength of this alliance.

The document which was formally circulated in January 1969 was signed on behalf of the alliance by the following: Abdur Rouf (President of the East Pakistan Students' League), Khaled Mohammad Ali (General Secretary of the East Pakistan Students' League), Saidfuddin Ahmad (President of the East Pakistan Students' Union), Shamsuddoha (General Secretary of the East Pakistan Students' Union), Mustafa Jamal Hyder (President of the East Pakistan Students' Union), Dipa Datta (Assistant Secretary of the East Pakistan Students' Union), Tofail Ahmed (Vice-President of the Dhaka University Students' Union [DUCSU]), and Nazim Kamran Chowdhury (General Secretary of the DUCSU). Apart from these student leaders, the General Secretary of the

⁵² Badruddin Umar, *The Emergence of Bangladesh Vol. 2* (Karachi: Oxford University Press,2006) pp.148-49

Students' Union (pro-Peking group), Mahbubullah, was a leading member of this alliance.

The Eleven Point programme can be easily seen as a much more democratic programming than the Six-Point programme of the Awami League in that it contained certain specific demands of the peasants and workers and it demanded [the abrogation of all military pacts and alliances with imperialist countries. It also demanded the annulment of all black laws like the Public Security Act and the release of all political prisoners detained without trial under such undemocratic Acts.

Both the Six-Point and the Eleven-Point programmes reflected the class interests, of the rising bourgeoisie in East Pakistan, but whereas the former represented the very narrow interests of the rightist section-of this bourgeoisie, the latter reflected the interest of a much broader and liberal section of the same class.⁵³

Rano who was no longer a student leader or even formally enrolled kept in close touch with the student leaders even as he put most of his energy into organizing the workers in the Tongi area. In his 2005 book, *Shotabdi Periye*, he gives the following assessment of the 11-points:

The 11-points resulted from intense inter-group discussions among the students. The Students' League pressured to accept the 6-points. The Menon group pressured to include anti-imperialist demands and demands from the workers and peasants. At the end...6-points were included completely. Another point included the cancellation of SEATO, CENTO etc. Pak-American pacts. Demands for nationalizing banks, insurance companies and large-scale industry were also included. That is to say, the 11-points were radical in many respects. Two points addressed issues related to the interests of the workers and peasants. But subsequently, I have concluded that these were not specific. For example, just wages are mentioned but nothing is specified. There is mention of repealing repressive black laws and regulations. But nothing specific was mentioned.

For peasants, the issue of land reform was conspicuous by its total absence. There was no mention of the *tebhaga* movement, the landmark struggle from 1946. There was mention of the minimum price for jute, reduction of taxes, repeal of debt and stopping the oppression of the tax collectors. But all of these were non-specific and superficially stated.⁵⁴

⁵³ Umar(2006 Vol. 2):149.

⁵⁴ Rano(2005):165. He also states self-critically that the leftist leaders like he himself did not pay enough attention to these matters. Such timely attention could have helped make the document more complete.

As stated before, the Eleven-Point program was, in reality, a logical development of student activism which had emerged since the early part of December 1968 throughout Pakistan. The student activism continued in both wings but gained increased momentum partly as a result of the consensus around these 11-points and coordination through DUCSU and other student organizations in other colleges and universities in East Pakistan in particular. But West Pakistan was not left behind either. In the first week of January 1969, students in various areas of West Pakistan demonstrated against government repression. This followed the police firing on demonstrators from the Navy in Rawalpindi and on students of the Punjab University.

The movement in both the wings was supported by many eminent literary figures and artists some of whom were also arrested. In protest against these arrests a joint statement was issued by various-student organizations of West Pakistan. On 7 January about a thousand female students from various schools and colleges of Rawalpindi participated in a militant demonstration against the repression of students and the people at large. The students remained on the streets for three hours with other women from different strata also joining in solidarity. Even the *madrassa* students in both East and West Pakistan called upon the opposition parties to organize a united anti-Ayub government pro-democratic movement.

The 4 January 1969 resolution of the Working Committee of NAP (pro-Peking) under the presidency of Mowlana Bhashani called for boycotting the election. The positions at this point, of the other political parties were very different. They called a meeting of the opposition parties at the residence of Ahmedul Kabir of the NAP (pro-Moscow) on 5 January. This meeting was attended by the five parties that comprised the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) and the National Democratic Front (NDF). These were: the Jamaat-i-Islami, Nezam-i-Islam, pro-PDM Awami League, Council Muslim League and pro-Moscow NAP, pro-Six-Point Awami League and Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam. The pro-Peking NAP was not present at the meeting.

As Umar (2006) describes this meeting:

The eight parties in their 5 January meeting agreed to form a United Front, which was formed in a meeting on the following day and was called the Democratic Action Committee (DAC). They reached an agreement on universal adult franchise and a parliamentary system of government but were divided on the question of boycotting the election. Mahmudul Huq Usmani of the West Pakistan NAP (pro-Moscow) strongly

opposed the idea of a boycott. However, the pro-Six-Point Awami League decided to boycott the announced election and put forward a Four-Point programme for the consideration of the DAC—universal adult franchise, federal system of government, release of all political prisoners including Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Wali Khan, the withdrawal of all warrants of arrest against political persons, and the withdrawal of cases including the cases which were being tried by the tribunal.⁵⁵

He goes on to add:

The DAC declared an Eight-Point programme and Mahmudul Huq Usmani of the pro-Moscow NAP (Wali Khan) declared on behalf of the new united front, a programme of meetings and demonstrations throughout the country starting on 17 January as the first step of a wider movement. The Eight-Point programme did not include most of the major demands included in the Eleven-Point programme. Due to this and the absence of Bhashani and the NAP (pro-Peking), there was not much enthusiasm among a large section of students for it. Moreover, the Usmani announcement that after the 17 January programme they would wait two months before announcing their next programme, was a great disappointment. However, they also declared a programme of action for 17 January for their Eleven-Point programme.

The DAC-programme on 17 January began after the Friday prayer meeting at *Baitul Mokarram*. In spite of some opposition by the police and occasional skirmishes with them, a loosely connected and thinly manned procession passed through the Nawabpur Road without seriously defying Section 144 and finally reached the Bar Library Hall, where a meeting was held. The previously announced programme of a public meeting was cancelled and the DAC procession did not take the form of an angry demonstration.⁵⁶

However, the students-led demonstration was quite militant. I was with this other demonstration and can offer an eyewitness account:

We gathered under the famous *Bot Tala* or under the Banyan tree in the premises of the Arts Building of the Dhaka University and held a meeting under the presidency of Dhaka University Central Students' Union (DUCSU) Vice-President Tofail Ahmed. The day was called

⁵⁵ Umar(2006)

⁵⁶ Ibid.

the *Dabee Dibosh* or the Demand Day and the meeting was conducted on the basis of the Eleven-Points. On that day (17 January), Section 144 was imposed on certain areas of Dhaka including the areas in and around the university. But the DU students and others who were present decided to take out a demonstration according to the previously announced DUCSU program defying the repressive section 144.

The students came out of the Arts' Building through the westside gate in front of the Proctors' office. Then the procession took a left turn physically and figuratively and proceeded towards the Public Library. Our passage was stopped by the police in front of Rokeya Hall, and they sprayed colored water from the US made and supplied riot cars, and shot tear gas shells at us indiscriminately. There were also many *lathi* charges or attacks by the police carrying beating sticks and shields. But we were determined to defy all attacks and counterattacks with brickbats. The policemen retaliated ferociously. We fought like this for more than an hour, from 12:30 p.m. to 1:30 p.m. that afternoon. Several of us were wounded and a number of senior students were arrested.⁵⁷ We remained on the street for some time longer and then returned to the Arts Building and again gathered under the Banyan tree. A meeting was held there in which our leaders denounced the police action and declared a city-wide strike in Dhaka on the following day. The meeting demanded the withdrawal of Section 144 and called for a strike in all educational institutions throughout the province on 1 February.

Showing the success of the 11-point in effecting a broad-based student unity, in a press statement on 17 January the former General Secretary of NSF, Mahbubul Huq Dulan (General Secretary of DUCSU) and President of Jinnah Hall NSF Nazim Quamran Chowdhury and General Secretary of Mohsin Hall Students' Union, Ibrahim Khalil in a joint statement denounced the police attacks on students and expressed their solidarity with the movement. In the same spirit of solidarity, the students of the Dhaka Medical College had raised black flags at all of their buildings, worn black badges and joined the university students' meeting at the *Bot Tala* on 17 January earlier. The General Secretary of Pakistan Jamiyat-i-Talabaye Arabia, S.M. Idris, and the Acting General Secretary of the Pakistan Chhatra Shakti Shafiqur Rahman, in separate press statements on 17 January supported the students. On 18 January students in all of

⁵⁷ A police report put the number of arrested students at twenty-five. Such reports typically understated the numbers of casualties and arrests.

the educational institutions, including Dhaka University, Dhaka Medical College and the Engineering University went on strike according to the program I mentioned previously.

Excited by the experience of the previous day, I went early and found the *Bot Tala* almost empty. I was feeling nervous but one of the sweepers who was nearby assured me that students had nothing to fear and all the workers were with us. I did not quite grasp it then, but now I realize what a powerful political force student-worker-peasant and lower-middle-class unity represented then and can—if achieved again—become in the future.

Soon a large crowd of which I became a part of, assembled at the *Bot Tala*. Meanwhile, the police had put up barricades. They tried to stop the advance of us, students. Again, there were clashes of tear gas flying in our direction and any missiles that we could find including brickbats flying towards the police. At one point I saw some people set fire to an EPRTC (East Pakistan Road Transport Corporation) double-decker bus. These had been imported just recently and many of us enjoyed rides in them for the small ticket fare which was only 12 paisas (less than a few cents), and if I recall correctly, later after the military coup of Yahya Khan the bus fare would be nearly free for us students and we would get big discounts in movie theaters by showing our student IDs.

But the struggle was uneven as the tear gas shells kept exploding all around us. With burning eyes, we returned to the Arts Building. I remember that our leaders held a short meeting which was also addressed by the President of Dhaka University Teachers' Association, the respected professor of Chemistry and the Provost of S.M. Hall, Dr Mafizuddin Ahmad, and the Provost of Mohsin Hall, the physicist Dr Innas Ali. Dr. Ali recognized me since I was the previous winner of a nationwide science speaking contest in 1967 and used to see him and Dr. Wajed Mian to learn some advanced physics from time to time. He rebuked me mildly and affectionately and said that I was too young to get mixed up with politics of the older university students. But I suspected that he was in fact pleased with me for showing some political courage and dedication at such an early age. Having been rebuked though affectionately, and thinking of my mother's anxieties, at that point I decided to go home.

Later I learned that the police started even heavier tear gas shelling. More than twenty students needed medical care and were taken to the medical college hospital. It became known also that the police had shot tear gas shells into Rokeya Hall which was a women students' hostel. It was shocking to many middle-class parents but the police offered the excuse that pieces

of bricks were coming at them from Rokeya Hall thrown by the women students of that dormitory.

I also learned from the evening papers that after 2 p.m. a procession reached the Gulistan area and gathered around the famous cannon put there by the troops of Mir Jumla, an early Mughal governor of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa (Subeh Bangal). According to these reports, the student leaders had stood on the cannon and began to address the public who gathered there. They were attacked by the police again with tear gas and *lathi* charge causing a number of casualties.

On the same day, members of the East Pakistan Rifles (EPR) raided the male student dormitories, Jinnah Hall and Iqbal Hall of Dhaka University. These “heroic protectors” of our land brutally beat up a number of students. According to the reports, they arrested eleven students from Jinnah Hall and nine students from Iqbal Hall, and also entered some of the teachers’ quarters in the Nilkhet area which was then the location of many university teachers’ quarters.

In response to the EPR brutalities and violation of teachers’ and students’ rights, twenty-five student leaders of various educational institutions made a joint protest statement to the press that evening.⁵⁸ In that statement they also demanded unequivocally the release of arrested students. Even more importantly, these leaders declared a strike in all educational institutions of the province on 20 January which would turn out to be a fateful day and crucial for this stage of eventualizing dynamics of the mass movement.

For the sake of historical accuracy, it must be stressed that at this stage, in the absence of the top leaders of the Awami League and the NAP (Peking) and the ineffective role of NAP (Moscow)⁵⁹ and the DAC, the students had to depend mostly on their own resources. However, also for the sake of historical accuracy, it must be stressed time and time again that at this stage, many individual rank and file members of both the NAPS and the Communist Parties participated out of a sense of moral obligation and common feelings of anger and frustration.

We should also recall that at this time Sheikh Mujib, Tajuddin and other Awami League leaders were in jail and Maulana Bhashani was again missing from action. At that crucial time. No one including his colleagues in the NAP or his partners in the EPCP could find him. Some

⁵⁸ i.e. the evening of 18 January.

⁵⁹ I personally went to many of these demonstrations because of the involvement of elder members of my family who were active in these at that time ineffective political organizations.

said that he was Panchbibi in Bogra. But the pro-Peking Students' Union leaders (Menon Group) could not find the Maulana in Bogra.

On 20 January, 1969 students from all educational institutions gathered in the Dhaka University campus grounds. It seems silly to write this now, but we thought we had armed ourselves well with bamboo sticks, iron rods and, of course enough pieces of brick called *surki* in Bangla. By noon the number of people ready for action had swelled to more than ten thousand. After a brief meeting that was held near *Bot Tala*, we came out in large numbers. But our procession was held up by the police forces who were in front of the university gate near the Rashid Building. A small section of the older students broke the police cordon and reached Bahadur Shah Park in old Dhaka where they held a meeting; but the major section of which I was a part of remained near the university gate where exchanges of tear gas shelling and brick throwing continued without respite for either side. Then the police opened fire on us, the students and a front-ranking leader of the Student Union (Menon group), Asaduzzaman was killed on the spot. That was indeed a turning point. Asaduzzaman's death provoked widespread protests and demonstrations in Dhaka and other parts of East Pakistan. A few hours after the incident, students gathered in front of the Dhaka Medical College and after a short meeting they took out a silent black flag procession. An unprecedented though not very large at this point number of teachers of the Dhaka University also joined the procession. On the evening of 20 January and on 21 January many militant demonstrations took place in all areas of Dhaka and on the latter day, a *Gayebana Janaza* (final rites without the body of the martyr) was held in front of *Baitul Mokarram* mosque.⁶⁰ The Eventualizing dynamics reached a new level of intensity when a hundred thousand people showed up for this---most of them had come spontaneously.

Following this trajectory of Eventualizing dynamics, on 23 January the students of Dhaka took out an unprecedented---- in terms of its scale at any rate---torchlight procession through, the city streets lighting up the night sky with their torch flames. Since the morning the students of various educational- institutions had been taking out processions through the streets in thousands. The DAC also brought out-a procession that was organized mostly by the Awami League and the NAP (pro-Moscow). There were several thousand participants in this procession. The number might seem small but one has to keep in mind that this event happened in spite of the imposition of the notoriously repressive Section 144. Noticing the anger and the level of

⁶⁰ This was and still is one of the major modern mosques in Dhaka

mass organization, the top police hierarchy wisely decided to follow a policy of no police interference anywhere and the processions were nonviolent and peaceful. Slogans were raised in unison by all the organizations for the release of political prisoners and the support of the 11-points. This was the point in the Eventualizing dynamics of ultimately the liberation movement and war when the 11-points became the progressive mass agenda.

It should also be mentioned that during the course of this torch procession of which I was fortunately and proudly a part, we were joined by many small processions of students and workers. Some of them were transport workers including rickshaw and baby-taxi drivers, office workers and even people from white collar professions. We did not honestly expect many white-collar workers for such a demonstration which was expected to have and did assume in fact, a mass militant character.

The role of progressive leftist women of Dhaka needs to be emphasized here. Begum Sufia Kamal, Zohra Tajuddin, Raziya Mahmud, Kamrunnahar Laily, Begum Idris and many other progressive women activists joined our three-mile-long procession. The whole event assumed a character of the festival of a united people's protest with people from the sides all along the route showing their enthusiastic support. The large amount of oil needed for the *mashals* (torches) was supplied voluntarily by some progressive petrol pump owners.

With such a demonstration of mass support---at least in Dhaka and environs---on the 23rd, the torchlight procession was interpreted correctly as a clear indication that Friday, 24 January would be an even more militantly successful demonstration of the public's just demands. It may be recalled that the call for a general strike on 24 January was issued by the All Party Student Committee (*Sharba Daliya Chhatra Shangram Parishad*). It became a most appropriate political call under the unfolding Eventualizing dynamics.

On 24 January, since very early in the morning small groups of people began to gather in different parts and *mahallas* (neighborhoods) of Dhaka city. The shops in old Dhaka---supposedly the habitat of more conservative Dhakaiyas---- were closed first again showing that the theory of eventualizing dynamics was indeed at work. Wisely, all public transportation vehicles were kept off the streets. Every type of workers from manual day laborers and factory workers to white collar office employees, including many employees of the East Pakistan Secretariat were on the streets of Dhaka.

The students again took the lead soon after the office hours had begun. A sizeable students' procession in which I was also present entered the Motijheel Commercial Area. Our leaders called out with megaphones for the office employees to come out and join us. The workers in Motijheel Commercial Area responded positively and happily, and we grew in numbers even more as the day went on. From the Motijheel Commercial Area the procession went towards the nearby government secretariat and confirming the Eventualizing dynamics theory, even the government employees left their desks at the secretariat and came out in large numbers to join our procession honoring the call of the students and other demonstrators. At this stage the police charged, precipitating a struggle between us the demonstrators and the repressive arm of the colonial state apparatus. Needless to say, tear gas shells were flying towards us and we threw back anything at hand including the tear gas shells themselves.

In the heat of those exciting moments, I, like many others at the scene, had not realized that during these exchanges the police opened fire injuring seriously a number of demonstrators. But the news of the police action had apparently spread quickly and people as if from nowhere appeared in large numbers to support us. Together we surrounded the Secretariat and the fighting continued especially in the area on and near the Abdul Ghani Roadside of the secretariat. This is where the two teenage boys, Matiur Rahman and Rustam Ali were martyred.

But proving Lenin right who had said that at certain moments in mass struggles, the people are finally ready to defy death, or as he put it, "develop a contempt for death", the demonstrating people showed indomitable courage and unforgettable persistence. By midday, there were more police firings and more deaths of innocent unarmed people.

Confirming again the theory of eventualizing dynamics, the news of these police firings and killings travelled like lightning throughout the city. Workers from Demra, Adamjee, Tejgaon and Tjngi and from the other side of the river Buriganga rushed to join us and the scene was even more vibrant and death-defying. Our working-class brothers showed us how to fight more effectively. I certainly learned much more in that one day's encounter than from radical lectures and books either up to that time or even up to now.

I stayed long enough with the crowd to see how the workers and students attacked the official residences of the collaborationist ministers on the Abdul Ghani Road and set them ablaze. They also attacked two pro-government newspapers—the English daily *Morning News* and the Bengali daily *Daijik Pakistan*. They set fire to the offices of both the newspapers. As a

consequence of the day's protests the government escalated the situation by calling up the army. Even the government report admitted that people had died on the spot. It was impossible for the rulers to suppress the news of killings because the demonstrators had been able to carry two dead bodies away. Needless to say, that the killings in front of the newspaper offices in Motijheel further angered the people and this quickly developed into a full-scale uprising of the people confirming for this stage of the struggle the eventualizing dynamics thesis completely. However, given the abdication of responsibility for leading the people by those political parties who had some leaders outside of jail, the student leaders were at a strategic dead end. Thus, the movement was seemingly at a dead end, but it was really a bifurcation point confirming the theory of transformation of a complex system.⁶¹

⁶¹ For more details about "events" of the movements, the inquisitive reader can see Hannan, Mohammad, *Political History of Bangladesh*. (Dhaka: Annannya, 2001)

Bangladesher Chatro Andoloner Itihash, Vol. 1, (Dhaka: Bhinnomot, 1984)

Bangladesher Chatro Andoloner Itihash, Vol. 2, (Dhaka: Wali Prokashoni, 1987)

Bangladesher Chatro Andoloner Itihash, Vol. 3, (Dhaka: Granthalok, 1990)

Bangladesher Chatro Andoloner Itihash, Vol. 4, (Dhaka: Granthalok, 1990)

See also, Lenin Azad, *Unshottorer Gonoabhyutthan: ekti shomajtantrik bisleshon*, (Dhaka: Dhaka University Department of Sociology, Ph.D. dissertation, 1993)

Rozina Quader, *Dhakar Shanskritik Andolon: 1958-1971* (Dhaka: Dhaka University Department of History, M. Phil. Thesis, 2005)

Chapter 4:

Jan. 25 to Feb.23

In the last chapter, we discussed how the hypothesis of eventualization dynamics is confirmed in large parts by the events as part of a larger, more complex historical process with its own complex dialectics. Here we begin with another part of this complexity that has to do with the failure of leadership from time to time. In this case the failure stemming from lack of foresight and planning was temporary. Even so the resolution will take a few more weeks involving great ambiguity and uncertainty. Therefore, our task in this chapter is to unpack some of this complexity by unraveling certain knots in the temporal process that had unfolded from December 6, 1968 onwards. We have seen how on January 24 the students were joined by others. The challenge was to propel this unified stream of popular consciousness forward through further political action and organization. Here the student leaders were clearly out of their depth. During the struggle, the students had announced a program which would, after a public meeting at Paltan Maidan, result in a march through the Nawabpur Road and the Old parts of Dhaka City. However, much of the struggles I have described in Chapter Three include spontaneous developments, some of which I witnessed firsthand as they unfolded. It is not surprising that the situation which developed threw the student leaders off balance. If they had made some strategic calculations---and it is by no means clear that they had--- these calculations were thrust into great disarray. The lack of strategic foresight stemming largely from the inexperience of these leaders led also to tactical floundering. Later, many--- including Abdur Razzak and Sirajul Alam Khan in particular---talked and wrote about the so-called “nucleus” of independent Bangladesh movement where the leaders planned with great foresight. But as Tofail Ahmad himself stated forcefully, such claims are highly exaggerated and results of hindsight and self-inflation rather than verified (or perhaps even verifiable) historic truths.

My own observations accord with those of other observers and analysts such as Umar, Menon and Ahmad. That afternoon, it was obvious that the student leaders were understandably panicky. After all, the tremendous response from the militant masses was surprising to everyone including those like myself who were themselves the direct participants in those actions. Certainly, the absence of seasoned political actors from the higher echelons of the opposition

political parties contributed to this state of affairs. Therefore, the student leaders should not be blamed for their state of mind full of confusion. If anyone is to be blamed, it should be the group of absent political party leaders from among those who were not in jail. In fact, we will see that up until *Bangabondhu* and some of the communist leaders came out of the jail, this state of affairs continued. What is really surprising that in spite of many weaknesses at the individual leadership level and failures of coordination quite natural in large scale movements, so much was accomplished between January 25 and February 23--- a period of a mere few weeks. Our claim is that the best explanation for this kind of success is offered by the theory of polyphonic eventualizing dynamics. The rest of this chapter will illustrate this main thesis for the period January 25 to February 23, 1969.

To continue with the narrative, indeed a huge and angry crowd assembled at the Paltan Maidan where the *Namaz-e-Janaza* was held with the bodies of the martyred school student Matiur Rahman and another student from Comilla whose name was not announced. This ritual prayer gathering also included a *Gayebana Janaza*. The latter was held for the those whose bodies either could not be found or could not be brought to the Paltan Maidan at that hour. However, after that ritual was over the student leaders could not give any guidance to the crowd. No one seemed to know what to do next.

The student leaders could not do anything more than announcing that they would take the bodies to the Iqbal Hall grounds of Dhaka University for another round of funeral rites, asking the crowd to disperse and go home. Naturally, it angered the people who had come out for further political action. Many of them decided to go to Iqbal Hall and confront the student leaders directly. In front of Iqbal Hall, the students held another meeting and announced that they would hold consultations with the labor and peasant association leaders. At that time, there was open resentment against this amidst some member. At that moment, the great majority in the crowd began shouting slogans against the student leaders themselves charging them with incompetence. They took the initiative themselves and declared that a *hartal* or a general strike would be held on the following day and began to disperse from the premises of Iqbal Hall in small groups. Later many of these student leaders ---particularly those who claimed to have been planning for independence and revolution through the so-called nucleus---would pass over this episode in silence. The truth is that the “nucleus” if it ever existed never had any plans regarding how to lead a movement when it arose largely as a dynamic process or through what I have been

calling a particular eventualization dynamics. Those who were actually in leading roles like Tofail Ahmed improvised as well as they could and Tofail Ahmad in particular acquitted himself well as subsequent events would show.

The truth is that during this great January uprising, the enraged people who were attaining a new political consciousness rapidly, organized themselves and armed with whatever they could find, they began to strike militantly at one target after another during these episodes there was no organized leadership from either the political parties or the student leaders. These events would prefigure the initial resistance to the army after March 25-26, 1971 which was not planned and was largely self-organized by local leaders among civilians, police and armed forces personnel who were Bangalees. But organized leadership at various levels would emerge through the operation of forces that gave the impetus to the powerful eventualizing dynamics.

Returning to our story of January 1969, although January 24 could be characterized as the day when students' power was the greatest, from that day onwards, the students were not the sole actors. They certainly were not the main leaders anymore. This affected the self-image of the more egoistic and egotistic student leaders. During the actual liberation war this would lead to difficulties even within the AL itself where some younger leaders went on an open campaign against the acting prime minister and president who were the main AL leaders recognized by supporters within and outside today's Bangladesh. However, this is not to say that the students did not remain a force. They certainly did continue to be an effective political force and remained active on the streets, however, other popular forces awakened and joined the students on the streets, in villages and town markets. Independent actions that were going on in fields and factories multiplied and coalesced. The main forces for the overthrow of the Ayub Regime were thus nearly ready. Soon an appropriate leadership at the national level would emerge.

The dictatorship was predictably unnerved by these unforeseen developments of eventualizing dynamics. They reacted in predictable repressive fashion. Thus, on 24 January at 6 p.m. the government announced a 24-hour curfew for Dhaka from 8 p.m. But that could not stop the rising tide of defiance. In spite of the curfew, students, workers and ordinary people in Tejgaon, Azimpur and parts of old Dhaka, brought out small demonstrations and violated the curfew. As a resident of Azimpur, I participated and observed the acts of defiance when people resisted heroically the diktats of a government made even more alien by its own repression hour by hour. The reports showed that the armed forces fired on these demonstrations in at least

thirteen places, killing many people on 25 January. But even the killings could not stop the resistance of the people. Unsurprisingly, another 24-hour curfew was announced in Dhaka that was further extended till 5 p.m. on 26 January. Extended further, this curfew remained in force till the evening of 27 January. As a result, more protests broke out not only in Dhaka but also in other areas outside of Dhaka. These areas included Chittagong, Narayanganj, Mymensingh and almost all district and even smaller towns. There were waves upon waves of ordinary citizens protesting. The police and army fired upon these unarmed citizens. Many were dead and even larger numbers were wounded. Arrests also were indiscriminate. But all of these measures seemingly only increased peoples' determination to resist and revolt.

At this point the DAC showed some leadership and courage; it demanded the immediate lifting of the curfew and the complete withdrawal of the East Pakistan Rifles (EPR) and the armed forces. This was followed by some further organizing efforts. The panicky government responded by arresting some of the leftwing leaders. For example, on 29 January, Professor Muzaffar Ahmad- of NAP (pro-Moscow) was arrested. On the popular side, on that day some civil society organizations responded courageously. For instance, the Dhaka High Court Bar Association held an emergency meeting after which it strongly denounced the imposition of curfew in Dhaka and other areas and the shooting and killing of innocent citizens by the government forces. The eventualizing dynamics could not be stopped from unfolding. Rather it spread to more remote areas such as the Jajira *thana* of Madaripur subdivision of Faridpur district, and Bhederganj, another nearly inaccessible area of Madaripiir. In these places and others like them many people were killed and wounded on 31 January.

The situation on university campuses remained volatile. This is shown by the fact that on 30 January the Rajshahi University Teachers' Association denounced police interference in the university affairs. Furthermore, on 4 February journalists throughout East Pakistan observed a 24-hour strike supporting the people's movement and particularly in protest against repression of newspapers and professional journalists. Also, notwithstanding the curfew, the Students' Action Committee (SAC) had made a statement to the press in the evening of 27 January. This statement was also published in the form of a leaflet. I remember distributing these leaflets with my fellow activists to an eager and supportive mass of people. The statement in the leaflet declared flatly that an uprising of the people was taking place and severe repression by the autocratic government would not be able to stop this uprising by the people. We will fight on until the

overthrow of the oppressive dictatorial. Our clear goal was the establishment of a democratic system with full regional autonomy for East Bengal, abolition of feudalism, monopoly, capitalism, imperialism and genuine freedom for all political prisoners and solution of numerous problems of students, workers, peasants as well as professionals and small businesses including retailers and small and medium size industry owners. Both the Six and the Eleven-Point demand charters were mentioned. It was drafted with input that came from the more radical progressive sections of the SAC leadership.

Even more importantly, there was the vow to continue the on-ground activism of the students and their allies. The leaflet expressed unequivocally that the students and their allies would not rest ---indeed they cannot rest---until the main objectives of the movement stated clearly were achieved. Not only this. The SAC declared a concrete program of action. Organizationally, the plan also included the setting up of action committees in all districts, subdivisions, *thanas* and villages and in all educational institutions, industrial areas and localities. The need for widespread ideological work was also mentioned. This agenda included the need for extensive ideological work through leaflets, wall writings⁶², street meetings, organizing volunteer squads, maintaining communal harmony, etc. Showing much foresight, it recognized clearly the necessity for an extension of the movement to rural areas.

In addition to a call to extend financial help to the fallen martyrs' families, the leaflet showed an awareness of the need for justice towards ordinary workers. Thus, it asked the people to give proper fares and wages to the rickshaw drivers, daily wage labors and other working people in offices and factories. Showing an awareness of real relations of production in urban small transport sector, we the students appealed to the rickshaw owners not to charge a whole day's rent from the rickshaw drivers, and to the shopkeepers and businessmen not to charge extra prices for the daily necessities of life.

This important document reflecting a realistic assessment of our struggle thus far and its potentials and possible problems for the future was signed by the representatives of the Students' League, both factions (pro-Moscow and pro-Peking) of the Student Union, the National Students' Federation (NSF) and the Vice-President and General Secretary of Dhaka University Student Union (DUCSU). February 6, 1969 will live on in the history of popular struggles as a

⁶² A new phrase, "*Chika Mara*" entered the Bangla political vocabulary. Literally meaning the "killing of rats", it meant writing revolutionary slogans on the walls late at night when the police would be asleep.

great day of unity of the oppressed. On that day, at the call of the All-Party Students' Action Committee, students of Dhaka observed a black day in perfect unity. Black flags were flown in all educational institutions, transports, small shops and even some neighborhood mosques and temples. Big character largely handwritten slogans saying 'Ayub Go Back' were pasted on buses. Baby taxis, rickshaws and trucks. The province wide strike was completely successful.

At noon a meeting was held at the new Arts Building of Dhaka University with students and teachers from the entire city participating. I was fortunate to be a part of this gathering. The main speaker was the Vice-President of DUCSU, Tofail Ahmad who declared on behalf of the All-Party Students' Action Committee that the students and the people of Purba Bangla (East Bengal) would not accept any decision of the proposed Round Table Conference until Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Wali Khan, Professor Muzaffar Ahmad, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and others, including arrested students were released and warrants of arrest and cases against Mohammad Toaha, Abdul Huq, Mohammad Fahad and others were withdrawn. The SAC demands also asked for the withdrawal of the emergency declaration that made violation of basic rights lawful. Another demand was for lifting the ban on the *Daily Ittefaq* which was the standard bearer of the AL.

With historical perspectives that fifty years after those momentous events can offer and taking all evidence into account, it seems fair to say now that during that first week of February 1969, the popular movement spearheaded by the Eleven-Point movement became heightened ushering in a new more progressive phase. Unlike even the previous month, various organizations and the political parties, either as a component part of the DAC or independently, came forward in support of this unprecedented mass movement with the potential for creating a truly people's agenda. The possibility of creating such a people's charter can be seen in the great stirring that began throughout the country among different sections of the middle-class, the workers and peasants. Such was the eventualizing dynamics at this point that by mid-February it developed into a massive movement for national resistance against the repressions of the sham democratic authoritarian government of Ayub Khan.

Further program for a public meeting and demonstration was announced for 7 February by the women of Dhaka showing the self-organization capabilities of the women at this point. This meeting was presided over by the poet- activist Begum Sufia Kamal, a lifelong principled fighter for women's and people's rights. The meeting which was held at the Bahadur Shah Park

in old Dhaka was attended by more than 2,000 women. With perfect clarity, those attending expressed unequivocal support for the progressive agenda expressed in the Eleven-Point program. They also demanded a judicial enquiry into the police firings and punishment for those who were culpable. Like the SAC demands, this meeting also demanded the release of all political prisoners to create a congenial and peaceful atmosphere as a pre-condition for the Round Table Conference between the Central Government and the opposition.

It may be recalled that Ayub Khan had proposed the Round Table Conference as a concession to the opposition forces on 1 February. Ayub Khan himself had arrived in Dhaka on 6 February. According to all appearances, there has been a considerable softening in his attitude towards the movement and he seemed to be eager to make some compromises with the opposition in order to resolve the deepening crisis of governance.

Some further political developments took place on the same afternoon of Friday, 7 February. A NAP (pro-Peking) meeting was held at their office. In this meeting, Maulana Bhashani extended his full support to the *hartal* announced for 14 February. Showing his resolve, he asked his party workers to work for its success and to join the demonstration in support of the Eleven-Point demand. Some of his fellow travelers in the pro-Peking EPCP were opposed but Bhashani realized that the popular struggles are going in the anti-Ayub direction regardless of what Peking wanted for its ally.

The next big event took place on 9 February. On that day, a huge meeting with thousands attending was sponsored by the SAC. It was held at the Paltan Maidan. In this meeting, the students expressed their unflinching determination to continue the struggle on the basis of the Eleven Points. Now on the defensive, the government made some concessions. The ban on the publication of the *Daily Ittefaq* was lifted, and on the same day that the ban on the publication of the *Daily Ittefaq* was lifted, it was announced that the Emergency would be lifted within two days and followed immediately by the release of political prisoners. In fact, on 9 February 144 political prisoners were released from the Dhaka Central Jail and some leading opposition party members were released the next day. Continuing this trend, on 12 February, Tajuddin Ahmad, the General Secretary of the Awami League (pro-Six Points) was released. On the 13th of February, sixty-five other political prisoners, were released.

Ayub went even further trying to effect a strategic compromise in order to derail the people's movement. He addressed a session of his reactionary party, the Convention Muslim League in Dhaka at that time, and announced that a new economic policy was being worked out to remove existing disparities between the two wings of Pakistan. It was the first clear and formal recognition that disparities existed between East and West Pakistan. Ayub Khan also met the vice-chancellors of the universities in East Pakistan and discussed with them the question of abrogating the University Ordinance. Thus, the clever strategy of Ayub making enough concessions without surrendering control was unveiled.

As far as the right of center DAC leadership was concerned, these acts and announcements by President Ayub fulfilled the conditions of the more conciliatory DAC leaders and they were prepared to attend the Round Table Conference.

However, a conflict developed within the DAC on the question of the release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. This was a serious issue. The DAC had earlier announced that they were not in favor of tagging the question of release of political prisoners with that of release of those who were detained in connection with the Agartala Conspiracy Case including Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. So, from their standpoint all impediments in the way holding the Round Table Conference had already been removed and the stage was set to convene it.

However, the pro-Six Point Awami League was firmly opposed to this position and declared that there was no question of them participating in the Round Table Conference without their Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. As long as Sheikh Mujibur Rahman remained in custody, there was no question of the AL attending the Round Table Conference. The DAC meekly responded that since the Agartala Conspiracy Case was a question of national security, the prisoners detained in that case, could not be equated with other political prisoners. Needless to say, this was anathema to the AL. Naturally, the Awami League took a completely different stand. Given this fundamental point of disagreement, the AL refused to attend without Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The NAP (pro-Moscow) held the same view as the Awami League. However, some leaders of NAP in the interest of unity were willing to work with the DAC. Thus, the DAC was hamstrung by the hodgepodge and incoherent nature of its composition.

Ayub left Dhaka on 11 February and before his departure said the question of national security was involved in the Agartala Conspiracy Case and the prisoners detained in that case

could not be released. Sensing its mass support base swelling, the Awami League announced a *hartal* throughout East Pakistan for 14 February and a public meeting in Dhaka the same day—in protest against the repressions and for the release of their leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The NAP (pro-Peking) also called a public meeting on 16 February at the Paltan Maidan in Dhaka.

The strength of progressives in civil society was demonstrated also when the writers, artists and cultural workers brought out a torch procession in Dhaka and declared their opposition to any kind of compromise with the Ayub regime and expressed solidarity with the Eleven-Point movement. In many cities of West Pakistan large demonstrations and torch processions were also observed opposing the Round Table Conference. The opposition became even more broad-based when seven members of the East Pakistan Provincial Assembly, which included three belonging to the NAP (pro-Peking), resigned in protest against repression of the people and in support of the Eleven-Point movement. In East Pakistan, a large number of Basic Democrats resigned, and it was reported in the Dhaka newspapers on 13 February that 300 had resigned in West Pakistan. On the 12th, the Rickshaw Workers' Union announced that 30,000 rickshaw workers would go on strike if Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was not released.

The AL was right about the broad-based support for its 14 February action. In fact, the *hartal* was unprecedented in that it was observed across the whole of Pakistan. An amazingly large public meeting was held at Paltan Maidan in Dhaka and attended by the DAC leaders. Somehow, no one was allowed to speak by the audience except Tajuddin Ahmad, Syed Nazrul-Islam and Muzaffar Ahmad (pro-Moscow NAP). This showed that a center-left alliance was indeed a strong possibility and perhaps was already in its early stages of being solidified. As a participant-observer, I remember that the mood of the crowd was definitely and defiantly militant.

During and after that February 14 meeting also, the Paltan Maidan reverberated with the militant slogan, “*Gol Tebil na Rasta—Rasta, Rasta*” ---“Round Table or the street? —the street, the street.”

The following day a tragic event occurred in the Dhaka Cantonment. This was the murder of Sergeant Zahurul Huq in the Dhaka Cantonment on 15 February 1969. As soon as the news of this incident got out of the Dhaka Cantonment, it took the agitation against the Ayub regime to a higher level with redoubled intensity. It was a clear case of custodial killing and abuse of power. But a press release of the Mass Communication Directorate of the Armed Forces said that while

attempting an escape from detention in the Dhaka Cantonment, Sergeant Zahurul Huq and his companion Flight Sergeant Fazlul Huq had attacked the sentries. Other sentries on duty fired upon them in order to prevent the escape of the prisoners, and both of them were wounded. Zahurul Huq was hit in the lower abdomen and he died at 9:30 p.m. in the Combined Military Hospital. The two had been accused in the frame-up known as the Agartala Conspiracy Case. No one was convinced by this justificatory press release. On the contrary, the people saw this press release as further evidence of the culpability of the self-serving Ayub regime.

The following day a NAP(Bhashani) meeting in the afternoon was a big success. The Paltan Maidan was flooded with workers and peasants from the industrial areas and the villages from the other side of the Buriganga river and the surrounding areas. Their number swelled to tens of thousands as more joined from within Dhaka. The mood of the people assembled at the Paltan Maidan was militant. The organized factory and transport workers, peasants, shop workers, press workers etc. played a dominant role and in spite of efforts by the reactionary elements to the contrary. There were rumors circulating about possible attacks. But nobody was able to disrupt the meeting.⁶³ Naturally, this Paltan Maidan meeting was presided over by Bhashani who declared that if the government did not accept the Eleven-Point demand within two months from that date, then the people would stop paying rents and taxes. He also declared that the days of the constitutional movement were over, and the existing extra-parliamentary armed struggle would continue. He was clearly exaggerating the armed struggle part, but the *Gherao* or Surrounding the factory owners' movement was already underway in a militant mass action fashion.

Addressing the DAC leaders, Bhashani made a historic analogy by comparison with the 1930 conference. I remember being quite impressed by the way he put this point which suddenly made dry pages of our history book come alive for me and many others at that meeting. The Maulana said that the result of participation in the Round Table Conference proposed by President Ayub Khan would be no different from the results of participation of Indian leaders in the Round Table Conferences convened by the British government. In fact, it would be even worse. He said that as the Round Table Conferences of the British government had not brought anything for the people, so the proposed RTC will also fail to achieve anything for the people.

⁶³ I remember feeling nervous at first; but seeing thousands of militant workers in particular, somehow filled me with courage and hope.

Resolutions were passed in that meeting denouncing the repressions on the students and others and demanding the immediate release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and other prisoners detained in the Agartala Conspiracy Case. Many slogans were raised in that meeting urging the Bengalis to rise to the occasion and fight for full and complete autonomy for East Pakistan. Like the meeting of February 14, the whole area again resounded with the slogan: *Round Table or the street?—The street, the street!* As far as I can recall, everyone there including me took up the chant. It seemed veritably the right demand from the masses then and there.

Unknown to me and many others, during the meeting, the police had opened fire nearby at the Abdul Ghani Road on a procession which was moving towards the Paltan meeting. This brutal and irresponsible police firing resulted in the death of a worker. On receiving this sad news, Maulana Bhashani immediately led us all in a prayer for the salvation of the departed soul. He quickly made up his mind regarding the next step and started leading a demonstration out of Paltan Maidan. Right at that point, another huge procession reached the Paltan Maidan carrying the body of Sergeant Zahurul Huq. It was an amazing scene of mourning and militancy combined in equal degrees.

But the police once again opened fire on that procession in front of the residence of the provincial communication minister. This was even more brutal as three persons were hit. The bullets killed one person who died on the spot. The masses were so enraged that it was difficult to maintain discipline. But the organizers showed great presence of mind by calling for funeral prayers to be held right then. The masses followed and a *janaza* prayer was conducted by Maulana Bhashani for Zahiirul Huq and others. But the masses in their grief and anger could no longer be controlled. They set fire to the house of the Communication Minister, Sultan Ahmad. Spontaneously, some people snatched rifles from the policemen showing great courage in open rebellion.

They then set fire to the residences of Nawab Khwaja Hasan Askari, President of the Provincial Convention Muslim League and Khwaja Shahabuddin, Central Minister for Information and Broadcasting. The enraged crowd then burnt the provincial Convention Muslim League office which was under construction in front of the Post-Graduate Medical Hospital. Many other buildings belonging to pro-government people were also set on fire on that evening of 16 February. The government reaction was to announce a curfew till 7 a.m. the next morning.

After assessing the situation further, this curfew was extended up to the 18th with only a few hours of hiatus in the morning. However, more unrest was almost inevitable with further brutalities by the regime.

On 18 February another death at the Rajshahi University Campus in Northern Bengal made the situation more turbulent in the whole province. At around noon in Rajshahi, there developed a confrontation between the students and the police near the western gate of the Rajshahi University. Acting recklessly, the police opened fire on the students and also on some teachers who were with the students. Among those seriously injured was Dr Shamsuzzoha. He was a highly respected academic, a Reader in the Department of Chemistry and the Proctor of Rajshahi University. Dr Zoha later died at the Rajshahi Medical College Hospital in the afternoon. The reaction across the province was almost immediate upon hearing this tragic news.

The curfew was still in force in Dhaka, but in spite of the curfew, tens of, thousands of people began to raise anti-government slogans in the streets and from the housetops. All went out defying the curfew after the news of Dr Zoha's death reached Dhaka. Late into that night people continued to demonstrate against the government brutalities. The armed forces who were trying to control the public spaces, opened fire on the people several times, but the resistance of the people truly showed their contempt for death. Their resistance continued throughout the whole night. The government officially admitted the deaths of twenty people, though from sympathetic police officers we heard that the true number of deaths passed the one hundred mark. The bodies were removed by the armed forces under the cover of darkness and no one will ever know how they were disposed of. On the next day, 19 February although the curfew was officially in force, the anger of the people was such that they came onto the streets in huge numbers and the curfew was virtually suspended. Barricades were raised at a large number of points. Various slogans resounded in the street but the slogans for the withdrawal of the Agartala Conspiracy Case and for the release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman surpassed all others in their frequency and volume. The All-Party Students' Action Committee had demanded earlier that 21 February be declared as *Shaheed Day* and also an official holiday. The United Front government, after the election of 1954, had declared 21 February as a holiday but this was cancelled after the promulgation of Martial Law in October 1958. After more than ten years, under pressure of the massive popular movement, on 16 February the government of East Pakistan had declared 21 February as an official holiday. Thus, even though the political prisoners were yet to be released, the activists

had achieved a significant symbolic victory that buoyed them and their supporters greatly at this point in the still unfolding struggle for liberation.

Along with this symbolic triumph, the people's death-defying movement against the military regime of Ayub Khan had also inspired the cultural activists in East Pakistan. These cultural workers among whom I could proudly count myself albeit not in the front rank by any means had constituted an important part of the resistance movement throughout since 1952. At this point however, their impact increased manifold because of the development in the political struggles of which culture was clearly a part of. On 21 February, 1969, many cultural organizations and student bodies---led by the leftist EPSU and the nationalist EPSL---now decided to suspend their separate and individual programs and observe this 21 February under a common united platform showing unprecedented maturity of the mass student movement since 1952.

The background to forging the actual unity for joint action is as follows. A meeting of cultural workers, students, artists and other interested parties was held in the premises of the Dhaka Press Club in the first week of February in which people like Kamal Lohani and Badruddin Umar played key roles. We note that this meeting showed great organizational and tactical foresight as it took place before the announcement of the provincial government later regarding 21 February. Clearly, no one could predict that outcome at that meeting; but the organizers set this demand as a key tactical goal. Showing practical organizational sense, a very detailed program was worked out by leading cultural workers of Dhaka for 21 February, 1969. The program was divided in two parts---one for 21 February and the other for the next day. Following the tradition started by the progressives, on 21 February wreaths were placed at dawn on the graves of the language movement martyrs and a meeting was held after that hallowed ceremony at the *Batamul* (the banyan tree) of the Bangla Academy. Abul Hashim----- the father of Badruddin Umar who had become a leading intellectual of the left through his work matched by his uncompromising integrity and sacrifices---presided over the meeting. However, the program for 22 February was jettisoned because of political developments on that very day. The Agartala Conspiracy Case was withdrawn and all prisoners, including Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, were released on the night of 21 February. Before that, on 21 February, Ayub Khan had announced that he would not seek re-election as President for another term. This was considered a major victory.

The prominent left leader Haider Akbar Khan Rano in his book *Shatabdi Periye* has an interesting account of Mujib's sudden release. According to Rano, even the leaders outside including students' movement leaders were completely taken by surprise. Ultimately, as he and others in the movement concluded, it really attested to the tremendous force and power of organized people's movement.⁶⁴

But the release was so sudden that even the papers on 21 February could not carry this news⁶⁵. As Rano describes how his parents discovered the Sheikh's release when they were coming to their new home on Road No. 32 in Dhanmondi next to the Mujib residence. Apparently, they spotted a military vehicle as they were near their home on Road 32. Their driver was trying to overtake the military jeep but was forbidden to do so by Rano's father. Suddenly, the jeep stopped startling the passengers in the car following who were Rano's parents. They could not believe their own eyes when they saw Sheikh Mujib and his military escorts get out of the car. This was the scene of something very human for all of them. Needless to say, Rano's parents got off their car and walked towards the recently released Sheikh Mujib. Sheikh Mujib knew them as neighbors. He embraced Rano's father warmly. Rano's parents then let Rano know of this event which to them was nothing short of a miracle. Rano ran to the Mujib residence as his parents proceeded to give the great news to the others at the Dhaka University.⁶⁶

After Rano got to the Sheikh's house, he had to wait while more people gathered. When there were more than a thousand people on the street, Sheikh Mujib appeared on his balcony with a mike at hand. From there he addressed people briefly. This prefigured March, 1971 when the crowds will be much larger and Sheikh Mujib would virtually run an independent government of Bangladesh. It is significant that Sheikh Mujib in this brief speech mainly talked about all kinds of exploitation and oppression. He also avoided a narrow provincial nationalism. In fact, he emphasized that there were indeed exploited and oppressed people in West Pakistan with whom he was in solidarity.

⁶⁴ Haider Akbar Khan Rano in his book *Shatabdi Periye* (Dhaka: Tarafdar Prokashoni), 2005:183

⁶⁵ One can listen to the relevant part of Prime Minister HE Sheikh Hasina's talk to the young people on Dec. 13, 2018 in Channel I and also her recollections about her mother: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WfJj6EX5fhQ> and <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HKJ1ZJyFUh0>

Hon. Tofail Ahmed's recollections in *Tritiya Matra*, Oct. 31, 2019. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tYGYvi0M2yk> See also Sobhan(2016) from Chapter 11 onwards.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* pp.183-84

Not only was Sheikh Mujib playing the role of a legitimate popular leader even then, he was also cognizant of his neighbor and the younger leader in front of his house. He greeted Rano and asked him how he was. Rano stated that he was not known to the crowd; but after Sheikh Mujib Greeted him Rano attracted much curious attention from the crowd.

By coincidence, it seems Rano was also at the NAP leader Sayeedul Hasan's house when on the same day, Sheikh Mujib went to visit Maulana Bhashani who was staying with Hasan. It is perhaps not known to many readers of this book that in a sense Sheikh Mujib always acknowledged the Maulana who founded the AL in 1949--- four years before Suhrawardy joined--- as a senior leader and mentor. Sheikh Mujib always greeted Maulana Bhashani in the traditional respectful way by touching the Maulana's feet. The two leaders talked on this occasion for about 20 minutes. After leaving the Maulana in his room, Sheikh Mujib saw Mohammad Toaha who was Sheikh Mujib's friend since the late 1940s. Although Toaha and Sheikh Mujib had political differences they remained close friends. Rano describes the very human scene briefly but vividly:

Sheikh Mujib after leaving Maulana Bhashani did not stay at that place too long. I only saw him drawing Toaha close to him. Sheikh Mujib whispered something in Toaha's ears. Toaha also responded in the same way. I understood from their reactions that they were not discussing anything serious. It seemed more like a friendly banter. Perhaps a conversation that can occur only between two close friends.⁶⁷

On February 23, 1969 at a mass meeting Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was garlanded and publicly given the title *Bangabondhu* or the friend of Bengal. A month later Ayub abdicated declaring another martial law regime under his deputy Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan. Under public pressure Yahya granted political parties to organize for free elections

Word had gone around earlier that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and others accused in the Agartala Conspiracy Case were to address the people at the Paltan Maidan on February 22. People in huge numbers began to assemble there and judging by the mood of the people, it became quite clear that the cultural program of the United Committee for the observance of 21

⁶⁷ Ibid. pp.184-85. M.R. Akhter Mukul in vol. 2 of his book *Abba Huzurer Deshe* (Dhaka:Sagar Publishers, 1987):172-73 confirms this visit and encounter but chooses to embellish his account by a conversation between the two leaders that could have taken place. But by Rano's account which seems more factual no one else was present in the room where the conversation took place.

February would have to be given over for the released prisoners reception. Earlier, Moni Singh, Monikrishna Sen, Amal Sen, Samar Singh, Manmatha Roy, Ashu Varadwaj and many others were released on and around 16 February. Along with the Agartala Conspiracy Case prisoners, some of the released communist leaders were present at the Paltan Maidan reception. But to the great disappointment of the people who fought for the release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and others, Mujibur Rahman did not come to the Paltan Maidan. As mentioned before, a separate reception for him was being arranged by the Awami League for the next day at the Racecourse Maidan. (*Suhrawardy Udyan*). However, some other prisoners of the Agartala Conspiracy Case Lt.Com. Moazzem, Steward Mujib, Shamsur Rahman Khan, Ruhul Quddus and others were present at the Paltan Maidan meeting. The government released political prisoners on such a scale that the jails were practically emptied of political prisoners, including communist prisoners. This fact alone clearly demonstrated the impact of the movement and the extent to which the government of Ayub Khan had been weakened. *Bangabondhu* realized that a center-left coalition with the AL as the main political force was a possibility. In his speech of 23 February he spoke of his future political plans. It was clear that the people were behind his Six-Point programme. He expressed his support for the Eleven-Point programme of the students and assured them that he would not hesitate to return to jail if he failed to lead by honoring people's demands as embodied in the 11-points in particular. He declared unequivocally that he did not believe in parity and public representation would have to be settled on the basis of population. As he had done consistently and repeatedly, he pointed out that although 55 per cent of the people resided in East Pakistan, their share in government services was less than 10 per cent. He also pointed out other areas of inter-wing disparities.

Several resolutions were passed in that Racecourse Maidan meeting. These included the implementation of the Eleven-Point program, annulment of the existing Constitution and the framing of a new Constitution on the basis of the Eleven Points, the withdrawal of the Security Act, Press and Publication Ordinance and all warrants of arrests. A call was given to all Basic Democrats and members of the national and provincial assemblies to resign by 4 March 1969. In a separate resolution, a heart-felt tribute was paid to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on behalf of the students, workers, peasants, the middle-class people and all working men. After this event, *Bangabondhu* realized that he was on his way to become the paramount leader of the provincial

autonomy and social and economic justice for the downtrodden. But no one could have predicted then the tortuous path he and his people would have to travel from that time onwards.

Chapter 5:
AL Takes the Lead from March 1969 as Eventualizing Dynamics Evolves and Unfolds
Further

Although *Bangabondhu* kept his word and attended the Round Table Conference in March 1969, his consistent and adamant defense of the six points in particular did not allow Ayub to achieve his objectives of stopping the eventualizing dynamics from unfolding further. In spite of general agreements on two points—elections on the basis of adult franchise and the parliamentary system of government—Ayub’s side in the Round Table Conference failed to reach agreements with the other forces regarding decisions on the dissolution of one unit in West Pakistan, regional autonomy and other issues which had been raised by *Bangabondhu* and other opposition leaders during this conference.

Logically therefore, immediately after the end of the conference, *Bangabondhu* declared unequivocally that President Ayub’s formula was not acceptable. Clearly, Ayub’s formula failed to take the Six Points—let alone the 11-points—raised by him and Wali Khan.

Another opposition leader the famous Air Marshal Asghar Khan also rejected the decisions of the Round Table Conference. On 13 March, the day the conference ended, Air Marshal Asghar Khan called a press conference in Rawalpindi. There, he announced the formation of a new political party called ‘the ‘Justice Party’. *Bangabondhu* returned to Dhaka on 14 March.

Bangabondhu addressed the crowd after reaching Dhaka and said that because of the non-cooperation of other leaders it had not been possible to reach any agreement on regional autonomy. According to *Bangabondhu*, Ayub Khan could have been forced to accept East Pakistan’s demands if others had lent their support to the issue. In particular, he mentioned by name Hamidul Huq Chowdhury, Mahmud Ali, Farid Ahmad and Abdus Salam Khan. Going further, he also criticized Maulana Bhashani for his inconsistent policies and said that it was time for Bhashani to retire from politics. Bhashani was inexplicably on a tour of West Pakistan at that time where on 16 March some hoodlums of the Jamaat-i-Islami tried to assault him while he was waiting for a train at Sahiwal station. In East Pakistan protests were made against this in Dhaka and many other places, but the biggest protest demonstration was held in Chittagong where

thousands of industrial workers came out into the streets. Since the failure of the RTC, the situation in East Pakistan continued to be turbulent as industrial strikes and *hartals* became a regular form of political action. Student agitation also continued. But, above all, the situation in the countryside turned increasingly militant. Under these circumstances Ayub Khan was forced to remove his lackey Monem Khan from the post of governor. In Monem Khan's place he appointed a Professor of Economics Mirza Nurul Huda of Dhaka University on 21 March. Professor Huda took his oath of office on Pakistan Day which was 23 March.

Other dramatic events also happened at about this time with even more drama to come. A renegade former progressive leader Mahmud Ali ---now a prominent leader of the lukewarm center-right National Democratic Front (NDF)--- who had opposed the six points at the RTC was kidnapped. Rumors went around that some Awami League workers, led by Sheikh Mujib's eldest son were responsible. From his Dhanmondi residence in Dhaka he was taken to and confined in a studio nearby. There he was forced to sign a paper which said he would not say anything against the six points. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, on 24 March, missing text about 200 lawyers at the Dhaka High Court issued a press statement denouncing the act. It was published in all the daily newspapers on 25 March, but these were overshadowed by the declaration of Martial Law and Ayub's resignation. Up to this time there were also many other protests---all supporting the six and eleven points. Thus, during the days following the RTC the agitations against Ayub Khan and his regime would continue, turning more and more violent. Ayub Khan clearly sensed that it was no longer possible for him to continue as President or to resolve the problems which beset him. General Yahya Khan and General Peerzada had already decided to move against their erstwhile boss. Therefore, Ayub had no choice but to resign as President of Pakistan and to hand over power to the Commander of the Armed Forces, General A.M. Yahya Khan. Accordingly, on the evening of 25 March 1969, President Ayub addressed the nation over Radio Pakistan for the last time. The following morning all the newspapers carried the text of his final speech in which he declared:

Unfortunately, the conditions continued to deteriorate from bad to worse. You are aware of the result of the Round Table Conference. After weeks of deliberations the representatives of various parties could agree on two demands. And I accepted both of them. I had suggested that the issues over which there was no unanimity should be referred for a decision to the directly elected representatives of the people. But this

proposal was not acceptable to the political leaders. Every one of them was insisting for immediate acceptance of their demands without even waiting for the election of the people's representatives. Some people suggested to me that if all these demands were accepted peace would be restored in the country. I asked them 'in which country?'

For the acceptance of these demands would have spelled the liquidation of Pakistan. I have always told you that Pakistan's salvation lay in a strong center. I accepted the parliamentary system because in this way also there was a possibility of preserving a strong center. But now it is being said that the country be divided into two parts. The center should be rendered ineffective and a powerless institution. The Defense Services should be crippled, and the political entity of West Pakistan be done away with. It is impossible for me to preside over the destruction of our country. It grieves me to see that a great desire of my life could not be realized. It was my desire to establish the tradition that the political power should continue to be transferred in a constitutional manner. In the conditions prevailing in the country, it is not possible to convene the National Assembly. Some members may not even dare to attend the assembly session. And those who would come would not be able to express their real opinion because of fear. There is also danger of the National Assembly becoming the scene of bloody conflicts.

The integrity of the country takes precedence over everything else. The fundamental and basic constitutional issues can only be settled in a peaceful atmosphere when people's representatives can deliberate over these calmly. Today, such an atmosphere does not exist. As soon as conditions improve someone stokes up the fire of mischief. It is also painful that people are bent upon destroying all that has been achieved in the last ten years or even during the previous regimes. There are some who would like to destroy the country established by the Quaid-i-Azam. It hurts me deeply to say that the situation now is no longer under the control of the government. All government institutions have become victims of coercion, fear and intimidation. Every principle, restraint and civilized existence has been abandoned. Every problem of the country is being decided in the streets. Except for the Armed Forces there is no constitutional and effective way to meet the situation.

The whole nation demands that General Yahya Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, should fulfil his constitutional responsibilities. The Pakistan Navy and the Air Force are with him and the entire nation has faith in their valor and patriotism. They should always keep in view the welfare of the people and their every action should be in conformity with the principles of Islam. The security of the country demands that no impediments be placed in the way of the Defense Forces and they

should be enabled to carry out freely their legal duties. In view of this I have decided to relinquish today the office of the President.

I am conscious of your sentiments. Have faith in the Almighty and do not abandon hope. I am very grateful to you all that you not only conferred on me the honor of being the President of Pakistan for ten years but also participated in the work of national reconstruction with courage and perseverance. Your achievements will be written in history in letters of gold. I also thank the government servants who, at difficult moments, displayed courage and selflessly served the nation in every way.

Ayub Khan ended his parting address to the nation with a further appeal to those elites who would succeed him:

... some of my close associates have been subjected to bitter and uncalled for criticism. But mindful of all this they worked day and night for the betterment of the country with humility and dedication. The Almighty will reward them.

The fall of Ayub was an enormous victory for the mass movement's eventualizing dynamics.⁶⁸

But even when he was stepping down Ayub exhorted---indeed ordered--- the Chief of Armed Forces to discharge his “legal and constitutional” responsibility. Later the Chief of Armed Forces, Yahya Khan’s interpretation of this “responsibility” would lead him and other Pakistani generals with Bhutto as a conniving partner to launch a genocide in East Pakistan. At that time, Ayub wrote to Yahya:

It is your legal and constitutional responsibility to defend the country not only against external aggression but also to save it from internal disorder and chaos. The nation expects you to discharge this responsibility to preserve the security and integrity of the country and to restore normal social, economic and administrative life. Let peace and happiness be brought back to this anguished land of 120 million people. I believe you have the capacity, patriotism, dedication and imagination to deal with the formidable problems facing the country. You are the leader of a force which enjoys the respect and

⁶⁸ See *Ittefaq*, 26 March 1969; BFWD, vol. 2, p. 445.
 Kamruddin Ahmad, *A Socio-Political History of Bengal*, p. 220.
 Oli Ahad, pp. 426-428
 Kamruddin Ahmad, pp. 221-2.

admiration of the whole world. Your colleagues in the Pakistan Air Force and the Pakistan Navy—many are men of honor and I know that you will always have their full support. Together the Armed Forces of Pakistan must save Pakistan from disintegration.

Yahya Khan in his turn as the Chief Martial Law Administrator, made a radio broadcast on 28 March, 1969, in which he declared:

My-sole aim in imposing Martial Law is to protect life, liberty and property of the people and put the administration-back on the rails. My first and foremost task as the Chief Martial law administrator, therefore, is to bring back sanity and ensure that the administration resumes its normal functions to the satisfaction of the people. We have had enough of administrative laxity and chaos and bloodshed, see to it that this is not repeated in any form or manner. Let every member of the Administration take a serious note of this Warning....

I wish to make it absolutely clear to you that I have no ambition other than the creation of conditions conducive to the establishment of Constitutional Government. It is my firm belief that a sound, clear and honest administration is a pre-requisite for safe and constructive political life and for the smooth transfer of power to the representatives of the people elected freely and impartially on the basis of adult franchise. It will be the task of these elected representatives to give the country a workable constitution and find a solution of all other political, economic and social problems that have been agitating the minds of the people. I am, however, conscious of the genuine difficulties and pressing needs of various sections of our society including the students' community, the labor and our peasants. Let me assure you that my Administration will make every endeavor to resolve the difficulties.

In terms of both the tone of this radio broadcast and the subsequent substance Yahya initially acted very differently from Iskandar Mirza and Ayub on 7 October and 27 October 1958 proclaiming Martial Law and abrogating the 1956 Constitution of Pakistan. Yahya promised to hand over power to the representatives of the people elected on the basis of universal adult franchise. He also promised to attend “to the pressing needs of the student community, the labor and the peasants”.

As I will discuss in the next chapter, the fall of Ayub Khan would turn out to be a prelude to the end of a unitary state called Pakistan. Although not inevitable, the logic of separation will

henceforth be working along with forces for unification. The latter will grow progressively weaker, partly because of the machinations of Bhutto and partly because of the follies of Yahya and his military cabal of generals.⁶⁹

Using an analogy from modern quantum physics, we could describe the period that began in April 1969 culminating in the amazing electoral victory in 1970 of the AL leading to the watermark public meeting of January 3, 1971 as a period of superposition of old Pakistan and either the autonomous East Pakistan or independent Bangladesh.

Ayub Khan undertook the modernization of Pakistan launching it on the path of capitalist development. Until then Muslim League leadership essentially represented the feudal landed interests. There was little genuine push for industrial development of Pakistan except some faltering initial steps towards a half-baked strategy---never fully or coherently articulated as in Turkey---of state-led capitalist development had been taken by establishing the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) and a few similar state organizations.

Ayub was astute enough to have realized that industrialization in Pakistan would not be achieved without a certain degree of land reform and the creation of conditions for rapid agricultural development as in Japan. He set about this task almost immediately after taking charge of the central government.⁷⁰

Since taking charge of the army as its Commander-in-Chief, Ayub had begun to build it up as a disciplined and well-equipped modern army. As President of Pakistan he undertook the task of reorganizing the civil service or the bureaucracy in a manner which would strengthen the central government and the military system. His policy of industrialization created a class of industrial as well as financial oligarchic bourgeoisie who came to exercise great control over the economy of Pakistan, both in the west and in the eastern wing. Thus, with the help of the army, the bureaucracy and the industrial elite, Ayub presided over the affairs of Pakistan for a decade which was undoubtedly the most spectacularly successful period in the history of united Pakistan. Ayub tried to build a new political system in Pakistan: The Basic Democracies. This, initially, was a great change for the people of the rural areas of West Pakistan who, in the crudest form of a feudal set-up, never had any political rights or role in the management of local affairs:

⁶⁹ I have discussed this fully in Khan (2020 forthcoming)

⁷⁰ However, because of the changed ideological conditions, the advice Ayub received from the Harvard group was shallow and ineffective. After WW2, the Americans who helped Japan, Korea and Taiwan to carry out genuine land reforms were left Keynesians or socialists. They were all purged by mid-1950s. The cosmetic land reforms with cooperatives in Comilla and other places were a far cry from the genuine reforms in Japan, Korea and Taiwan.

In East Pakistan, however, it was nothing new. Union boards and local boards had been functioning there since the last quarter of the nineteenth century. But Basic Democracy's function was not limited just to local administration; it was made the constituency to elect the provincial and national assemblies and also the President of Pakistan. Thus, a system of indirect-election was introduced through the Basic Democracy system. It was a retrograde political step for the whole of Pakistan, particularly for East Pakistan, where it never achieved real acceptance among the people.

Now under Ayub's successor there would be a new set-up, the next in power to Yahya himself would be General Peerzada in his official capacity as the Principal Staff Officer (PSO) to the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) and the President. Under General Peerzada were two brigadiers one a Punjabi and the other a Bengali. These two brigadiers, who acted as 'super secretaries,' were subsequently promoted to the rank of Major Generals. Such were their powers that no central secretary could send a file to the president without it going through these two lieutenants of Peerzada.

President Yahya's cabinet was entirely composed of military men. He put himself in charge of Defense and Foreign Affairs. The Chief of Staff, General Hamid, was given charge of the Home Ministry. Nur Khan, the Air Force Chief, was given charge of the Ministries of Education, Labor, Health and Social Welfare. The Chief of the Naval Forces, Admiral S.M. Ahsan, was in charge of Finance, Industry, Commerce and Planning. Thus, these top members of the Armed Forces constituted the cabinet of Yahya Khan, which was called the Council of Administration. Civilian secretaries used to be summoned before this council when matters relating to their particular ministries were discussed.

Of the members of Yahya's cabinet, Nur Khan proceeded to introduce certain reforms, mainly in the labor and education sectors. For that purpose, he recruited a number of young men outside the Civil Service. Nur Khan wanted to establish himself as someone quite different from his other cabinet colleagues, and thus began to push his reforms which were considered 'radical' by Yahya. Nur Khan's attempts at reforms displeased, alarmed and antagonized big business, the bureaucracy and Generals Hamid and Peerzada who all wanted to get rid of him as soon as possible. However; following in 'Nur Khan's footsteps, Yahya also set up a small 'planning cell'. With the military takeover of the Administration, the 1962 Constitution of Pakistan was abrogated and with it the centered and provincial assemblies and ministries were dissolved. Their

place was taken by the Zonal Martial Law Administrations (MLA). The zonal MLAs had to manage the administration exclusively with the help of the old civil officers—the CSPs. So, the administrative set-up at the provincial level remained as it was during the administration of Ayub Khan. Difficulties soon arose in the Council of Administration as differences between Nur Khan and others like Yahya, Hamid, Peerzada, Ahsan and most of the generals increased. Nur Khan began to rush through his reforms which alarmed the others, first, because they seemed quite radical to his partners in the Council and secondly, the Administration of Yahya was not oriented and equipped in any manner to carry forward such reforms, though they were not radical in any real sense. Under such conditions the Council of Administration fast became a non-functional body and eventually ceased to exist. Nur Khan and Ahsan, the Chiefs of Air and Naval Forces, were removed from their positions. The former was appointed governor of West Pakistan and Ahsan became the governor of East Pakistan. According to the previous arrangement, the zonal MLAs would act as governors of the provinces, as there was no provision for provincial governors after the abrogation of the 1962 Constitution. For many reasons Yahya had to revive the 1962 Constitution and it was done under an ‘ordinance of continuance’. As Ayub Khan had realized soon after abolishing the party system and declaring all existing political parties illegal, that governance was not possible for very long, without political parties, and thus had to revise the party system and even launch a party of his own. Yahya also realized that the government could not be run without civil servants at all levels and without a constitution of some kind. He could not find anything better at hand than the 1962 Constitution, even as a transitional arrangement.

After the revival of the 1962 Constitution and the appointment of the governors, the administrative pattern became diarchic in the provinces. The zonal MLAs were in charge of martial law affairs and were directly responsible to the Chief Martial Law Administrator and President, while the governors became the heads of the provincial administration, as was provided under the 1962 Constitution. At the center, Yahya replaced his Council of Administration with a civilian cabinet comprising five nominated members, each from East and West Pakistan, after consultations with Hamid, Peerzada and other top generals. Ahsan, the new governor of East Pakistan was given the responsibility of selecting the members of his provincial cabinet. During the four month long 1968-69 mass movement there was strong and bitter opposition against Basic Democracy as an electoral constituency and a political instrument.

Yahya had no personal stake in the system, and it did not fit in with his new pattern of administration. So, he abolished the electoral role of the Basic Democrats, but their functions as local bodies for rural development were retained. The Martial Law authority, after the promulgation of Martial Law on 25 March 1969, initiated a soft labor policy compared to the labor policy of its preceding regime. ⁷¹Air Marshal Nur Khan, Deputy Martial Law Administrator in charge of Labor and Education, called tripartite labor conferences in Karachi, Lahore and Dhaka and imposed on the employees 'The Minimum Wages Act.' Collective bargaining as a method of settling wages was also introduced by him and Collective Bargaining Agents (CBA) were given wider scope and legal facilities for bargaining than they had been allowed before.

The employers and industrialists had welcomed the promulgation of Martial Law on 25 March 1969, but they were surprised at the announcement that they would have to honor the agreements which had been signed by them under duress during the *gherao* movement. Most of the employers had decided to institute civil and criminal cases against those labor leaders who forced them to sign the agreements. These reports were published in the newspapers. A lot of confusion was created with the newspaper reports, on the one hand, and the circulars of the Labor Directorate, on the other. In order to make the official position clear, the Director of Labor issued a letter to the heads of industrial firms on 9 April 1969. The letter declared:

You must have seen in the newspapers the press release relating to the agreements signed before the imposition of Martial Law including those agreements obtained under duress, wherein detailed explanations have been given on the order of the Chief Martial Law Administrator regarding honoring of, commitments by the employers. It has come to our notice that some of the employers have been hesitating to implement the terms of these agreements, in so far as they relate to the wages and emoluments.

In spite of the seemingly liberal announcements regarding the agreements during the February March 1969 period, strikes, lockouts and agitations were still banned and the right to hold meetings and union ejections were kept under the effective control of the Martial Law authorities.

⁷¹ This was not because the regime was soft but rather because of the intensity of class struggles in East Pakistan at this time. See Haider Akbar Khan Rano's vivid descriptions of the struggles in Tongi and other industrial areas.

Nur Khan met the trade union leaders of East Pakistan on 10 April, 1969 and they put three principal demands to him. Firstly, anti-worker labor laws enacted in 1965 should be repealed. Secondly, unusual delays in the settlement of disputes and disposal of cases by Labor Courts should be avoided. Thirdly, inadequacies and weaknesses of machineries set up by government for the implementation of labor laws be removed. Nur Khan also met the representatives of the employers on the following day and they placed their grievances against the trade union leaders, but admitted that “the real problem was the lack of implementation and-enforcement of labor laws and that the machineries of the government for the enforcement of these labor laws were both qualitatively and quantitatively inadequate. After these meetings with both sides, Nur Khan recommended the following outline of Labor-Management Relations Policy:

1. Freedom of association so that the workers may form trade unions of their own free choice and select their representatives by secret ballot.
2. Strengthening the scope of collective bargaining by conceding the right to strike.
3. To guarantee a fair and equitable living minimum wage.
4. Consolidation and simplification of labor laws strictly in accordance with the ratified convention of the International Labor Organization.
5. Review of the schedules of essential and public utility services and to reduce them to the barest minimum.
6. Effective implementation of labor laws for protecting the rights of workers, including the minimum wage.
7. Uniform application of labor laws without discrimination between public and private sectors.
8. Relating the wage structure to productivity by increasing the workers’ share in quality and quantity of production.

It would appear from Nur Khan’s recommendations that in April the Martial Law authorities were in favor of relaxing, to some extent, the restrictions which were initially imposed on trade union activities of the workers. In this respect their willingness to concede the right to strike and to select their representatives by secret ballot was significant. Moreover, the recommendation for uniform application of labor laws without discrimination between the public and private sectors and effective implementation of labor: laws for protecting the rights of workers, including their

minimum wage was also important. On 7 May 1969, the Martial Law authorities announced that they would 'bring uniformity among various labor laws in Pakistan'. The secretary of the Planning Division, Quamrul-Islam, told a press conference that the recent labor unrest in Pakistan had been due to the provisions of these laws not being implemented. In fact, for the first time, all blame was not put on the workers and instead it was officially admitted that the labor unrest was caused primarily by the non-implementation of existing labor laws. The central government convened a Special All Pakistan Labor Conference in Karachi on 15 May which was inaugurated by the central labor secretary. He said 'that the government was eager to find a satisfactory solution to problems that obstructed the growth of both trade union movement and the employers' organizations. Referring to the recent labor unrest in both parts of Pakistan he requested all concerned to find out why such widespread unrest took place spontaneously.' The conference was split into four working groups:

1. industrial relations and labor laws
2. wages and welfare
3. occupational hazards and industrial hygiene
4. profit sharing in industry.

The report submitted by the chairman of the group on wages and welfare contained a wide area of disagreement in the fixation of minimum wages. The trade unions point of view was that the minimum wages should be fixed on the basis of the consumption budget of a worker. Accordingly, they suggested for West Pakistan a minimum wage of Rs. 220 per month and Rs. 260 for East Pakistan. Opposing this, the employers said that the capacity of the industry to pay should be the most important consideration in the fixing of wages. Unlike the recommendations of the wages and welfare committee, there were no wide differences in the recommendations of the other three groups.

On May 2, 1969, it was announced by the Martial Law authorities that no retrenchment or termination of service of workers could be done without the prior approval of the MLA. Finally, the official labor policy of the Pakistan government was announced in July 1969. Such was the impact of the labor movement of 1969, that the ruling classes of Pakistan as represented by the MLAs frequently admitted that the labor 'disturbances' were mainly due to the absence of any fair deal to the workers in both wings of Pakistan. This was particularly so with regard to the workers of East Pakistan. While there were serious shortcomings in the labor policy of the MLA,

it is quite interesting to notice how they actually identified certain important factors which led to the massive labor unrest in the first quarter of 1969. But the class struggles continued in 1969 even under the Martial Law regime. Apart from the jute and cotton industries there was continuing or intermittent unrest among workers of the Pakistan Tobacco Company, Bengal Textile Mills, Noapara, Jessore, SAP Industries, Khulna, Rahim Metal Industries, Tejgaon, Eagle Box, and Carton Manufacturing Company, Postagola, Pak Jute Bailers, Daulatpur, Khulna. The Carpeting Jute Mills, Jessore, was closed down indefinitely on 17 October because of violent unrest among the workers.

The press workers, who were led by the Purba Pakistan Sramik Federation went on an oil strike in November 1969. They continued the strike for twenty-seven days, at the end of which an agreement was reached on 19 December. The press workers union was a constituent of the Purba Pakistan Sramik Federation and was led by Habibur Rahman. The strike of industrial workers which had begun in January 1969, and had become quite turbulent in February, continued till the end of 1969 in spite of the promulgation of Martial Law. These strikes were led mostly by the pro-Peking Purba Pakistan Sramik Federation led by Mohammad Toaha in the 1968-69 mass movement the most visible role had been played by the workers and students throughout Pakistan and there was considerable unrest among the peasantry in East Pakistan. It was, therefore, no surprise that the new military regime directed their attention to the problems of the workers and students immediately on taking charge of the government. The peasant question could not be taken up in the same manner as the other two questions, but they abolished the electoral role of the Basic Democrats and they abolished the latter as a political constituency.

In order to appease and domesticate the rebellious students, Khan also unveiled an unimaginative education policy which ---perhaps deliberately---did not address any of the issues raised in the 11-points. The changes proposed were merely cosmetic. Given this situation, unsurprisingly, Nur Khan's education policy was rejected by the three main student organizations of East Pakistan—the Students' League and the pro-Peking and pro-Moscow factions of the Students' Union. Among other things, Nur Khan tried to introduce religious education into the general education system and his recommendations on the language question greatly undermined the status of *Bangla* as a medium of instruction. The right wing Islami Chhatra Shangha, the student organization backed by the clerical proto-fascist political party, the Jamaat-i-Islami extended its full support to the military government's education policy. In order

to gain popularity among the students, Nur Khan tried to introduce certain practices which included such fantastic and outrageous proposals as ‘giving students the right to participate in the selection and promotion of teachers including university professors.’ Yahya had strong disagreements with Nur Khan on this question, though he was prepared to replace the black university ordinances which were introduced by Ayub Khan. The military government invited the student organizations to express their views on the proposed educational reforms, and the three major student organizations of East Pakistan forwarded their written views to the Education Ministry of the government. The Islami Chhatra Shangha (ICS) under the guidance of the Jamaat-i-Islami started a campaign in support of the Nur Khan proposals on education, particularly its recommendations on religion and language, and initiated a slander campaign against the other student organizations who opposed the education policy of the government.

On 12 August 1969, the Dhaka University Central Students’ Union organized a discussion meeting on the proposed education policy of the military government. When the discussion came around to the question of language, members of the Islami Chhatra Shangha created a disturbance and tried to interrupt the speakers. Finally, they physically attacked the speakers and organizers of the meeting. As a result, most students among the audience left the hall in fear and clashes took place between groups of students. At one stage, Abdul Malek, a student of the Dhaka University was killed. A joint statement on this incident, as well as the position of the student organizations on the education policy of Nur Khan, was made by Shamsuddoha and Nurul Islam (President and General Secretary of the pro-Moscow Students’ Union, respectively), Tofail Ahmed and Abdur Rab (President and General Secretary of the Students’ League, respectively), and Mustafa Kamal Hyder and Mahbubullah (President and General, Secretary of the pro-Peking Students’ Union, respectively). The statement said that in fact the ICS made the attack when the President of the East Pakistan Students’ Union, Mr. Shamsuddoha was offering a detailed in-depth analysis of the weaknesses of the various aspects of the draft education policy. Instead of participating in a reasoned analysis the ICS cadres attacked the other students and thus created the disturbance. Without the slightest hesitation they had launched their attacks physically with sticks, metal rods and other weapons when others were trying to reason.⁷²

⁷² Kamruddin Ahmad, *A Socio-Political History of Bengal*, p. 231. See also pp. 88-94 and Appendix III, p. xv. See also, BFWD, vol. 2, p. 465.



Chapter 6: 1970

Bangabandhu's superior organizing and the strategic change of AL from 6 points to incorporating workers' and peasants' demands---Inroads made by the AL among the peasants and workers under the leadership of *Bangabandhu* and Tajuddin---fear of the WP bourgeoisie and the aspiring bourgeoisie of EP. The radicalization of the middle class in EP and its contradictions.

On February 23, 1969 at a mass meeting Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was garlanded and publicly given the title *Bangabandhu* or the friend of Bengal. A month later Ayub abdicated declaring another martial law regime under his deputy Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan. Under public pressure Yahya granted political parties to organize for free elections. This was the background of the October 1970 Radio Speech for election by *Bangabandhu*. Under popular pressure, the government of Pakistan itself was forced to arrange a series of Radio and Television speeches by leaders of the major political parties. The official government rationale was that it was for the benefit of the political leaders to enable them to inform the people of their party manifestos and programs. On 28 October 1970, *Bangabandhu* Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, President of the Awami League, was the first to make this Radio and TV broadcast for the electronic media in Pakistan. Sheikh Mujib had been presenting both 6-point and 11-point demands for autonomy and social justice relentlessly throughout 1969 and 1970 to his people. His electoral speech reflected honesty in a forthright manner his political, economic and social thinking as a progressive social democrat. In fact, as historical sources establish, he would increasingly come around to a program of democratic socialism from now on.

In the speech, the translation of which follows, he begins by clearly identifying three principal aspects of our problem:

We must overcome the crises that are about to destroy our nation. The primary and number one reason for the crises is that fact that our people do not have their political rights. Secondly, the majority of our people has become a victim of discrimination. Thirdly, increasing regional disparities have created the feeling of endless injustice. In the

main, these are the main reasons for the resentment and unhappiness of the *Bangalees*. But the ignored public in the West Pakistan also share the same sentiments.

The last sentence shows *Bangabondhu*'s awareness of the exploitation in West Pakistan also. Hence, the revolt he was about to lead would be the revolt of the exploited masses against their exploiters. But *Bangabondhu* emphasized the greater injustice towards East Pakistan in detail. Also showing much political wisdom, he made a bid on the basis of objective conditions to unite the great majority of the Bengalis by underlining different kinds of deprivation for different strata as well as the common suffering of all:

We must overturn the intolerable framework of exploitation and miscarriage of justice that has been created. Only two families control more than sixty per cent of our national wealth. More than eighty per cent of banking assets and seventy per cent of insurance assets are also controlled by two families. The loaned-out investment capital from the banks are enjoyed by only three per cent of our people. Other developing countries raise six per cent of their GDP as taxes while we raise only two per cent. On the other hand, we have indirect tax on an essential item like salt. The rulers have created a monopolistic cartelization by following policies of protected markets, tax holiday, bonus voucher etc. With minimal land reform that is an eyewash the feudal landlords still have princely unearned wealth. These classes enjoy unlimited opportunities. Their wealth keeps increasing. At the same time, the poor peasants' condition keeps deteriorating. Just to survive, our rural folks are migrating to the towns. According to official statistics, one fifth of the labor force or 900,000 workers are unemployed. The rapid increase in cost of living is felt primarily by the toiling masses. The pressure is intense for teachers, low-income white-collar workers, especially the fourth-class government workers as well.

Looking at horrifying picture of economic inequalities, we can see that during the last twenty years, out of the total expenditure out of the government revenue, only about Rs. 1,500 crores (that is only one fifth of the total expenditures) was spent in Bangladesh, as against Rs. 5,000 crores in West Pakistan. Of the total development expenditure during the same period, Rs. 3000 crores (that is only a third of the total) was spent in Bangladesh, as against over Rs. 6,000 crores in West Pakistan.

Over twenty years, West Pakistan imported goods worth more than Rs. 3,000 crores as against its own foreign exchange earnings of barely Rs. 1300 crores. Imports into West Pakistan have been three times the value of the imports into Bangladesh. It was made possible for West Pakistan to import goods worth Rs. 2,000 crores in excess of its

export earnings by allocating to it Rs. 500 crores of the foreign exchange earnings of Bangladesh and allowing it to utilize over 80 per cent of all foreign aid.

The record in the field of government services is just as deplorable after twenty-two years since our independence. Even today, Bengalis account for only 15 per cent in Central Government Services and less than 10 per cent in the defense services.

The total economic impact of such discrimination has been that the economy of Bengal is today in a state of imminent collapse. Near famine conditions are prevailing in the majority of the villages. Some fifteen lakh tons of rice has had to be imported only to save the people from starvation. The powerless people of Bangladesh are victims of the rising trends of inflation in our country. Prices of necessities are 50 to 100 per cent more than the prices in West Pakistan. About 40 kg of coarse rice will cost you between 20 and 25 rupees whereas in Bangladesh the same amount costs between 45 and 50 rupees. The flour that costs 30 to 35 rupees costs only 15 to 20 rupees in West Pakistan. There each kg of mustard oil is only two and a half rupees, and here it is 5 rupees. In Karachi gold costs 135 to 140 rupees and here the same weight of gold costs 160 to 165 rupees. Even so, we cannot bring gold from West Pakistan to East Pakistan. Even the central government cannot change this economic structure that has been erected over the last 22 years. This truth was demonstrated during the 4th five-year plan.

The Six-Point program of the Awami League which is included in the 11-point program, points to the path for overcoming the regional disparities. It presents a rational solution to this problem of regional injustice. With a central bureaucracy in which *Bangalees* account for just 15 per cent, and with the nature of the power structure being what it is, to expect justice from a centralized system of economic management would be to expect the impossible. If Bangladesh and other victimized regions attempt to secure larger allocations such efforts would only aggravate regional tensions and threaten the viability of the federal government. The only feasible solution is the re-ordering of the constitutional structure by giving full regional autonomy to the federating units on the basis of our six-point formula.

Looking at *Bangabandhu's* address to the whole nation on October 28, 1970 impresses the reader immediately by its clarity. *Bangabandhu's* commitment to creating a truly democratic polity and a nonexploitative economic system shines through. Here are a few short excerpts that demonstrate these two key points. *Bangabondhu* states forthrightly at the beginning:

The manifesto of AL has a roadmap for solving these essential problems. We must establish a true and genuinely lively democracy in our country. In this type of democracy all basic rights will have constitutional guarantee. In our manifesto, we delineate clearly the development paths for political parties, labor organizations, local self-governance institutions etc. We will restore complete freedom of press and academic freedoms. We are determined to eradicate completely the corruption that has spread like cancer in our social body.

He then addresses the problems of economic and overall justice in an equally forthright manner:

We must overturn the intolerable framework of exploitation and miscarriage of justice that has been created. Only two families control more than sixty per cent of our national wealth. More than eighty per cent of banking assets and seventy per cent of insurance assets are also controlled by two families. The loaned-out investment capital from the banks are enjoyed by only three per cent of our people. Other developing countries raise six per cent of their GDP as taxes while we raise only two per cent. On the other hand, we have indirect tax on an essential item like salt. The rulers have created a monopolistic cartelization by following policies of protected markets, tax holiday, bonus voucher etc. With minimal land reform that is an eyewash the feudal landlords still have princely unearned wealth. These classes enjoy unlimited opportunities. Their wealth keeps increasing. At the same time, the poor peasants' condition keeps deteriorating. Just to survive, our rural folks are migrating to the towns. According to official statistics, one fifth of the labor force or 900,000 workers are unemployed. The rapid increase in cost of living is felt primarily by the toiling masses. The pressure is intense for teachers, low-income white-collar workers, especially the fourth-class government workers as well.

A manifestation of such injustice was inequality both regional and within regions:

Looking at horrifying picture of economic inequalities, we can see that during the last twenty years, out of the total expenditure out of the government revenue, only about Rs. 1,500 crores (that is only one fifth of the total expenditures) was spent in Bangladesh, as against Rs. 5,000 crores in West Pakistan. Of the total development expenditure during the same period, Rs. 3000 crores (that is only a third of the total) was spent in Bangladesh, as against over Rs. 6,000 crores in West Pakistan.

Here is the text of the entire speech as I have translated it:

Text of the Speech: (On October 28, 1970) Radio and TV speech in East Pakistan in Bangla) Translation into English by Haider A. Khan

My dear citizens (of Pakistan): Assalmu Alaikum (Let peace be upon you)!

Please accept my salutations in our common struggle.

I will begin my talk by praying for the souls of all our heroic martyrs who gave their blood--indeed, their very lives for the freedom of our people. They sacrificed their lives in struggling against the oppression of the dictatorship in order to build our movement. Countless numbers of our people made heroic sacrifices. It is their sacrifice that has led to the great mass movement during the past year. This uninterrupted mass movement has advanced our movement for democracy. In fact, this opportunity I have today of presenting my viewpoint to you can be considered an initial victory of our democratic movement because till today such freedom of speech was monopolized by those in power.

Our struggle will go on. This is because we have not yet realized our fundamental aim. People must have power. The exploitation of man by man, by one region by another region must end. The powerful clique that has ruled Pakistan for the last 22 years will try all means to prevent the transfer of power to the people. These are the groups that are conspiring to cancel the general election. Even if the elections are held, they will continue their efforts to cancel the verdict to end exploitation. If necessary, they will mobilize their huge resources for this effort. They have money, they have influence, they have the means of repression at their disposal. But history is witness to the fact that determined popular forces have battled autocratic forces with success. And at the end the victory of people has become inevitable.

To the people of Pakistan Awami League (AL) can make a solemn promise---AL will always be on their side, leading them in their struggle against the autocratic and exploiting groups. No nation in history has ever been able to win freedom and justice without making sacrifices. AL will confront the oppressors with all our people. If the democratic process is interrupted, AL will oppose such moves with all its might. AL was born in adversity. At that time the rulers were trying to convert our political system into a one-party state. It was then that AL was born under the leadership of our great leader the late Hossain Shahid Suhrawardi. This is how we started our uncompromising struggle for establishing democracy. Our struggle for democracy is still not over. Those cliques in power have tried to destroy the AL by attacking us repeatedly. They have struck against us again and again; they have thrown the leadership of the AL in jail time after time. These leaders have spent the best years of their lives full of promise incarcerated in the dark cells. But we have defeated all these torture and suppression. We have earned a great victory. Our victory has inspired us to face all the powers that oppose democracy.

We must overcome the crises that are about to destroy our nation. The primary and number one reason for the crises is that fact that our people do not have their political rights. Secondly, the majority of our people has become a victim of discrimination. Thirdly, increasing regional disparities have created the feeling of endless injustice. In the main, these are the reasons for the resentment and unhappiness of the Bangalees. But the ignored public in the West Pakistan also share the same sentiments.

The manifesto of AL has a roadmap for solving these essential problems. We must establish a true and genuinely lively democracy in our country. In this type of democracy all basic rights will have constitutional guarantee. In our manifesto we delineate clearly the development paths for political parties, labor organizations, local self-governance institutions etc. We will restore complete freedom of press and academic freedoms. We are determined to eradicate completely the corruption that has spread like cancer in our social body.

We must overturn the intolerable framework of exploitation and miscarriage of justice that has been created. Only two families control more than sixty per cent of our national wealth. More than eighty per cent of banking assets and seventy per cent of insurance assets are also controlled by two families. The loaned-out investment capital from the banks are enjoyed by only three per cent of our people. Other developing countries raise six per cent of their GDP as taxes while we raise only two per cent. On the other hand, we have indirect tax on an essential item like salt. The rulers have created a monopolistic cartelization by following policies of protected markets, tax holiday, bonus voucher etc. With minimal land reform that is an eyewash when the feudal landlords still have princely unearned wealth. These classes enjoy unlimited opportunities. Their wealth keeps increasing. At the same time, the poor peasants' condition keeps deteriorating. Just to survive, our rural folks are migrating to the towns. According to official statistics, one fifth of the labor force or 900,000 workers are unemployed. The rapid increase in cost of living is felt primarily by the toiling masses. The pressure is intense for teachers, low-income white-collar workers, especially the fourth-class government workers as well.

Looking at horrifying picture of economic inequalities, we can see that during the last twenty years, out of the total expenditure out of the government revenue, only about Rs. 1,500 crores (that is only one fifth of the total expenditures) was spent in Bangladesh, as against Rs. 5,000 crores in West Pakistan. Of the total development expenditure during the same period, Rs. 3000 crores (that is only a third of the total) was spent in Bangladesh, as against over Rs. 6,000 crores in West Pakistan.

Over twenty years, West Pakistan imported goods worth more than Rs. 3,000 crores as against its own foreign exchange earnings of barely Rs. 1300 crores of imports into West Pakistan, which have been three times the value of the imports into Bangladesh. It was made possible for West Pakistan to import goods worth Rs. 2,000 crores in excess of its export earnings by allocating to it Rs. 500 crores of the foreign exchange earnings of Bangladesh and allowing it to utilize over 80 per cent of all foreign aid.

The record in the field of government services is just as deplorable after twenty-two years since our independence. Even today, Bengalis account for only 15 per cent in Central Government Services and less than 10 per cent in the defense services.

The total economic impact of such discrimination has been that the economy of Bengal is today in a state of imminent collapse. Near famine conditions are prevailing in the majority of the villages. Some fifteen lakh tons of rice has had to be imported only to save the people from starvation. The powerless people of Bangladesh are victims of the rising trends of inflation in our country. Prices of necessities are 50 to 100 per cent more than the prices in West Pakistan. About 40 kg of coarse rice will cost you between 20 and 25 rupees whereas in Bangladesh the same amount costs between 45 and 50 rupees. The flour that costs 30 to 35 rupees costs only 15 to 20 rupees in West Pakistan. There each kg of mustard oil is only two and a half rupees, and here it is 5 rupees. In Karachi gold costs 135 to 140 rupees and here the same weight of gold costs 160 to 165 rupees. Even so, we cannot bring gold from West Pakistan to East Pakistan. Even the central government cannot change this economic structure that has been erected over the last 22 years. This truth was demonstrated during the 4th five-year plan.

The Six-Point program of the Awami League which is included in the 11-point program, points to the path for overcoming the regional disparities. It presents a rational solution to this problem of regional injustice. With a central bureaucracy in which Bangalees account for just 15 per cent, and with the nature of the power structure being what it is, to expect justice from a centralized system of economic management would be to expect the impossible. If Bangladesh and other victimized regions attempt to secure larger allocations such efforts would only aggravate regional tensions and threaten the viability of the federal government. The only feasible solution is the re-ordering of the constitutional structure by giving full regional autonomy to the federating units on the basis of our six-point formula.

Such autonomy in order to be effective must include the power of managing the economy. This is why we insist upon federating units having control over monetary and fiscal policy and foreign exchange earnings and other powers to negotiate foreign trade and aid. By giving the federating units full control over their economic destiny, while entrusting to the federal government responsibility over foreign affairs and defense and, subject to certain safeguards, currency, we believe a just federal balance will be attained. Our federal scheme envisages the abolition of all-Pakistan services and its replacement by federal services in which persons shall be recruited proportionately on the basis of population from all parts of Pakistan.

We believe further that all the regions will be able to contribute effectively to national defense by building militias and paramilitary units of their own. Our proposed federalist plan will guarantee the existence of Pakistan by ending all regional suspicions and conflicts. In the region where powerful people want to use the people of other regions in a colonial fashion, for understandable reasons such a region

will be opposed to our plan. But we believe that ordinary people of all regions will support our plan. We believe that through such a constitution we can bring about a social revolution democratically. As a result, we will be able to build a just socialist economic system free from exploitation.

We need to have rapid economic development in the face of a continuously rising population. In order to make such economic development possible, our people must work hard and make sacrifices. The people will respond to our call only when the fruits of economic development can be shared by all. In order to have a more egalitarian economic system, we have to bring radical changes to our economic structure. We believe that it is imperative to place key areas of the economy, including banking and insurance, under public ownership through nationalization. Future development in these areas should take place through the public sector. In our new economic order, workers should have share in the equity capital and management of industrial enterprises.

The private sector, also in its own sphere, must make its full contribution to the economy. Monopolies and cartels must be totally eliminated. The tax structure must be made truly progressive and drastic restrictions must be imposed on the consumption of luxuries. We must encourage small businesses and cottage industries by supporting them practically through ensuring the supply of inputs to them. Small industries should be built up as cooperatives. We will make these industries village centric and spread them in every village so that the rural people can have adequate employment. So far our Golden Fiber, Jute has suffered from unlimited neglect. The direct producers---our jute farmers---have been deprived of their just share by discrimination in investment and the parasitical middlemen. It is an urgent necessity to improve the quality of jute and increase the rate of production. Nationalization of the process of jute production, emphasis on research and development in the jute sector and increasing the production can move this sector towards playing its proper role in the national economy. We must emphasize cotton sector in the same manner. That is why we think that the cotton processing should also be nationalized. We also need to improve the quality of our cotton and increase cotton production. In the past, the government ignored our other key wealth producing sectors such as tea, sugar cane and tobacco. As a result, their outputs have declined precipitously.

In our low-income country, we cannot tolerate this situation. We must take steps to increase production quickly. We must guarantee the peasants a fair and stable price for their products.

Our agricultural sector needs to be revolutionized. The jagirdari, zamindari and sardari system in West Pakistan must be abolished. The entire land system has to undergo a radical reorientation in the interest of the actual tillers of land. Ceilings must be imposed on land holdings. Land above such ceilings and government Khas land must be redistributed among the landless cultivators.

If truth be told, agriculture must be modernized. The obstacle presented by the fragmentation and sub-division of landholding must be overcome. An immediate step in the right direction would be to

induce the farmers to group their holdings under multipurpose co-operatives. Government could provide effective inducement for this purpose by funneling through such co-operatives vital inputs such as irrigation, embankment, drainage, deep tube wells, water pumps, fertilizer, improved seeds, agricultural implements and machinery, credit and instruction in modern agricultural implements and machinery, credit and instruction in modern agricultural techniques. We would abolish land revenue in respect of holdings up to 25 bighas and write off all arrears in respect of such holdings. Ultimately, we aim at abolishing the present system of land revenue. We must explore the best scientific methods for the optimal use of our natural resources. We must prioritize the development and use of our forest resources, cultivation of fruits, chicken and duck farms, fish farms etc. We need to establish without delay research institutes for developing our water resources and water transports.

We must prioritize the three basic pillars of our economy. Our first and foremost duty is to control floods. We need an integrated and workable plan for flood control to meet the emergency. We need to solve urgently problems of waterlogged lands and salinity of soil in West Pakistan. The next pillar is electricity production and distribution. There must be massive expansion in power generation and distribution. Extensive rural electrification must be launched to take electricity to the villages as to make it possible for small-scale industries to be established. We aim at attaining power generation capacity of 2, 500 megawatts in Bangladesh within five years. Every source of power must be harnessed by maximizing power generation capacity. The Rooppur Nuclear Power Project and Jamalganj Coal Project must be immediately implemented. Natural gas must be fully utilized.

The third economic pillar is transport and communication. We give the highest priority to building the bridge over the Jamuna river for connecting North Bengal directly to the rest of Bangladesh. We must also build bridges over the rivers Indus, Buriganga, Karnafuli, and Sheetalakhya. We must prioritize internal river ports and development of seaports. We are also emphasizing the roads and railways.

In order to build a healthy, progressive society, there is no other sector that is more important than the education sector. Therefore, investment in this sector should receive the highest priority. It is an alarming fact that the number of primary schools in Bengal has declined since 1947. Only 18 per cent of our population has attained literacy and the number of illiterates is increasing by over one million persons per year. Primary education is denied to more than half of the nation's children. Only 18 per cent of our boys and 6 per cent our girls complete the first five years of elementary school. A crash program must be launched to extend free compulsory primary education to all children within five years. Secondary education should be made readily accessible to all sections of our people. New universities, including medical and technical universities, must be rapidly established. Immediate steps should be

taken to ensure that Bengali and Urdu replace English in all walks of life, while every effort should be made to encourage the development of regional languages.

If we look at the problems of citizens in the urban areas, we will see that people of low-income groups were living in sub-human conditions. The so-called improvement trusts had been developing luxurious residential areas of the wealthy while the poor had been left to fend for themselves. Future urban development must concentrate on providing for the needs of the poor majority of the city-dwellers. Low cost housing must be accorded the highest priority.

The same sad situation prevails in the healthcare sector. Immediate measures should be undertaken to establish a rural medical center at every union, and a hospital at every thana headquarters. National service in rural areas should be introduced for medical graduates, and paramedical personnel must be trained in large numbers to staff the rural health centers.

Industrial workers play as vital a role in the economy as in the people's struggle. Their basic rights to form trade unions, to bargain collectively and to strike must be guaranteed. A living wage and the basic amenities such as housing, education and medical care for themselves and their children must be assured. All labor laws which restrict the basic rights of workers must be repealed. By ensuring that workers are given a stake in the industry, they can be expected to make their full contribution towards increasing industrial productivity. The wage structure throughout the economy must be altered in keeping with the dictates of justice. Price stabilization measures must be adopted to protect the real wages of the workers and low-paid employees against spiraling inflation. The refugees should have the same rights and join the rest of us. By working in solidarity with the local people, they will receive rights equal to those of the locals.

I am warning for the last time those who are spreading falsehoods to the effect that our economic program and the six-points are endangering Islam. They should desist from spreading such lies. Nothing that attempts to overcome regional disparities and establish just rule of law can be against Islam. We are committed most firmly to Islam and will never allow any anti-Islamic laws to be promulgated.

To turn to the important area of foreign policy, we believe that it is imperative for us to avoid involvement in global power conflicts. We must, therefore, pursue truly independent non-aligned foreign policy. We are committed to the immediate withdrawal from SEATO, CENTO and all other military pacts and to avoid any such involvements in the future.

We have emphasized the importance of a just settlement of the Kashmir dispute in accordance with the United Nations resolutions. The threat of grave and permanent damage to the economy of Bengal posed by the completion of Farakka Barrage must be immediately met.

The members of the minority community should know that we have always stood against every form of communalism. They shall enjoy equal rights with all other citizens and shall enjoy equal

protection of the laws. Every effort must be made to develop our tribal areas so that these areas can be fully integrated with other areas and the tribal people are able to enjoy equal opportunities with other citizens in all walks of life. What we need is a new constitution that guarantees these opportunities

It is imperative for the security of the nation that our armed forces should not have to carry the burden of civil administration or to have to involve itself in politics. These highly trained professionals should be left free to devote themselves exclusively to the vital task of defending the nation's frontiers.

In conclusion, I would like to state that we will meet successfully the challenges facing our nation. We must establish real democracy for all. All those who are Pakistanis can live together in peace and prosper together only in a truly democratic state.

Any attempt to destroy democracy will destroy Pakistan. To avoid this, we must make certain that all units in the federation have full regional autonomy and justice according to our six-point program. We must institute a progressive economic program for making possible the beginnings of a social revolution within the framework of such a federal democratic system.

The Awami League is firmly positioned to take up this challenge. The Awami League has earned the trust and support of our people. That is why we believe that Insha'Allah, we will meet this challenge successfully.

Pakistan Zindabad

On 28 November 1969, President Yahya made a radio and television broadcast in which he outlined his plan to transfer power to the elected representatives of the people. In this radio speech he declared:

My aim is to transfer power to the elected representatives of the people, but this aim cannot be achieved without a legal framework. This, as you know, is not available today. It is, therefore, necessary for me, in my capacity as the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator of this country, to take initiative in the matter. I have naturally given deep thought to this problem and could think of four possible alternatives whereby a legal framework for the holding of elections could be evolved.

His first alternative was to hold an election for a 'constitutional convention whose task would be to produce a new Constitution and 'then dissolve itself.' The second was 'to revive the 1956 Constitution'. His third 'to frame a Constitution and have a referendum on it in the country.' Yahya, after mentioning the limitations and disadvantages of the first three, decided to drop

them. He opted for the fourth alternative which was ‘to evolve a legal framework for holding elections to the National Assembly.’ After announcing his decision to hold elections he added:

As I had mentioned in my July address, it became evident to me that the three main issues that face us as a nation in the constitutional field are—firstly, the question of one Unit, secondly, the issue of one man one vote versus parity and thirdly, the relationship between the Center and the Federating Provinces. As discussions on constitutional matters went on in the country during the past few months, I could see that the first two of these issues would have to be resolved before the elections are held because they are connected with the basis for elections and with the setting up of the National Assembly, As regards other constitutional issues, such as the Parliamentary Federal Form of Government, direct adult franchise, fundamental rights of citizens and their enforcement by the law courts, independence of the judiciary and its role as the custodian of the Constitution and the Islamic character of the Constitution which should preserve the ideology on which Pakistan was created, there is no disagreement and these can be considered as settled.

With regard to the three major issues as referred to by me, opinions were divided and made it clear in my last address that these must not become election issues. I am glad to find that differences on these issues have now begun to narrow down. This is a good sign. Although no formal all-party meetings have taken place, through statements both to the press and during party meetings most political parties have now come quite close in their thinking on these issues. Also, during my tours in various parts of the country, it became quite clear to me that there is hardly any difference amongst different sections and groups of people on these questions.

Whatever Yahya said in this part of his broadcast about narrowing down of differences and agreement among people on the issues mentioned by him was, in fact, partially correct. Because this broadcast was immediately followed by strong criticism from student organizations of East Pakistan and some others. Yahya, Khan also announced that he had decided to dissolve One Unit in West Pakistan and accept the principle of the one man vote which would be the basis of election for the future National Assembly.

While giving details of the timetable for the election he said that the provisional legal framework for holding elections would be ready by 31 March 1970, and the Electoral Rolls would be ready by June 1970. With the completion of the Electoral Rolls, the Election Commission would be engaged in delimiting the various constituencies both for central and provincial elections in accordance with the provisions which would be made in the legal

framework. Regarding the date of the election, Yahya said that since there were climatic difficulties to consider for holding elections both in East and West Pakistan from 1 June to the end of September, he had decided to hold general elections on 5 October 1970. The provincial elections would be held after the National Assembly completed its task of constitution making. About this constitution making he said that the National Assembly would be required to complete the work within a period of 120 days from its first sitting. If they were unable to complete the task by the end of the stipulated period, the Assembly would stand dissolved and the nation would have to go to the polls again.

Finally, he said that full political activity would be allowed in the country from 1 January, 1970 and the Martial Law Regulation prohibiting such activities would be duly cancelled. In this connection he threatened that he would not tolerate any obstruction in the way of what he called the restoration of democracy. All political activities would have to accord with certain norms of behavior and for that he proposed to issue certain guidelines in the near future.

This announcement was immediately followed by a long joint statement by three students' organizations—the East Pakistan Students' Union, the East Pakistan Students' League and the National Students' Federation—criticizing the President's plan for transfer of power. The statement described the decision to annul the One Unit in West Pakistan and to accept the principle of one man one vote as a victory for the people's movement. They said that although the rights to hold meetings, take out public demonstrations and organize strikes had been restored, full individual rights and fundamental rights were not yet restored; political prisoners like Moni Singh and others—mostly leftists--- were still in jail. They demanded the immediate release of all political prisoners; withdrawal of all political cases filed in the martial law courts and also warrants against all political persons. They criticized the provision of framing the Constitution within 120 days and made certain specific demands for making the process of transfer of power more democratic. They also demanded the lifting of Martial Law from 1 January 1970, and from that day on the government should run on the basis of the existing laws of the land.

Unlike the student organizations, President Yahya's announcement of 28 November was generally well-received by almost all the political parties of the country. That was by no mean an achievement for a military dictatorship which had taken over the country towards the end of a democratic mass upheaval of gigantic proportions. A preliminary analysis of the reactions of

political individuals and parties make it evident that it was the fear of the alternative which forced them into acquiescence. The President's announcement had practically come in the form of an ultimatum and they accordingly decided to accept rather than take any other path. It was a grave situation for any country, particularly for one like Pakistan, which had not yet been able to develop appropriate political institutions for the promotion of democracy.

In Pakistan, years of virtual disenfranchisement had paralyzed the political judgment of the middle class intelligentsia to such an extent that they would have perhaps been just as happy as they were at that time if the President had announced the election, not of a National Assembly, but of a National Football Association on the basis of adult franchise. The President and his advisors had been astute in assessing the mood of the people, particularly in the urban areas, and in choosing to disarm them through the announcement of a definite election date, if not by anything more concrete and tangible. A country which had been unable to produce a viable constitution in twenty-two years, owing to the interplay of various power factors, was promised one by Yahya within the brief span of 120 days! The question of the relationship between the center and the federating provinces needed to be settled. A mere declaration to the effect that the future constitution of Pakistan would be a federal parliamentary system in which maximum power would be transferred to the provinces meant very little. As was pointed out by Maulana Bhashani in his 6 December 1969 anniversary speech at the Islamic Academy, 'maximum' autonomy did not mean anything unless the precise contents of it were adequately spelled out, and spelled out it must be in a democratic society for the people in whom sovereignty was supposed to reside.

President Yahya displayed a certain unwillingness to refer that vital question to the people at that time on the grounds that it would create unnecessary bitterness and pause a 'delay in the transfer of power'. In this connection Yahya Khan said that during his tours in various parts of the country it became quite clear to him that there is hardly any difference amongst different sections and groups of people on these questions. If that was so, then why did he object to it being made an election issue on the grounds that it would create divisions? This question if posed in a straightforward manner should have raised further question of good faith on the part of Yahya and his advisers. Yahya's strange statement described and analyzed above could only mean one of two things. First, that the groups and sections of people, whom the President had met during his tours, did not truly represent the people. Secondly, even if they did so, they must

have entered into a secret and tacit agreement with him, the contents of which agreement they were not willing to make public for fear that it would generate ill-feeling and undermine their credibility.

It was a no-brainer for a seasoned politician thinking logically in light of the history of Pakistan since 1947, to grasp that the question of autonomy was absolutely vital for the people of East Bengal. Without a proper settlement of this essential question of autonomy, no constitution in Pakistan could be viable. Therefore, the election of October 1970 would become meaningless for the people of East Pakistan if the question of autonomy remained unresolved under the undemocratically tailored garment of a new constitution.

President Yahya's declared intention to transfer power to the people as early as possible and the procedure he had offered to follow raised a few other important questions. The date of the election was fixed for 5 October, 1970, the reason given was that the country was climatically unsuitable for that purpose during the four months following May, i.e. during the Monsoon. This argument sounded quite strange in view of the fact that people in East Pakistan never suspended---in fact, considering the fact that they had to earn a living, could never suspend--- their normal activities during this period. On the contrary, the people for this reason of livelihood remain seriously engaged in various types of productive activities regardless of seasonal changes of climate.

Moreover, that delay in holding the election was not consistent with the President's eagerness to-transfer power as early as possible and for that he had allowed only 120 days to the elected Constituent Assembly to solve the most intriguing problem in the History of Pakistan. Again, by minimizing the importance of the election to the provincial assemblies the President actually put his entire emphasis on the National Assembly through which he intended to transfer power. But that programme was quite inconsistent with any programme of real transfer of power. If autonomy was to be granted to the people of East Bengal, then that autonomy would be exercised only through the provincial government. In the absence of that government, the question of transfer of power would be nothing more than a verbal declaration. President Yahya announced that for a quick transfer of power, the Constituent Assembly, after 120 days, would start functioning as a National Assembly and would form a new government. If transfer of power meant handing over power only to a central government then the programme would have some meaning. And in that case, compared to the provincial assemblies, the National Assembly would

have to be given much more importance in relation to the question of transfer of power. But even if it was so, the election for the new National Assembly could be held simultaneously with the election for the provincial assembly and it could be arranged simply by providing an extra ballot paper to each voter. And between the end of the prescribed period of constitution-making and the election of a new National Assembly, the first Assembly could function as a provisional National Assembly and form an interim government replacing the Martial Law regime.

There would have been an added advantage to such an arrangement. In the formula given by President Yahya, the National Assembly would stand dissolved if it was unable to produce a constitution within 120 days, but in case of success they would continue to function as a legislative body and be allowed to form a new central government. In the former case, the short period, on the one hand, and the fear of dissolution, on the other, would undoubtedly act quite adversely on the decision-making process in the Constituent Assembly, perhaps even crippling it. Whatever the intention of Yahya Khan, the personal stake of each member of the Assembly would inevitably force most of them into a compromise position while working out the details of a federal constitution, particularly on the question of autonomy. Two elections for the Central Assembly—one for preparation of the constitution and a second one to meet once the new constitution was prepared could have eliminated the very real danger which threatened decision-making process with the ever-present suspended dagger from the air of a time limit of 120 days. Finally, there is the ultimate question of sovereignty. Though the proposed National Assembly was to be elected on the basis of universal adult franchise, yet it would not be free in taking its own decisions. A number of pre-conditions had already been imposed upon it by the President—pre-conditions that had been decided and settled undemocratically. There was also the fear of dissolution and its accompanying opportunistic lust for reward in the form of political power, however ephemeral. All these factors added together made the future Constituent Assembly in all likelihood a body eager to produce a constitution suitable to the needs of the forces which wielded sovereign power over the 120 million people of Pakistan. Or, at least such was the calculation of Yahya's manipulative and wily advisers.

It was surprising that no major political party in Pakistan, including the Awami League, opposed these aspects of the Yahya scheme and all of them decided to follow the rules framed by him. Even before announcing the Legal Framework Order 1970 on 30 March, President Yahya

had presented Pakistan with the infamous Martial Law Regulation (MLR) No. 60. This infamous set of regulations laid out the rules of conduct for political activity constricting the space for popular politics greatly. For astute observers the MLR 60 was not an accident; it was a logical follow-up of the declarations made by Yahya in his 28 November broadcast. A detailed examination of the provisions of the Regulation pointed to difficulties that would give rise to a certain degree of confusion that needed to be removed by sound political analysis. Some of these difficulties were pointed out by Dr. Alim Al-Razee, Mohiuddin Ahmad Z.A. Bhutto and others. Their criticisms were mainly directed against the provision of obtaining permission prior to holding meetings and taking out processions from the executive authorities.

There were also other tricky provisions of the ordinance. It said, 'no political party shall propagate any opinion or act in a manner prejudicial to the ideology or the integrity or the security of Pakistan. It was a historic fact that the 'ideology of Pakistan' had been more a victim of the actions of those who had successively ruled the country since the earliest days than of the many others who had been branded by the rulers as anti-Pakistan. They had all declared that Islam was the ideology of Pakistan while at the same time carrying on the vilest type of un-Islamic exploitation. This behavior was what actually undermined---even jeopardized--- the very foundation of the state of Pakistan. As a rule, whenever the exploiters found any activity threatening their own position of privilege mid-power, they did not hesitate to denounce it as un-Islamic and as such contrary to the ideology of Pakistan. The phrase 'ideology of Pakistan' served as an elastic cover for protecting vested interests of the ruling class. The integrity of Pakistan was another factor which the rulers had always used for suppressing movements which embraced the genuine demands of the exploited people from different classes and regions.

The participants in such movements---even very moderate ones as in Sind and Baluchistan--- were ruthlessly shot down, imprisoned and removed from their jobs. People might genuinely differ in their approach to the relative suitability of different constitutional frameworks to preserve and promote the integrity of Pakistan. In the absence of any clear-cut definition of what was meant by any 'opinion or act, prejudicial to the security and integrity of Pakistan' the MLR 60 was too vague and that very vagueness left the Martial Law authorities with sufficient scope to adopt repressive measures against those whose activities they could consider to be counter to their own interests. Sections 7 (a), (b) and 8 (a) of the MLR 60 prohibited the use of any 'treasonable' expression, the making of any statement 'calculated to produce feelings of

enmity, or hatred between different regions or between different classes of citizens of Pakistan.’ Religion was as always to be used as the great ideological shield for the exploiters.

Also, as a consequence of the liberal use of words like treason, great difficulties were to inevitably arise concerning the definition and meaning of ‘treason’. Furthermore, given the vague generalities of MLR 60 that were prohibitory, another very real difficulty could arise in the field of political campaigning if any critical statement was equated with ‘treason’. There were other unclear areas; MLR 60 defined political party as ‘a group or combination of persons who are operating for the purpose of propagating any political opinion or indulging in any other activity.’ It then went on to say that no political party and no member of a political party shall interfere in the operation or the functioning of the public services corporations or institutions set up by or under any law, in any manner, interfere with, or cause disruption in, the functioning of educational institutions, and in any manner interfere with the functioning or transgress the limits of decent and fair criticism of any other political party or its members. It implied that people working in the various public services and autonomous corporations would not be permitted to take part in strikes. Interference with educational institutions, and causing disruption, meant that students would not henceforward be permitted to organize strikes under MLR 60.

The Legal Framework Order was announced on 30 March 1970. Like the MLR 60, it also put serious restrictions on the activities of the political parties and made everything entirely and ultimately dependent on the wish of the President, a single unelected head of state. A critical example is the provision on the authentication of the Constitution. On this point, Article 25 stated, ‘The Constitution Bill, as passed by the National Assembly, shall be presented to the President for authentication. The National Assembly shall stand dissolved in the event that authentication is refused.’ Again in Article 27 it was said (a) Any question or doubt as to the interpretation of any provision of this Order shall be resolved by a decision of the President, and such decision shall ‘be final and not liable to be questioned in any Court, (b) The President, and not the National Assembly, shall have the power to make any amendment in this Order. An analysis of both MLR 60 and the Legal Framework Order clearly reveals that the Martial Law administration of Yahya Khan had no intention of introducing any viable democratic system of government which would function under a democratic constitution without being interfered in any manner by any arbitrary non-elected forces, particularly the armed forces of Pakistan. After the announcement of the Legal Framework Order (LFO) by President Yahya on 30 March 1970,

the political parties in East Pakistan criticized its various provisions and called for necessary changes in the LFO to various degrees.

Underlining the gravity of the post-LFO situation, a two-day emergency meeting of the East Pakistan Awami League Working Committee was held on 31 March and 1 April 1970, in Dhaka. In a resolution they expressed their concern regarding the fulfillment of the aspirations of the people which were thwarted by the LFO. They also urged the President to make amendments to the LFO consistent with the principles of democracy. The meeting was presided over by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

Likewise, in a press statement on 1 April 1970, Maulana Bhashani, while criticizing the LFO, said that from President Yahya's broadcast it was apparent to every Pakistani that the elected members of the National Assembly would have no say on the final structure of the constitution. The President of NAP (Requisitionist), Professor Muzaffar Ahmad, in a public meeting held in Chittagong on 2 April also severely criticized Articles 25 and 27 of the LFO. He added that their party (NAP) was opposed to the provisions of those articles. Thus, almost all the political parties of the country criticized the LFO as contrary to the principles and the practice of democracy, but no political party organized any movement against the LFO taking a clear stand regarding the transfer of power to the representatives of the people. It seemed that in spite of their various criticisms and reservations, the leaders of these political parties, in their eagerness for the elections, were willing to overlook the restrictions of LFO.

It was clear from the very first proclamation of the LFO that the LFO and the Six-Point programme of the Awami League were in their several aspects inconsistent with each other. One could then raise the question: should the AL have rejected the LFO and gone on agitating on the streets? Like all counterfactuals in history, it cannot be answered with any degree of certainty. Much would have depended on the readiness of the people of East Pakistan to revolt and fight for autonomy. The estimation of both the AL and the Pro-Moscow NAP seems to have been that such a struggle would not be optimal at that time. Hence the Awami League and the Pro-Moscow NAP continued their propaganda on the basis of its Six and Eleven Points without launching any movement against the LFO. At the same time, they continued their strategic commitment to these two crucial documents that have emerged in our terms from the unfolding of the eventualization dynamics of the struggle for liberation during the 1960s.

Such attitudes and commitments of the left-center coalition in the East Pakistan could be interpreted as a clear violation of the LFO. However, Yahya refrained carefully from taking any action against the Awami League or NAP. There could not have been a tacit understanding between him and Sheikh-Mujib---much less with the much weaker leader of the NAP-- for power sharing. Most likely, Yahya's calculations were that avoiding street politics can allow for a divisive middle-class electoral politics through the ballot which will not ultimately lead to radical constitutional changes. Compared to the Awami League leadership, their student wing the East Pakistan Students League, was politically much more active though not necessarily strategically more mature though their approach to the political manipulations of the Martial Law authorities were more radical. The same was true of the student wings of both NAPs. One indication from that historical period is that on 5 April, 1970, the students declared a 'Demand Day', launching a movement against the LFO using the Six-Point and Eleven-Point programs as their theoretical and practical political justifications. There was a crucial and courageous leaflet which stated that against the background of the historic Eleven-Point movement. Martial Law had been promulgated in the country in order to suppress the popular demands.

General Yahya. Khan as he had on many previous occasions, declared that his intention remained to hand over power to the representatives of the people. His plan was clear though in retrospect from the intelligence reports was in reality devious based on a calculation of electoral splits and even possible postelection electoral impasse. But he continued to demand that on the basis of his assurances, every Pakistani would be expected to meet their demand for autonomy and various other problems facing the country through elections. The responsibility for this would be given to a sovereign parliament composed of representatives of the people elected on the basis of adult franchise. But even many mainstream political actors thought that with the 28 March broadcast of Yahya Khan and later with the announcement on 30 March of the Legal Framework Order such hopes had been dashed. These leaders particularly criticized Articles 25 and 27 of the LFO. It was claimed that these articles betrayed the dictatorial attitude of Yahya Khan. The aforementioned student leaflet took this criticism to a popular radical direction. It pointed out that in spite of the prevailing normal conditions in the country, the Martial Law authorities were still in a repressive mode, arresting political workers some of whom had been given long-term jail sentences as well. This latter claim was certainly true. Therefore, the students demanded an immediate release of all political prisoners exhorting the people to unite

for their democratic demands and demands for economic liberation. The East Pakistan Students' Union (Matia Group) called for a 'protest day' on 13 April, 1970. For this action, the EPSU issued a long statement on 12 April, 1970, which was also published in the form of a leaflet over the signature of the student leaders Shamsuddoha and Nurul Islam, president and secretary of the organization. The gist of this statement was that the government of Ayub Khan had fallen under the impact of the mass uprising of 1969. This is another way to state the reality of what we have been calling the eventualizing dynamics of the mass movement during the 1960s.

According to this EPSU document, the people had expected that the National Assembly which was going to be formed through a general election would be able to frame a constitution without any impediments. This EPSU document further pointed out that it was Yahya Khan who made promises to that effect but the announced LFO had dealt in reality a big if not mortal blow to the hopes and aspirations of the people. In the LFO all powers had virtually been concentrated in the hands of the unelected President Yahya Khan who could even scrap the constitution framed by the elected National Assembly by Presidential diktat. The logical implication was that the freedom to frame the constitution on the basis of the Six-Point and Eleven-Point programmes had been completely abrogated both *de facto* and *de jure*. In fact, an attempt was clearly being made to impose another arbitrary constitution on the people like the scrapped Constitution of 1956 that was in many respects against the democratic aspirations and struggles of the people. The students went further and said that the previous autocratic methods had all been retained in the LFO. On closer inspection, this would seem to be quite correct.

The EPSU document also denounced the decision of the Martial Law government to give final approval to the unpopular---and indeed the anti-people--- clerical educational policy which was unanimously rejected by the student community of the country. The EPSU document demanded the release of all student and political leaders who were kept under detention by the policies of the military regime. This revolutionary statement of the Students' Union blamed the political parties for not being able to unite for a concerted agenda of popular democratic action in the face of the military government's machinations against the basic interests of the people which were now manifest. The EPSU document claimed that since 1 January, 1970, when the right to participate in political activities was restored in a limited way, the students had been urging the political parties to form a united front. Instead of progressing towards building a united front, the centrist and rightist parties were engaged in creating disunity among the

democratic forces and parties. The EPSU statement also regretted the fact that such disunity was prevailing even among the student organizations. In the immediate past of unified struggles--- i.e., positive eventualizing dynamics and united but polyphonic and dialogical voices with political and cultural heteroglossia of the people--- the polyphony of the popular demands from the masses had formulated the Eleven-Point- programme and led the Eleven-Point movement. On the other hand, at this time, all the reactionary forces were trying unitedly to put pressure on the military government so that a sovereign National Assembly could not be elected to begin the just consideration of this polyphonic popular demands. Therefore, it argued with cogent logical force that it was, in fact, the disunity among the democratic forces which made it possible for the military government to go back on their promises.

The radicalization of the situation continued. For example, on 17 April 1970, a joint call was issued by the NAP (Bhashani), the Students' Union and Sramik Federation (Workers' Federation) to observe a protest day on 19 April, 1970 for the release of political prisoners and for the implementation of the key demands of students, peasants and workers. A *hartal* in Dhaka was called for and announcements made for a public meeting at the Paltan Maidan under the presidentship of Maulana Bhashani on that day. Among the records from that time, we also find that they had published a leaflet signed by Najimul Alam (Students' Union), Sirajul Hossain Khan (East Pakistan Sramik Federation) and Mohammad Sultan (NAP) which said that the country was in the midst of a serious economic and food crisis among other things.

The various sections of the working people were facing involuntary retrenchments, forced lockouts and the continuous rise in the prices of essential commodities which made their real incomes go down, increasing their precarity. Naturally, class struggles were becoming more intense and workers were being forced to resort to strikes as the last collective resort. Thus the situation clearly called for building workers, lower-middle-class, peasants, students unity as the main force for revolutionary struggle with allies from other segments. Both Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the leftists understood this and went to build their organizations. The AL under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman formed a parliamentary board with other senior leaders after the Yahya government published the final list for electoral locations on June 5, 1970.⁷³

⁷³ Ahmed, Sirajuddin, *Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman*. (Dhaka: Bhaskar Prakashoni, 2001):272

More importantly, the next day, the AL held its Council meeting and declared its fundamental principles as a basis for electoral participation. ⁷⁴The official party declaration which has become a historical document announced unequivocally the party's opposition to monopoly capitalism, landlordism and all other semi-feudal institutions. The document affirmed unequivocally a commitment to socialism within a democratic framework and an egalitarian economic and social development strategy. It was as if the party has gone away from the pro-western, pro-capitalist path set by Suhrawardy and returned to the more radical program of Bhashani. ⁷⁵Ironically, Bhashani himself was being pressured by pro-Peking ultra-leftists and was floundering about, unable to decide on a viable strategy and tactics for the pro-Peking NAP.

Instead of assisting Bhashani on a viable strategy and tactics for this crucial time, the ultra-leftists in contradistinction with the AL and the Pro-Moscow NAP, were content with writing revolutionary slogans on the walls without doing the hard work of building organizations with deep roots among the people on the basis of a viable revolutionary program derived from the actual history of people's struggles. The subsequent history of movements in late 1970 and most crucially in 1971 will show which strategy was correct through the further unfolding of real eventualizing dynamics. We now turn to this turbulent period of storm and stress and dramatic historic possibilities.

⁷⁴ A total of 200 councilors were present of whom 94 came from West Pakistan.

⁷⁵ Sarkar(2008) Vol.1:387

Chapter 7:

The Polyphony of Climactic Eventualizing Dynamics

The November Cyclone and its Political Aftermath: The elections---Promises of Jan. 3 Mass Meeting Machinations of Bhutto, Yahya and the Military Heightened ED from March 1 to March 7, 1971 and from March 7 to the Liberation War

Faced with this unfolding of a united mass movement dynamics in both the wings, Yahya Khan's regime was forced to fix the dates of elections on the basis of one person one vote in both the wings. The initial date was fixed as 5 October, 1970. However, the sudden and immensely destructive cyclone and Tsunami in the coastal areas of East Pakistan on 12 November forced Yahya to move the dates. The new dates were announced to be 7 December, 1970 for the National Assembly elections. For the provincial assembly elections, the new date would be 17 December, 1970.

Contrary to Yahya's military intelligence assessment and the predictions of political pundits, in December of 1970, the Awami League gained a majority in the National Assembly. However, despite winning a majority, they were not permitted to establish a government which pushed further the already politically awakened and militant masses towards rebellion. *Bangabandhu* used his political leverage under the circumstances that developed because of the intransigence of Bhutto and Yahya. He acted as leader of the majority that has been denied its legitimate political demands to launch support his goal to bring East Pakistan to independence. The following pages set the context for the noncooperation movement launched by *Bangabondhu* in early March 1971 and his unforgettable speech of March 7.

Before describing the circumstances surrounding the events of March 1971, we need to pause and see how the chronotope of history in the process of creation led to ever louder crescendos of polyphony by the masses. *Bangabondhu* through the electoral mandate became the conductor of this symphony of the people. I had the good fortune to observe this phase also as I did the earlier phases of the unfolding of the eventualizing dynamics. Here I will confine myself to describing only the mass meeting of January 3, 1971 which turned out to be an oath-taking ceremony of historic importance. In my view, for Bangladesh it is just as important as the tennis court oath before the French revolution.

I was lucky to be invited---indeed transported--- to this meeting by some AL activists who were very close to *Bangabondhu*. Hence, I could observe the events unfolding from the ground near the stage. The stage itself was in the shape of a huge boat⁷⁶ which was the electoral symbol of AL. It was also symbolic of the United Front of 1954 and thus unified many episodes of people's struggles for self-determination in one semiotic moment.

I could see that people had poured in from all directions. There were many women who were safely seated in a special area well protected by volunteer forces. The meeting began with the singing of what was already becoming the unofficial national anthem, a song with lyrics by the great poet Rabindranath Tagore with a melody that he borrowed from a *Baul* song.⁷⁷ I had been singing this song and leading others to sing it in unison in many protest meetings and marches. I admit it was a very proud moment for me personally as it was for the others as well. Then *Bangabondhu* himself led the crowd in chanting our revolutionary slogans that has emerged through the eventualizing dynamics of the mass movement: *Amar Desh, Tomar Desh--- Bangladesh! Bangladesh! (My country, your country---Bangladesh! Bangladesh!), Jago, Jago--- Bangalee Jago(Awaken, Oh Bangalees!), Joi Bangla!(Victory to Bangla)*.

Not only this song which is now officially the national anthem of Bangladesh but also after the oath-taking ceremony, we sang the other song which will become the signature song for the Free Bangla Radio Center during the liberation war. This song was *Joi Bangla, Banglar Joi (Victory, Yes Victory to Bangla!)*. After so many years I can still feel the pulses quicken as they did in the immense crowd then. Indeed, as the poet wrote thinking of the French Revolution more than 180 years ago:

*“Bliss it was in that dawn to be alive.
But to be young was very heaven.”⁷⁸*

Thanks to our English teacher, Prof. Noman who was a revered person and to my surprise told me later that he was also at that meeting, I had memorized a whole section of the Prelude for a literary meet and I recited quietly to myself those lines now:

⁷⁶ This area is currently the site of the children's park.

⁷⁷ See the appendix to this chapter for my translation of the lyrics.

⁷⁸ William Wordsworth, *The Prelude*, Book X

Oh! pleasant exercise of hope and joy!
 For mighty were the auxiliars which then stood
 Upon our side, we who were strong in love!
 Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive,
 But to be young was very heaven!—Oh! times,
 In which the meagre, stale, forbidding ways
 Of custom, law, and statute, took at once
 The attraction of a country in romance!
 When Reason seemed the most to assert her rights,
 When most intent on making of herself
 A prime Enchantress—to assist the work
 Which then was going forward in her name!
 Not favored spots alone, but the whole earth,
 The beauty wore of promise, that which sets
 (As at some moment might not be unfelt
 Among the bowers of paradise itself)
 The budding rose above the rose full blown.
 What temper at the prospect did not wake
 To happiness unthought of? The inert
 Were roused, and lively natures rapt away!
 They who had fed their childhood upon dreams,
 The playfellows of fancy, who had made
 All powers of swiftness, subtilty, and strength
 Their ministers, —who in lordly wise had stirred
 Among the grandest objects of the sense,
 And dealt with whatsoever they found there
 As if they had within some lurking right
 To wield it; —they, too, who, of gentle mood,
 Had watched all gentle motions, and to these
 Had fitted their own thoughts, schemers wilder,
 And in the region of their peaceful selves; —
 Now was it that both found, the meek and lofty
 Did both find, helpers to their heart's desire,
 And stuff at hand, plastic as they could wish;
 Were called upon to exercise their skill,
 Not in Utopia, subterranean fields,
 Or some secreted island, Heaven knows where!
 But in the very world, which is the world
 Of all of us, —the place where in the end
 We find our happiness, or not at all!⁷⁹

Major newspapers in Pakistan carried more prosaic but quite accurate reportage of the January 3 meeting.⁸⁰ The Bangla *Daily Ittefaq* in particular gave the headline, “People’s Representatives take a Solemn Oath to Create the Foundations of a Society Free from Exploitation.” In fact, the great majority of the AL elected representatives indeed took detailed oaths to this effect. According to

⁷⁹ William Wordsworth, *The Prelude*, Book IX

⁸⁰ See for example, *The Dawn*, *The Pakistan Observer*, *The Morning News*, *The Dainik Ittefaq*, *The Dainik Sangbad*, *The Dainik Pakistan* all on January 4, 1971.

the report, there were 151 MNAs and 268 provincial assembly members took this solemn oath to realize both the six and eleven points.

It may be pertinent here to record the observations of a seasoned US diplomat in Dhaka who observed the whole electoral process and met *Bangabondhu* during the postelection period. This is none other than Archer Blood who would send the famous “Blood Telegram” protesting the genocide that was only a few months away beyond anyone’s wildest nightmare in January 1971. Blood wrote to the US State Department immediately in the aftermath of the 1970 elections:

In a telegram written shortly after the elections I posed this question: “What are the characteristics, attributes and views of this man (Sheikh Mujibur Rahman) who most probably will exercise a dominant influence on Pakistan for months and perhaps years ahead?” and then answered it as follows:

1. Mujib is a life-long, full-time politician. As near as we can tell, he has never really been gainfully employed since leaving school without a law degree. His visible income is derived from his status as advisor to the Great Eastern Life Insurance Company. His administrative experience consists of a two-year stint beginning in 1956 as Provincial Minister of Commerce, Labor and Industry in AL government of Aatur Rahman Khan with whom he later broke in struggle for control of Awami League (Mujib eventually won). Since 1948 Mujib has spent almost ten years in Pakistani jails, climaxed by the Agartala conspiracy case which martyred him in the eyes of the East Pakistani people and guaranteed his rise to power. After a long struggle, Mujib can now savor the sweetness of success and power.

2. Mujib, the man, is hard to characterize. In private meetings he is charming, calm and confident. While not a worldly sophisticate of Bhutto’s stripe, he is well traveled and urbane. He knows Europe, particularly the U.K., as well as China and the U.S. (thanks to a far-sighted Congen who sent him to States on a Leader Grant in 1958). On the rostrum, he is a fiery orator who can mesmerize hundreds of thousands in a pouring rain. As a party leader, he is tough and authoritative, often arrogant. Mujib has something of a messianic complex which has been reinforced by the heady experience of mass adulation. He talks of “my people, my land, my forests, my rivers.” It seems clear that he views himself as the personification of Bengali aspirations.

3. Mujib has also shown himself to be impulsive and emotional when talking of Bengali grievances. He doesn’t appear to be a systematic thinker nor to have a reflective temperament. He is primarily a man of action – a mass leader. A favorite theme of his detractors is his lack of intellectual depth, unprincipled opportunism,

and lust for power. That he strongly desires power is beyond question. Opportunism is a common charge against any politician. Mujib the politician appears no more or no less guilty of the charge than most politicians. While he may not be an intellectual, Mujib demonstrates considerable mental ability in private meetings. He also has a sense of humor.

4. Mujib has concerned himself little with foreign affairs. Officially he is for “genuine neutrality, withdrawal from CENTO and SEATO, and improved relations with India.” Better relations with India will probably in fact be his most pressing concern since he sees at least partial solution for East Pak problems in expanded trade with neighboring India. Mujib, like many Bengalis, is not (except for record) particularly hard on Kashmir. Also like many Bengalis he believes the Farakka issue could be resolved in the context of a general improvement in Pak-India relations. In conversations with Congen officers he has shown himself well disposed toward U.S. Mujib has visited China on two occasions: to attend the Peking Peace Conference and in 1957 as member Pak goodwill mission. He admits to finding the Chinese experiment impressive but notes that as a political observer the restrictive and oppressive nature of the society was very apparent to him.

5. Mujib’s very appearance suggested raw power, a power drawn from the masses and from his own strong personality. He was taller and broader than most Bengalis, with ruggedly handsome features and intense eyes. A no-nonsense moustache gave added strength to his face, as did the heavy-rimmed dark glasses he invariably wore. I never saw him in Western clothes; his dress was that of a native Politian.⁸¹

Blood drew some shrewd conclusions although his observations about *Bangabondhu*’s drive for power were rather exaggerated. In my many conversations starting with the one on 3 January when he personally issued me the visa to the US in order for me to participate in the World Youth Forum, when he asked me detailed probing questions about the role of our students in the mass movement, I was able to convince him that *Bangabondhu* was a political leader of a difference caliber. But his basic political assessment of *Bangabondhu* was prescient. Later, Blood and his colleagues in Dhaka would play an admirable role in protesting the official US line on Pakistan documenting carefully what these conscientious Americans called plainly and simply and accurately a genocide. But let us return to Yahya’s state of mind after the landslide victory of the AL in December 1970.

⁸¹ Archer K. Blood. *The Cruel Birth of Bangladesh* (Dhaka: UPL,2002): 46-47

Initially after the election Yahya had expressed his anger privately to his director of intelligence Rizvi. He rebuked Rizvi severely at a cabinet meeting for misjudging the strength of the AL in East Pakistan. Rizvi had been forecasting that no single party will dominate. This had led Yahya and other generals to think that the legislature could be manipulated quite easily. But the election victory of AL had upset the whole military applecart.

Yahya now began to look at the six points with the help of Bhutto and other legal analysts close to the military. He even asked the loyal Bengali general Karim about the six points and Mujib. The general told him that Mujib had been propagating these demands for a long time. Apparently, a bewildered and frustrated Yahya blurted out: “He is talking sedition.... he had told me that this was a political thing but now he is serious about them.”⁸²

Yahya visited Mujib in January but could not succeed in making him give up on the six points. He returned to Karachi on January 13, 1971 and declared he was quite tired and needed rest. Bhutto read this correctly and invited Yahya to Larkana for rest and hunting. Yahya complied. Clearly, some unholy alliance was forming between the generals and Bhutto.

From this perspective, Bhutto is the one who was the real culprit. Not only was he intransigent and uncooperative he was also plotting with the military for obstructing the people from taking power. Above all, Bhutto was interested in his own position. He knew that with the majority that the AL had gained Bhutto’s PPP could at best play the role of opposition. He had his natural allies among the generals who had their own reasons to be afraid. Some of them thought that the defense budget will be cut in favor of development of East Pakistan which has long been deprived of its fair share of resources. Others thought even more narrowly and concretely. Earlier Colonel Osmani from Sylhet, Bangladesh had been forced out of the Pakistani Army through an involuntary retirement. Now Osmani was an elected MNA from Sylhet. What if he became the next defense minister under an AL government led by Mujib? What would happen to those highhanded West Pakistani generals who treated Osmani so unjustly?

As is clear from the above, Bhutto knew that his ambition for immediate power could only succeed if he enjoyed the military’s patronage. He remarked “I will ensure Yahya remains on my side”.

⁸² Hasan Zaheer. *The Separation of East Pakistan*, p.130-31; Siddik Salik. *Witness to Surrender*.(Karachi: Oxford University Press):29.

“Punjab and Sind are the bastions of power in Pakistan,” he declared in Lahore on 20 December. “Majority alone does not count in national politics.” Bhutto asserted that his party was the “sole representative of the people of West Pakistan,” and that he would not allow anyone to “chisel us out” of power.⁸³

The upshot was that there was not going to be a smooth transfer of power. The palace intrigues and conspiracies had already begun. Therefore, *Bangabandhu* was correct when he said in his speech on March 7 later:

I have seen President Yahya Khan. As not just the leader of Bengal but as the majority party leader in all of Pakistan, I requested him to hold the regular session of our national assembly on February 15. He did not accept my position; instead, he listened to Bhutto Sahib and supported his position. He told us that the meetings of the national assembly will take place during the first week of March.

But until and even after March 1, *Bangabondhu* was proceeding towards a lawful transfer while keeping his mass-based support intact. He was indeed serious about autonomy and social justice.

⁸⁴ At a mass meeting on January 3, 1971--- attended by over a million people at the then Racecourse where this author had the good fortune to be present near the stage from which *Bangabondhu* spoke---the elected MNAs all swore solemnly that they would not betray the electoral promises. On this day, *Bangabondhu* gave another memorable speech that combined his political acumen with his heartfelt understanding of his people and their problems. This speech is second only to his speech later in 1971 on March 7. How did the crisis that led to the events of March, 1971 develop?

Throughout the rest of January and February, 1971 Bhutto prevaricated and threatened boycott of the projected meetings of the elected National Assembly. Yahya had even publicly announced that Mujib would be the next prime minister of Pakistan. Privately, however, he, his generals and Bhutto had other ideas.

⁸³ It is also clear from the memoirs of various generals and other political actors in West Pakistan in 1971 that Bhutto had already reached an understanding with Yahya after the latter visited Bhutto in Larkana under the pretext of shooting some birds in mid-January 1971. At the same time Bhutto wanted to have untrammled access to power without Yahya or his generals. The defeat that Pakistan suffered in its 1971 war gave Bhutto his opportunity. See Tariq Ali, *The Duel: Pakistan in the Flight Path of American Power* for a concise account. The various memoirs and analyses by patriotic Pakistani writers cited in the bibliography provide further evidence for these theses.

⁸⁴ This has been confirmed by many participants including Dr. Kamal Hossain, Amirul Islam, Prof. Nurul Islam, Prof. Rehman Sobhan and others.

On 21 February, 1971 *Bangabandhu* gave another memorable speech that prefigured the later, better known speech of March 7. In this speech, he summed up the long history of the struggles for economic, social and cultural self-determination of Bengalis and affirmed his commitment to uphold their just demands. He uttered among other things, a sentence that has become emblematic of the subsequent war of liberation: “*Ghore Ghore Durgo Gore Tulun.*” (*Build every house into a fortress (for freedom).*)” My friend Prof. Abdul Mannan describes his feelings and perceptions during this time under the heading, “The Last February of United Pakistan”:

February, the month of language martyrs was observed differently in the then Pakistan’s Eastern [wing] which after the general election of 1970 came to be more known as Bangladesh rather than Pakistan. Following the thumping victory of Awami League in the general election of 1970 and expecting that *Bangabandhu* Sheikh Mujibur Rahman will form the next government of Pakistan and implement the party’s manifesto based on the Six Point programme of Awami League the common people of Bangladesh was somewhat in a hyper mood thinking that for the first time their future destiny will be in their hand. However, Pakistan People’s Party Chairman Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had other ideas. Immediately after the general election results were announced he declared on 20 December 1970 that ‘Punjab and Sind are Pakistan’s fortresses and without the consent of Pakistan Peoples’ Party no Constitution of Pakistan can be framed.’ Next day in the same tone he declared ‘for last twenty-three years East Pakistan was denied of its legitimate rights but that does not mean for next twenty-three years they will be dominating on the affairs of West Pakistan.’ Observers did not fail to notice the tone in Bhutto’s statement. Virtually he was trying to signal the separation of Pakistan.⁸⁵

My friend Dr. Abdur Rashid⁸⁶ who was like me a class XII student at Dhaka College, one of the centers of 1969-71 student movement described to me how moving and inspiring this past midnight brief speech was to everyone. From thousands of miles away in New York, I remember discussing the situation with Dr. Alamgir and Hon. Mahmud Ali who was then the Vice Consul at the Pakistan Consulate.⁸⁷ Later, we would occupy the Pakistani consulate under his leadership

⁸⁵ Communication from Prof. Abdul Mannan on Jan. 13, 2020. Prof. Mannan is the former VC of Chittagong University and Chairperson of UGC.

⁸⁶ Dr. Rashid later would become a Professor of Engineering in Massey University in New Zealand.

⁸⁷ Both of them were already active in the community and would play leadership roles. In a humble and minor way, as a delegate to the *World Youth Forum, 1971* I was able to play a small role in creating public opinion and help in approaching some members of the international academic and diplomatic communities.

where the home-made flag of Bangladesh was raised in a public venue in the US for the first time.

Another friend who was a University student at that time and is now an academic, Prof. Habibul Haque Khondker⁸⁸ recently described his state of mind during February-March 1971 in the following words:

On March 1, 1971, I was at the Dhaka Stadium watching a cricket match between Board of Cricket Control of Pakistan XI against the Commonwealth XI. Suddenly, there were commotions which I later found out were reactions to President Yahya Khan's unilateral decision to postpone the convening of the Parliament *sine die*. The convening of the Parliament was due on March 3, 1971 when *Bangabondhu* Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was to form his government as the leader of the majority party in the parliament. The historic electoral victory of the Awami League which bagged 167 of the 169 seats of the Parliament gave them a chance to form the government of Pakistan. But the Pakistani ruling class had other plans. The sudden and abrupt announcement on March 1, led to spontaneous reactions from the general masses. Here, the ordinary people on the street, at the cricket stadium, people minding their everyday lives sprang to action to protest this unjust postponement of the parliamentary session, which was seen as a postponement of their democratic rights and a blow to their democratic aspirations.

I was a resident of S.M. Hall in those tumultuous days. Even before the fateful day of March 1, 1971, political temperature was rising as the students were demonstrating at Dhaka University campus. But after March 1, the situation became volatile and incendiary. I saw the military troops in full gear marching the streets in front of the university as a show of force to intimidate the students with dubious results. I saw myself as a friend and sympathizer of politically involved students. I had no track-record of involvement in students' politics directly, except attending some meetings during my college days with my friends who were left-leaning. I had the impression that the smart students were naturally drawn to the left-leaning politics. At S.M. Hall, my good friend and roommate Mahbulul Hoque Lenin held some position in the elected students' council of the Hall. Lenin and I used to have long political discussions and we came to the conclusions that things would go out of hand. We decided to leave the Hall quietly, which we thought would be a target if the

⁸⁸ Previously at National University of Singapore, and now at Zayed University in UAE.

circumstances took a violent turn. In my mind, the sooner we left the better. I knew that my parents in Bagerhat were anxious as were Lenin's in Mymensingh. We decided to leave on our own accord. We just wanted to be out of the harm's way. On March 5, I boarded a ferry at Sadarghat, Dhaka for Bagerhat reaching home the next morning.⁸⁹

Prof. Khondker goes on to talk about the speech on March 7 and of its significance for him:

I heard the speech of *Bangabondhu* on the radio with a group of friends in Bagerhat. There was a spontaneous crowd around the radio which was put on full volume. The East Pakistan Radio carried the speech. I was convinced that the crisis situation would escalate further after the speech. It was clear to me after the historic speech that there was no point of return. The next few days, I would follow the newspapers carefully reading the day's proceedings. There was a flicker of hope as the negotiations were proceeding. Little did I know that the Pakistani military rulers were buying time under the ploy of negotiations to receive reinforcements from West Pakistan for a military crackdown. At that point in time no one could believe that a surprise murderous attack on the civilians would be carried out by the military. From Bagerhat it was difficult to assess the full extent of the tragedy of March 25. Information, those days, was scarce. Wild speculations and rumors dominated public discussions in the street corners of a small town. Pakistani military rolled into Bagerhat three-weeks after the crackdown in Dhaka. By then, I moved to a neighboring village on the skirt of Kochua, a smaller town as our house in Bagerhat was used as a camp for the *Mukti Bahini* made up of runaway soldiers and others organized by the local MP of Awami League. As Pakistani troops moved in, they set the market area of Bagerhat on fire, which we watched from a distance and thought – mistakenly, as it turned out later - it was our house that was on fire. At that moment, we did not know which way the war would go.⁹⁰

Another Dhaka University student who lived through these turbulent times as a participant, Dr. Abdullah Shibli gives the following account under the apt heading “Our Spring of Discontent: February 15 to March 7, 1971 in Dhaka”. He recalls vividly those turbulent times of great hope:

⁸⁹ Communication from Professor H. Khondker, Jan. 5, 2020

⁹⁰ Ibid.

The month of *Falgun* in the Bengali Calendar ushers in spring in Bangladesh. In 1971, “*pohela falgun*” or the first day of spring came as always on February 14. We were second-year students (or Sophomores) at Dhaka University and could feel the breath of freedom in the air. The National Assembly elections -- held two months ago on December 7--had returned the Awami League with an absolute majority and a mandate for regional autonomy for Bengal, and we were all, the entire nation, waiting in anticipation. The day before, on February 13, Pakistan’s military ruler Yahya Khan announced that the National Assembly would meet in Dacca on March 3. Dhaka was abuzz with excitement at the news that our struggle for emancipation would finally reach a major milestone in the city where it began in 1952.

Our hopes were somewhat jolted on February 15 when Bhutto, the leader of the majority party in West Pakistan hinted that he and his People's Party would boycott the Assembly. But, *Ekushey February* was just around the corner, and we soon got caught up in the preparations for this day. I was a second-year student of Rabindra *Sangeet* at Bulbul Academy of Fine Arts (BAFA) at our Dhanmandi branch, and following the tradition set in the previous year, we gathered for the midnight open-air concert in our huge courtyard on February 20.

We got on stage at 11:30 PM and took our place on the dais. There was a nip in the air, and my elder brother and I were huddled together counting down the minutes with a bunch of other young as well as more seasoned artists as we waited for the clock to strike midnight. At 12:01 AM, Atiq Bhai fired up the harmonium, and we all started to hum the prelude in unison, and then with our full reserve of emotion and heart, sang, “*Amar Bhai-er Roktey Rangano Ekushey February*”.

The next few days went by like a blur. Newspapers were full of stories that the ruling military junta and the politicians from the-then West Pakistan were dragging their feet at the negotiations that were taking place to form a central government and to transfer power to the elected people's representatives. We did not want to believe that Yahya Khan would renege on this promise, made a few weeks earlier on January 14 after his talks with Sheikh Mujib in Dacca, to hand over power to the latter as the Prime Minister of Pakistan.

Our worst fears came true on March 1, when Yahya announced that the National Assembly session due on March 3 would be postponed sine die. This, he said, was “to give more time to political leaders of East and West Pakistan to arrive at a reasonable understanding on the issue of Constitution-making.” Dhaka city

erupted in anger and people from all walks of life took to the streets, and spontaneously all stores and business centers in the city closed down as well.

The student leaders of Dhaka University immediately declared war and sent out a national call for action. We stopped going to classes. Sheikh Mujib declared a province-wide *hartal* and “non-cooperation” every day from 6:00 a.m. - 2:00 p.m. starting from March 3 to March 6 and announced that on March 7 he would address a rally at the Ramna Racecourse. I still remember after almost half a century, the pride we felt when for the first time the national flag of Bangladesh was hoisted at Dhaka University from the dome at the front entrance of the Arts faculty building on March 3. And the rest is history.⁹¹

Dr. Abdullah A. Khan who was then a third-year honors student at the Dhaka University also recalls those events and sentiments during February- March 1971 in similar terms. Here is his extended testimony:

In early 1971, I was a 20-year old 3rd-year Honors student at the University of Dhaka (DU), still hoping to finish our honors practical exams which had been postponed amid the political turmoil brewing all around us. For me and most of my classmates and close friends, completing our Bachelor’s degree with honors and eventually finishing our Masters were to be stepping stones to launch our desired careers, and thereby making our middle-class families proud of us. None of us were seriously involved in politics yet, but we all were proudly aware of our DU’s heritage as the incubator and springboard for two of the most significant political movements of our young country’s history – 1952 Language Movement and 1969 Anti-Ayub Movement – and so, were quite aware politically as to what was going on in the country at the national level. In fact, many of us were active participants in the 1969 protests that led to the demise of the longest-lasting dictatorial rule in the country and paved the way for the December 7, 1970 democratic elections.

I was too young to vote in the 1970 elections, but following the landslide win by the *Awami* League (AL) under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, me and the overwhelming majority of East Pakistan’s population were jubilant at the real possibility of finally achieving political, economic and cultural autonomy for our part

⁹¹ Communication from Dr. Abdullah Shibli on January 6, 2020. Dr. Abdullah Shibli is an economist and works in information technology. He is Senior Research Fellow, International Sustainable Development Institute (ISDI), a think-tank in Boston, USA. Dr. Shibli is the author of six books and has been writing a column “An Open Dialogue” for *The Daily Star* since 2008. He has worked for the World Bank and Harvard University.

of the country. My thought was – we are really in the midst of making history and charting a new and just path for our *Bangalee* nation and also for Pakistan. And my feeling was that irrespective of our erstwhile political and other differences, we *Bangalees* are a people united for a purpose. Like most of my friends, I didn't belong to AL, Chhatra League (CL) or any other political/student party but Sheikh Mujib was my leader, and embodiment of our hope. Indeed, it was a very optimistic time for a while!

Our enormous optimism was short-lived, however, as it was becoming apparent that the Pakistani military-political elite was trying their utmost to prevent a transfer of power to the legitimate representatives of the people. On February 13, 1971, the caretaker President, Gen. Yahiya, finally announced that the first session of the newly elected parliament would be held on March 3rd at the newly constructed National Parliament building in Dhaka, which was designated a few years earlier as the Legislative or 2nd Capital of Pakistan. But under intense pressure and threat of boycott from the minority party (PPP) leader Z.A. Bhutto, the scheduled date was unceremoniously postponed on March 1, indefinitely! Most people were shocked and confused by the rapidly unfolding facts and rumors, and the general mood in the country had suddenly changed from one of jubilation, hope and optimism to one of uncertainty and somewhat pessimism. However, this fateful decision by the Bhutto-Yahiya duo also reflected their worst miscalculation as it soon precipitated events that ultimately led to the break-up of Pakistan and emergence of Bangladesh.

Inevitably, the entire province erupted into active protests, and an organized civil disobedience and non-cooperation movement followed, and everything in the public and private sectors were effectively being run via directives from Sheikh Mujib and the AL. Pakistani military forces were largely confined to the barracks, after a few incidences of shooting and killing protesting civilians in the districts.

These instances and circumstance combined to not only instill a new ethno-nationalistic identity in me and most of my friends and relatives but also helped transform our doubts into defiance and determination. The widespread feeling was that the legitimate authority of the Pakistani government over the territory of Bangladesh had ceased and their military was nothing but an occupying force. To me personally, I was still technically in Pakistan but no longer a Pakistani.

During that first week of March, notably, two particular events of momentous historic significance happened that had essentially propelled the country towards eventual independence, even though some of our political leaders were

lagging behind. I was fortunate to have witnessed and experienced both these events personally.

The first event occurred on March 2nd, the day after the decision to postpone the parliament session was announced, and it was the bold decision by the DUCSU leadership to inaugurate the first ever national flag of Bangladesh. The flag was designed and created by a DU student, and it was basically the same as our flag today, except that it also had a small yellow-gold map of Bangladesh on the red sun, representing “*Sonar Bangla*” (Golden Bengal). That day, Dhaka City was responding to the *Hartal* (General Strike) called by the AL, and we (me and some close friends) were hanging out on campus to find out what’s happening, what’s on the protest/resistance agenda, and how we can help/participate; then we got wind of this plan that the proposed Bangladesh flag is going to be raised in the Arts Building around noon time. So, we rushed to Arts Building and found several hundred students had already gathered near the west entrance of the Arts Building and chanting “*Joy Bangla*” and other pro-independence slogans. Soon, A.S.M. Abdur Rob, Shahjahan Shiraj and some others from the progressive and pro-independence wing of CL arrived; then after a few short speeches Rob went up on the west entrance dome and hoisted the first Bangladesh Flag amid loud cheers and slogans. We were, of course, literally breathless experiencing this historic moment, and shouting out the slogans at the top of our voices! As to the flag itself, we all liked the design and what it signified, but, being a geographer, the thought crossed my mind as to how difficult it would be to maintain the accuracy of the very sinuous outline of our national map; so, I am glad it was simplified subsequently.

The invigorating impact of the national flag was overwhelming and contagious, particularly after it was formally adopted by central CL and hoisted the next day at a Paltan Maidan rally of thousands by its President, Nur-e-Alam Siddiqui. The hawkers and vendors of Dhaka and other parts of the country were amazing selling at minimal cost replicas of the flag which were being produced and distributed spontaneously by small clothing and tailoring shops all over the country with awesome efficiency. My friends and I bought a bunch of them and proudly hoisted them on the rooftops of the Azimpur Estate buildings in our residential neighborhood. Many others were doing the same, and soon the Bangladesh Flag was ubiquitous! The flag had become the most powerful symbol of the transformation of our dream from Autonomy to Independence. To most of us, there was no going back. The second prime event of those tumultuous days that I had the honor of attending was the historic March 7th Speech by the then undisputed leader of the entire

Bangalee nation, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. As noted earlier, by the time this speech was scheduled the aspiration of the people had already turned distinctly pro-independence, and so I and millions of other young supporters were excitedly awaiting some form of declaration of independence and clearly enunciated directives charting a path forward to achieve that goal. The anticipation for this speech was so high that it had attracted young and old from all over the country overflowing the huge Ramna Racecourse venue and making it the largest ever public rally in the country's history. My friends and I were indeed lucky to have secured a pretty good location, about 100 yards southwest from the dais toward the Public Library on (the then) Airport Road; we were close enough to be able to see and identify the people on the dais, and we were ready to absorb every word from our beloved leader. Then, after a few warm-up remarks by Tajuddin and others, there appeared Sheikh Mujib amid thunderous cheers and slogans, and delivered the most crucial speech of his life in his booming voice and typical folksy language and style.

We all listened very intently, and by the time it ended, many of us had almost memorized the rather short speech. However, the most consequential line that everybody could grasp, and was in everyone's lips, was: "The struggle this time is our struggle for Liberation, the struggle this time is the struggle for Independence." As we were leaving, everyone was reviewing what they had just heard and evaluating what it actually meant. Some of us were a little disheartened that it was not a formal declaration of independence from Pakistan, but soon under cooler retrospection I realized that the speech was indeed a very well-crafted, and very thinly veiled, declaration of our determination for economic emancipation and political independence. And that outright declaration of independence under the prevailing circumstances of the time would only hand Yahiya a "justifiable" excuse for a military crackdown when we were not yet prepared to launch a full-fledged armed struggle. So, we understood that the leadership needs a bit more time to get things properly organized, and also believed that we, the young people, need to prepare ourselves with whatever means available for the inevitable, difficult and potentially long struggle ahead.⁹²

⁹² Communication from Dr. Abdullah A. Khan on January 7, 2020. I am most grateful for his taking the time to do this. I had heard bits and pieces of his story when I was a young assistant professor in Ohio, and he was finishing his Ph.D. at Kent State University. But this is the first time as far as I know, he has set things down albeit briefly in writing. I hope he and others like him who were in Bangladesh in those glorious but uncertain days will write down their experiences for future generations to learn from these.

What is most significant about this brief speech is *Bangabondhu*'s foresight that the situation will become more difficult. He told the huge crowd in a solemn and somber tone as the occasion demanded honestly that they must prepare for a long hard struggle. This is contrary to the view of those who have tried to propagate the view that *Bangabondhu* did not realize the murderous intentions of the Pakistani dictatorship. Quite to the contrary, he chose the way of alerting the public and as later events in March would show, lead them towards the path of liberation politically through the noncooperation movement.⁹³

With the announcement by Yahya of a March date for the meetings of the elected National Assembly, *Bangabondhu* and the AL parliamentary party were meeting at the Hotel Purbani in Dhaka on March 1. Their aim was to draft their version of the future constitution in light of the six and eleven points. At the same time a Cricket match was in progress at the Dhaka stadium attracting enthusiastic crowds. Raqibul Hasan, one of this author's classmates from Dhaka College was the only *Bangalee* member of the under 25 team. It is significant that a young cricketer like Raqibul Hasan would write the slogan of our demand for freedom, "*Joy Bangla---Victory to Bangla*" on his bat before appearing on the field.

Suddenly on that very day, Yahya Khan gave a brief radio speech postponing for an indefinite period the convening of the elected National Assembly which was slated to meet on March 3 according to Yahya's previous announcement. His reason? Bhutto and PPP had refused to come to the elected National Assembly meetings on March 3.⁹⁴

Clearly Yahya and Bhutto had misjudged the mood of the people in East Pakistan. Immediately, people in Dhaka and the rest of East Pakistan stopped everything else they were doing and flooded the streets in massive protests. The Cricket match was abandoned halfway. People gathered in spontaneous demonstrations. The residence of *Bangabondhu* on Road No. 32

⁹³ I am grateful to Dr. Rashid for locating the online version of this February 21, 1971 speech (skype conversation on January 4, 2019). One can find it on line at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7KLV_mPhj24

⁹⁴ There are many vivid descriptions including some misleading and inaccurate ones like the controversial account--- and in my view a distorted account--- by A.K. Khondker. Among the authentic descriptions, the accounts by HE Hasina Wajed and Tofail Ahmed are both vivid and accurate. I have given some links further on.

HE Hasina Wajed gave a very intimate portrait of *Bangabondhu* and inter alia of February-March 1971 in her heartfelt and historically accurate talk on her mother's role in the freedom movement:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZITXe-NxFtg>

During a TV interview in *Tritiya Matra* (The Third Dimension) 17 April, 2019 Hon. Tofail Ahmed described mainly the formation of the government in exile on 17 April, 1971; but this interview also covers earlier events including January to March events in 1971. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZITXe-NxFtg>

in Dhanmondi, Dhaka and the local AL offices throughout the province became headquarters of an alternative government. At first procession after procession proceeded towards Hotel *Purbani*. *Bangabandhu* met with the journalists there and revealed the nature of conspiracy between the military junta and Bhutto. The journalists and the people who had gathered all were waiting for further instructions from *Bangabandhu*. One asked: will you announce independence? *Bangabandhu's* measured answer, "Wait a while."⁹⁵

Bangabandhu answered in the negative another question from the journalists about whether he was consulted about the decision to postpone *sine die* the meetings of the National Assembly.⁹⁶

Bangabandhu reiterated his firm opposition to all undemocratic policies including press censorship. He stated clearly that Yahya's decision was most unfortunate and will lead to unpredictable consequences. He reaffirmed the AL's commitments to the people.

Such was the unanimous opposition that even rightwing leaders like Nurul Amin expressed their dissent. Ataur Rahman Khan also echoed the same sentiment. Oli Ahad who once was a leftist but no longer so in 1971 also agreed with Nurul Amin and Ataur Rahman Khan.

On March 3, many leaders across the political spectrum came together publicly in front of the important Baitul Mukarram mosque near Jinnah Avenue in Dhaka to register their dissent from Yahya's decision. Most serious criticism from the left came from NAP-Wali Khan party. In their working committee meeting, NAP passed unanimously a strongly worded resolution against Yahya's undemocratic decree. NAP called for mass actions against Yahya's dictatorship. It is important to note leaders of NAP from both wings were present including representatives from the Punjab, NWFP, Baluchistan and Sind. They all agreed with the leaders in East Pakistan against Yahya. Organized disciplined protests became the order of the day from March 1 onwards in East Pakistan.

Bangabandhu called for *hartal* in Dhaka on March 2 and for the rest of East Pakistan on March 3. Yahya had already fired the balanced governor of East Pakistan Vice Admiral Ahsan because he, unlike Bhutto and the generals, had a deep understanding of the grievances of people and was sympathetic to their plight. Yahya's regime also banned all activities after dark in

⁹⁵ Salahuddin Ahmad et als.eds. *Bangladesher Muktijuddher Itihash 1947-1971*.(Dhaka: Agamee Prokashoni.):206; The *Dainik Sangbad*, March2, 1971

⁹⁶ Hasan Hafizur Rahman et als. eds. *Bangladesher Shadhinota Juddho, Dolilpatra*.Vol. 2 (Dhaka:Ministry of Information).1982:662

public. Even with curfew, mass protests became unstoppable. The army responded by shooting and killing unarmed citizens.

From March 2 on, the students of Dhaka University engage in exemplary political activity obeying *Bangabondhu*'s call for noncooperation with the military regime. In fact from now on Bangladesh will be *de facto* independent with its own flag and disciplined activists from the AL, NAP and the underground Communist Party (EPCP) and its student organization, East Pakistan Students Union (EPSU) together with the activists from East Pakistan Students League (EPSL).

During this period, the renowned journalist from Lahore Mr. Mazhar Ali gave a statement against the regime of Yahya reflecting the thinking and sentiments of progressive West Pakistanis.

On March 3, *Bangabondhu* announced:

The military has fired upon unarmed people...simply because they protested against the unjust and insulting treatment of their homeland. I condemn such firing upon innocent people in the strongest terms...We, the representatives of the people of East Pakistan were ready to meet democratically. In fact, some representatives from West Pakistan had also come here to meet... But a minority group conspired to stop our democratic gathering.

He said further:

You cannot keep the *Bangalees* down any longer. Under the present circumstances, there is no rationale for keeping the martial law even for a single day longer. I call for immediate removal of martial law and stopping the conflict removing the obstacles in the path of democracy.

Furthermore, *Bangabandhu* gave clear instructions for noncooperation movement to continue nonviolently at least till March 7. He announced unequivocally:

From March 3 to March 6 , every day from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. all will observe *hartal* in this province....only emergency health care vehicles, pharmacies, electricity and water supply operations will continue unimpeded. I call upon all to observe *hartal* in a disciplined manner without harming lives or properties of others. Remember that whoever lives here even if their language is not Bangla, they are still *Bangalees*. We are the guarantors of their safety and security...

March 3 will be observed as a national day of mourning. On that day after the public meeting of the Students League in the Paltan Maidan, I will lead a public procession...On March 7, I will speak at a public meeting at the Racecourse Maidan at 2 p.m. There the next steps for our movement will be announced.⁹⁷

For the next few days many houses and vehicles will fly the flag of Bangladesh. Life with a high degree of political awareness and a sense of crisis will go on. Students in particular will be the vanguards of disciplined volunteers in maintaining order in the civil society. For all intents and purposes people from all walks of life including the police and the bureaucrats will accept self-rule by *Bangalees*.

It is instructive to read the description of these February-March days by Prof. Rehman Sobhan who was a close advisor to *Bangabondhu*. Even he was unaware of the machinations in Bhutto and Yahya's close circles. Here is an excerpt from his autobiography that confirms that no one who had good faith anticipated the treachery of Bhutto and Yahya:

Notwithstanding the mounting tension, no one anticipated that the CA would actually be postponed. West Pakistani MCAs, other than; the PPP, began arriving in Dhaka in the last few days of February to attend the prospective session of the CA on 3 March, in spite of Bhutto's threat to break their legs. I had conversations with several of those known to me who had checked in to the InterContinental Hotel. At that stage, they expected that Bhutto would eventually turn up once the CA was in session.⁹⁸

Prof. Sobhan continues:

Wali Khan, the leader of the West Pakistan NAP, and Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, a NAP leader from Baluchistan, who I met several times at the residence of Ahmedul Kabir in Indira Road, were less sanguine and reaffirmed the belief that a conspiracy was being plotted by Yahya with Bhutto to frustrate the transfer of power to, civilian rule. Both Wali and Bizenjo argued that the conspiracy by Bhutto and Yahya was not just targeted towards Bangladesh but also directed at frustrating the national aspirations of the Pathans and the Baluch, particularly as Bhutto had won few seats from these two provinces. I record, with sadness, those long and increasingly melancholy

⁹⁷ Hasan Hafizur Rahman, op. cit. p.669

⁹⁸ Sobhan, Rehman, *Untranquil Recollections: The Years of Fulfilment*. (New Delhi: Sage, 2016)

discussions with the NAP leaders, sitting in the tranquility of Laila Kabir's garden at Indira Road, where she attempted, to illuminate the unfolding darkness with her incandescent charm and insightful interventions.⁹⁹

Prof. Sobhan goes on to add with great sadness that he learned the bitter truth in 1977:

I learnt some years later, in conversations in London in 1977 with Admiral Ahsan and later with Lt General Yakub in New York in 1993, that at some crucial meetings in Islamabad they had both attempted to persuade Yahya to go ahead with the session on 3 March and that any attempt to postpone the session could provoke the most severe reaction among the *Bangalees*. Their views did not prevail.

The conclusions from my own discussions with Ahsan and Yakub have been confirmed, again in Raja's memoir, where he reports that Yakub was informed at a meeting with Yahya in Islamabad of his decision to postpone the convening of the CA in Dhaka on 3 March. According to Raja, by early February, Yahya had already drawn up a contingency plan. Operation Blitz, for a military crackdown accompanied by suspension of all political activity, whereby the armed forces would move against defiant political leaders and take them into preventive custody. Operation Blitz had been passed on to the CMLA in Dhaka to be activated when ordered. Yakub, on his return to Dhaka from his abortive mission to dissuade Yahya from his folly, instructed his commanders on 26 February to be ready to put Operation Blitz into action if called to do so after 1 March. The timing of the preparation of Operation Blitz suggests that it coincided with the return of Bhutto from Dhaka and was part of the operationalization of the Larkana agenda.

Apart from Yakub, Governor Ahsan also made a last-minute dash to Islamabad to avert Yahya's march of folly. Yahya was not persuaded by Ahsan's arguments and, instead, dismissed him from the post of Governor. Yakub was then ordered to take over as Governor of East Pakistan. Ahsan will be remembered by history as- a genuinely decent man who did all in his power to not only ensure a free and fair election in December 1970 but tried, until the last moment, to work for a peaceful democratic transition.¹⁰⁰

And here is Prof. Sobhan's eyewitness account of the events that transpired after Yahya's treachery:

⁹⁹ Ibid.p.324

¹⁰⁰ Ibid p.325

On the afternoon of 2 March, the Chattro Sangram Parishad convened a massively attended public meeting on Paltan Maidan, which I attended, that was addressed by various student leaders. All speakers proclaimed that we should now fight for independence and proceeded to unfurl the green and red flag of an independent Bangladesh. The next day, an even larger meeting was addressed by *Bangabondhu*, where he spelt out his defiance of Yahya and the launching of a program of total non-cooperation.

The initial phase of non-cooperation was far from peaceful. General Yakub did not fully activate Operation Blitz that involved the arrest of major political leaders including, presumably, *Bangabondhu*. Under the prevailing political circumstances, Yakub sensibly realized this would be an unfeasible and senseless act. He did, however, move to impose curfew, backed by a sufficient show of military force, which he thought would be enough to calm down the situation and buy time for some sort of political deal between Yahya and Mujib. Yakub's military and political calculations did not add up. The *Bangalees*, who were reputed to run away at the first, sight of the army or the sound of gunfire, proved to be sired from another breed. They unprecedentedly defied the curfews, demonstrating willingness to face up to the guns of the army and risk death. Many were indeed killed in confrontations with the army as the local police force refused to fire on *Bangalees* at an early stage of the non-cooperation movement. All offices and institutions, both public and private, all factories, educational establishment and even the law courts came to a standstill.

When General Yakub realized that no military solution was possible, he recalled his troops to the cantonments around 4 March 1971. At that point, he effectively relinquished Pakistan's sovereignty over Bangladesh, thereby drawing down the curtain on 24 years of imperial rule. When he failed to persuade Yahya to travel to Dhaka to deal with the situation in person to seek a political solution, he chose to resign as CMLA and Commander, Eastern Command. Yakub, in his resignation letter sent to Yahya on 5 March informed him that

the control of the administration had passed on to Sheikh Mujib who was *now de facto* head of government and controlled all public life. ... I am convinced there is no military solution which can make sense in the present situation. I am consequently unable to accept the responsibility for implementing a mission, namely military solution that would mean large scale killing of unarmed civilians and would achieve no sane aim. It would have disastrous consequences. (Khadim Hussain Raja)

Yahya accepted Yakub's resignation and immediately sent out General Tikka Khan, the Butcher of Baluchistan, to take over as both Governor and Chief Martial Law

Administrator. Tikka's arrival in Dhaka on 7 March indicated that much blood would need to be shed before the *Bangalees* attained self-rule.¹⁰¹¹⁰²

During this period, the US diplomats like Blood in his dispatches to Washington and Kissinger's aids like Harold Saunders drew the same conclusions. Eric Driffel who was the head of USAID in Dhaka at the time also had premonitions of much bloodshed. But no one could anticipate the ferocity of 26 March that was yet to come.¹⁰³¹⁰⁴

So, these were the circumstances under which the historic speech of March 7 occurred. *Bangabondhu* showed considerable political skills in crafting a speech¹⁰⁵ that called for a fight for real freedom on the one hand, and also left the door open for a principled solution within the framework of a confederation-like Pakistan of the future. Thus, in the speech that follows he underlined four substantive conditions for Yahya, Bhutto and the military to accept. Among other eyewitness accounts we have various interviews of Hon. Tofail Ahmed who was a key student leader and worked closely with *Bangabondhu*. He has repeatedly affirmed that *Bangabondhu* listened patiently to all freedom fighters and particularly the student leaders; but ultimately, the judgment he showed and the demands he made in this amazing speech were

¹⁰¹ Ibid. 326-7

¹⁰² One can also consult the interviews with Dr. Kamal Hossain, Barrister Amirul Islam and other direct participants in the negotiations. Among other sources one can see 1971 | Tanvir Mokammel | Kino-Eye Films I a mega-documentary <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wDOrEyHdg3I&t=1562s>

¹⁰³ See Blood, *Cruel Birth* pp.128-137; NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files---Middle East, Pakistan, Vol.III. Sisco to Farland, 26 February 1971; Foreign Affairs Oral History Project Library of Congress, Blood interview, 27 June 1989.

¹⁰⁴ During 1969 to 1971, I was a student-activist-writer-singer studying in Dhaka College. I participated in all important demonstrations in Dhaka and travelled through many districts of East Pakistan as an activist and a cultural worker. My earliest published reflections can be found in H.A. Khan "Notun Shurjer Protikkhay (Waiting for a New Sun)". *Dhaka College Literary Journal*, 1971. Web lecture available at:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pukydWgs5PI> English translation available at:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IHETwXzWqLk>

H.A. Khan "Shanskritik Dahotto (Cultural Slavery)", Dhaka: *Ekushe Shankolon*, 21 February 1969

¹⁰⁵ From all available evidence including the testimony of people close to the leader such as Hon. Tofail Ahmed, the final speech was not a written document though many had submitted their notes beforehand. Some young militants such as Sirajul Alam Khan and Abdur Razzak had put pressure on *Bangabandhu* to declare independence unequivocally. However, *Bangabandhu* made it clear that he was their leader and would speak as he saw fit. The final speech was definitely not extempore but it had the ring of spontaneity and at the same time showed mature political craftsmanship.

entirely thought out by *Bangabandhu*.^{106, 107, 108, 109}

¹⁰⁶ One can listen, for example to his interview on NTV on 15 August, 2015.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pMmxME7VkG0>

¹⁰⁷ One can listen also to his speech at the Bangladesh parliament on March 7, 2017

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GvLusCWGJvI>

¹⁰⁸ One can listen also to his interview with RTV: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IsqbVapPj4U>

¹⁰⁹ It is also instructive to listen to Prof. Syed Anwar Hossain's recollections on *Bangabandhu*'s birthday event:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vQFh5G4Rj3w>

Chapter 8:

Conclusions--- Towards a New Theory of Mass Movements and a Strategy for Liberation in the 21st Century: Unfolding Eventualizing Dynamics, Polyphonic Possibilities

Sartre once wrote famously:

“Man is condemned to be free; because once thrown into the world, he is responsible for everything he does. It is up to you to give [life] a meaning.”

Without going into a critical discourse about phenomenological assumptions regarding the transcendental ego etc. and the many philosophical weaknesses of Sartrean existentialism¹¹⁰, we can accept provisionally at face value that individuals are free to act within limits set by many historical factors and influences. In his essay, *Existentialism as Humanism*, Sartre gives two literary examples---one from English literature and another from French literature of the 19th century in his attempt to answer possible objections to the (non)foundations of an ethics of freedom:

Let us, for example, examine the two following cases, and you will see how far they are similar in spite of their difference. Let us take *The Mill on the Floss*. We find here a certain young woman, Maggie Tulliver, who is an incarnation of the value of passion and is aware of it. She is in love with a young man, Stephen, who is engaged to another, an insignificant young woman. This Maggie Tulliver, instead of heedlessly seeking her own happiness, chooses in the name of human solidarity to sacrifice herself and to give up the man she loves. On the other hand, La Sanseverina in Stendhal's *Chartreuse de Parme*, believing that it is passion which endows man with his real value, would have declared that a grand passion justifies its sacrifices, and must be preferred to the banality of such conjugal love as would unite Stephen to the little goose he was engaged to marry. It is the latter that she would have chosen to sacrifice in realising her own happiness, and, as

¹¹⁰ In my earlier works I have dealt with weaknesses in phenomenology from Hegel to Heidegger including Husserl and post-Heideggerians like Gadamer, Derrida and Deleuze. Likewise, I have also analyzed some crucial weaknesses in the theories of subject by Barthes, Foucault and Lacan even as I have read their genealogical, textual and deconstructive gestures sympathetically.

Stendhal shows, she would also sacrifice herself upon the plane of passion if life made that demand upon her. Here we are facing two clearly opposed moralities; but I claim that they are equivalent, seeing that in both cases the overruling aim is freedom. You can imagine two attitudes exactly similar in effect, in that one girl might prefer, in resignation, to give up her lover while the other preferred, in fulfilment of sexual desire, to ignore the prior engagement of the man she loved; and, externally, these two cases might appear the same as the two we have just cited, while being in fact entirely different. The attitude of La Sanseverina is much nearer to that of Maggie Tulliver than to one of careless greed. Thus, you see, the second objection is at once true and false. One can choose anything, but only if it is upon the plane of free commitment.¹¹¹

It becomes clear upon closer examination that this “plane of free commitment” is not an ontological given. Rather it has to be created through risky political and social action by both individuals and groups. Theoretically, this book has been an attempt to find the ontological and phenomenological rhizomes of the discourses and actions of a particular liberation movement. Since the movement in which I was a participant during the last few tumultuous years was at least partly successful, there are lessons to be learnt even in an age of deep epistemic doubt.¹¹²

Writing any book if done properly, becomes a lesson in humility. Lessons in humility that I received in writing this particular book are even more striking than the lessons from any other books I have written. Pondering over the events, the personalities, the crowds, the contradictions, confluences, the moments of inspiration and courage, the moments of despair and cowardice but above all the overall heroism of the masses, demonstrate to me at least that the eventualizing dynamics of a mass movement is a profound ontological unfolding. It is as if the Lacanian real reveals itself in all its grand perversity and nobility in a series of philosophical moments through the actions of all the participants beyond any level of conscious awareness and certainly beyond both the imaginary and the symbolic moments of the Lacanian subjectivity. Delving into this unfolding of the Real has certainly taken me to the boundaries of meaning and interpretation. Clearly, the process is endless. That is all the more profound reason not to fall into a shallow postmodern skepticism. On the other hand, I have also learned through this process not to fall

¹¹¹ Jean Paul Sartre, *Existentialism as Humanism*, on line version, <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/sartre/works/exist/sartre.htm>

¹¹² I have dealt with various aspects of poststructural and more generally postmodern sources of doubt as a sympathetic critic from both within the camp of postmodernism---since I am a postmodern literary writer myself---and from its margins as a serious student of both Western and Buddhist philosophy.

into the arrogant self-certainty of European modernism which as Dipesh Chakrabarty and others have demonstrated is just one provincialism among many others.

At the end of the writing of any book, it is also well to remember Braudel's wise reflections on how books---all books--- have a tendency to run away from their authors. Again, this book has done more running away than my other books which have run away from me also but to lesser degrees. Inevitably, accounting for the complexities of a mass movement with its panoramic scope compels the so-called author to surrender the authorial control which is in reality---- as Barthes, Foucault and others reminded us long ago and authors like Borges demonstrated in profoundly circuitous and therefore, in a paradoxically convincing manner--- imaginary in a profound Lacanian sense.

But life itself now poses another question as another post cold war 21st century Real reveals itself: *Quo Vadis?* Where to go from here in our crises-ridden 21st century? In answering this question, Moses Hess's call to action which Marx heeded and Chernyshevsky's profound practical question: *what is to be done?* are equally important to keep in mind. Therefore, instead of doing much in the way of summarizing the arguments in previous chapters, I will emphasize a few salient mainly methodological points ending with an 11-point strategic guide for facing the future in the tumultuous unfolding of eventualizing dynamics and dialogical polyphony in the 21st century. From my perspective, this is my response to the urgency I feel in engaging dialogically with the polyphony that is now emerging on our planet from the marginalized majorities---the youth, women, minorities, women and others at the margins of global capitalism and white European modernity.

I have followed a particular strategy in trying to capture the global within the local in this book. I have also endeavored to present the macrocosm of tumultuous postcolonial politics in South Asia since 1947 through the independence of Bangladesh and its recognition by the World by 1974 mainly---- but not exclusively----through the political events in the real movement of one key area, *Bangladesh*. The progressive democratic revolutionary forces from all sectors of the then East Pakistan and today's Bangladesh were galvanized in 1971 through a complex revolutionizing process that started at least in 1947 if not earlier.

I have built my narrative and analysis around the important historical events and processes surrounding the birth of today's Bangladesh. My main purpose in this analytical narrative building has been to let an international readership---especially young people who are

looking for a way out of the present global crisis---know that the political ideas, strategies and tactics of this liberation movement are relevant today--- within proper historical limits--- for our crisis-ridden period of struggle. The proposition that this work needs to be done has several historiographical justifications. The most important one from a historical perspective is that the history of Bangladesh liberation movement and of many others such as in South Africa have already been distorted by both the extreme right and the extreme left with the middle in great confusion.

The world today needs an objective evaluation of the most important ideas that motivated millions of people in Bangladesh during their struggle for self-determination. In many ways, leaders like *Bangabondhu* embodied symbolically their aspirations and his ideas and other leaders' ideas concentrated the inchoate but deeply felt needs of the people. The specific---in some particular instances in space and time, even unique--- historical trajectories of secular democratic and socialist ideals and discourses of politics and political economy are the most important to understand here. Undoubtedly, there is much to be criticized if for no other reason than simply for incompleteness. Therefore, my aim here has been to extend the discussion in several useful directions for the future. This is undertaken in the concluding part of all three of my books but particularly intensively in this, my most recent book.

Finally, the present effort may also be considered in light of the emerging frontier areas of research on mainstream narrative politics¹¹³ as well as the more radical post-Bakhtin analytical approach to narrative form as *a polyphonic*¹¹⁴ and *dialogical* discourse of the people with necessary, inevitable *heteroglossia* and specific types of *chronotopes*. My research emphasizes the construction of public and collective goods through the use of common narratives and original more radical interpretations for advancing the common good. In the East Pakistan of the 1960s the construction of the six points and 11 points programs in light of the theory of two economies advanced in the 1950s and 1960s by a group of Bengali economists can be insightfully seen from this new perspective of narrative politics. It is by no means certain that the more progressive narratives will win. This is demonstrated by the dominance of autocracies and kleptocracies in the aftermath of many national liberation movements and also after the breakup of bureaucratic and undemocratic structures in former USSR and Eastern Europe. In

¹¹³ Mayer, 2014

¹¹⁴ See the Bakhtin references in this essay. Also see Khan(2014)

these cases one set of exploiting elites has been replaced by another. The power structure is maintained largely through overt repression mixed with ideological narratives that are cruelly deceptive.

I have offered a post-Badiou dynamic theory of the ontology of the Event (événement).¹¹⁵ Based on the concrete historical development of liberation movements like those in Bangladesh in the postcolonial setting, I have developed the political ontological concept of *eventualization dynamic* and, I hope, thus demonstrated the reach of a theory based on this key concept in explaining successes and failures of liberation movements. Like Badiou, I also use rigorously modern set theory for this purpose. But unlike him, I dispense with the unsatisfactory axiom of choice. I also work with the more general theory of fuzzy sets axiomatically. Finally, I integrate this set theoretic approach with complexity theory via deep learning in neural networks and mesh works with multiple hidden layers.

An important methodological point also needs to be mentioned at the outset. My investigations of both the narrative and dynamic (political) ontological structures of the most significant speech acts of *Bangabondhu and others* in my previous books as well as this one are also attempts to present both the objective and the subjective factors that led to the victory of the liberation forces in Bangladesh on 16 December, 1971. I have tried to do this systematically through a complex systems perspective as dispassionate an analysis as possible of the objective factors within the limited space here. For the subjective factor, the reorganization and restructuring of the new NAP and the AL from 1963-64 along with the activism of the underground communists together building a base for liberation movement by going lower and deeper among the masses under the leadership of *Bangabondhu* and other progressive political forces were the most important.

Intricately interweaved with these subjective factors were also the personalities and actions of the leading figures that included not only *Bangabondhu* but also Maulana Bhashani, the other leaders of NAP(The National Awami Party)¹¹⁶ and the communist party, the young student leaders and many others at the local levels. It is impossible to do justice to all of them even in a few volumes because they deserve an encyclopedic treatment. Here, I have chosen a *polyphonic* and *dialogical* narrative style for analyzing the semiotics of the utterances and public

¹¹⁵ See the Badiou references in this essay. Also see Khan(2020a,b)

¹¹⁶ “*The National People’s Party*” when translated into English completely.

speeches by *Bangabandhu* and others to highlight the nature of such political discourses and connections between a democratic leadership and the creativity of the masses. However, one of my main theses is that in terms of political semiotics and ontology, *Bangabandhu* and the other revolutionary leaders are far greater than the persons themselves and their institutional titles. Through *Bangabandhu's* and his compatriots' consistent and courageous judgements and actions their subjectivities merged with the objective forces of the history of East Bengal, of South Asia and ultimately, the whole post WW2 world. I end therefore, with hope for the future without illusions regarding the critical nature of the multiple crises facing us and the need to build disciplined revolutionary organizations and train the activists of the future.

Lessons for Our Times---An Eleven Point Strategic Agenda for the Youth in the 21st Century:

1. Methodologically and substantively for progressive political practice, the most important lesson for young people everywhere from the lifelong political activism of *Bangabandhu* is to recognize the importance of building progressive political movements and to learn constantly from within the movement about the relationships between the local and global politics, between the complex (sometimes with many contradictory elements that need to be confronted and analyzed openly and honestly) nationalism of the oppressed and the equally complex democratic internationalism from below.
2. The post-WW2 socio-economic-political social democratic/embedded liberal consensus in the Global North is frayed. Young people need to build various types of socially oriented democratic movements
3. In the Global South, although export-led growth became possible for some countries that pursued what Khan (2013, 2017,2020ab) has called “strategic openness” most countries did not or could not achieve this type of growth.
4. Furthermore, the gains from “globalization” when present have been unevenly distributed everywhere. Consequently, inequalities in income and wealth distribution have risen almost everywhere in the world in the late 20th and in the 21st century so far.

5. Therefore, we have a heavily polarized world both in the Global North and in the Global South. We have to build a movement for fighting to remove the root causes of polarization.
6. Building various types of socially oriented democratic movements will require courage and steadiness; but these qualities are not enough. From *Bangabandhu* and Bangladesh liberation movement, we can also learn the value of organizing in a detailed, consistent manner relentlessly, always going lower and deeper among the masses. Learning from Rosa Luxemburg's dialectical analysis, which was independently rediscovered and applied creatively by *Bangabandhu*, we should fight for both broad and specific reforms everywhere but build a base for ever deeper social and democratic revolutions dialectically within our fight for reforms.
7. One must build local and global anti-racist and anti-fascist democratic coalitions strategically; but tactics need to be flexible and adaptable according to changing internal (national) and external(international) conditions.
8. There will be no narrow one-size fits-all narrative of struggle. Instead there will be many voices necessitating the building of appropriate *polyphonic narratives* of resistance. It is crucial for all voices to be heard and all liberatory points of view to be discussed openly.
9. As *the eventualizing dynamics* unfold with multiple trajectories in specific parts of the world, the leaders of mass movements must choose carefully and optimally at each step but know that all liberation struggles must embrace to various degrees some uncertainty. It is not possible to build a progressive political movement without embracing uncertainty in a rational manner.
10. Therefore, a *polychronotope* of struggle will be the norm. But how to understand the *polychronotope* for each situation and sequence of events is an empirical matter calling also for a great deal of political judgement and maturity so that both ultra-leftist adventurism and opportunistic rightism can be avoided at crucial strategic junctures. This will truly have to be an exercise in the applied science of complex

socio-economic-political systems. *Bangabandhu's* life of steadfast political engagement has many specific lessons to offer.

11. The progressive struggles themselves will be kaleidoscopic but broad qualities like anti-patriarchy, anti-racism including respecting the rights of minority groups, particularly the indigenous peoples and movement towards equalizing socially embedded capabilities for all will give an egalitarian strategic focus for deepening democracy. Together with a steady strategy of democratic internationalism, the movements of the future will be able to organize for liberation both locally and globally in an integrated manner.

Selected Bibliography

Books

- Abbas, Hassan, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror*. Armonk, (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2005)
- Abercrombie, N. and Urry, J., *Capital Labour and the Middle Classes*. (London: George, Allen & Unwin, 1983)
- Achebe, Chinua, *There Was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra*. (London: Allen Lane, 2012)
- Afzal, M. Rafique, *Political Parties in Pakistan 1947-1958*. Vol. 1. (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1986)
- Ahmad, Abul Mansur, *Amar Dekha Rajnitir Panchash Bochhor*, (Dhaka: Nowroz Kitabistan, 1975)
- Ahmad, Kamruddin, *Purbobanglar Shomaj o Rajniti*, 2nd edition, (Dhaka: Mawla Brothers, 2002)
- Ahmad, Kamruddin, *Banglar Ek Madhyabitter Atmakahini*. (Dhaka: Mawla Brothers, 1979)
- Ahmad, K., *The Social History in East Pakistan*. (Dhaka: Ms. Roushan Ara Ahmad, 1978)
- Ahmad, Mohiuddin, *Awami League: Juddhodiner Katha: 1971*.(Dhaka: Prothoma,2017)
- Ahmad, Mohiuddin, *Awami League: Utthanporbo 1948-1970*.(Dhaka: Prothoma,2016)
- Ahmed, Akhtar, *Advance to Contact: A Soldier's Account of Bangladesh Liberation War*. (Dhaka: University Press, 2000)
- Ahmed, Kamaruddin, *A Socio-Political History of Bengal and the Birth of Bangladesh*. (Dhaka: Inside Library Pub, 1975)
- Ahmed, Moudud, *Bangladesh: Constitutional Quest for Autonomy, 1950-1971*. (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1979)
- Bangladesh: Era of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman*. (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1991)
- Democracy and the Challenge of Development: A Study of Politics and Military Interventions in Bangladesh*. (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1995)
- Ahmed, M, *South Asia: Crisis of Development— The Case of Bangladesh*. (Dhaka: UPL, 2002)
- Ahmed, Salahuddin, *Bangladesh: Past and Present*. (New Delhi: A.P.H. Publishing, 2004)
- Ahmed, Sirajuddin, *Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman*.(Dhaka: Bhaskar Prakashoni, 2001)
- Ahmed, Sufia, *Diaries of Justice Muhammad Ibrahim (1960-1966)*. (Dhaka: Academic Press and Publishers Library, 2011)
- Ahmed, Viqar, and Rashid Amjad, *The Management of Pakistan's Economy 1947– 82*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1984)
- Ahsan, Syed Badrul, *From Rebel to Founding Father: Sheikh Mujibur Rahman*. (Dhaka: Niyogi Books, 2014)
- Aijazuddin, FS, *From a Head through a Head to a Head: The Secret Channel between the US and China through Pakistan*. (Karachi: OUP, 2002)

- The White House and Pakistan: Secret Declassified Documents, 1969– 1974.* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002)
- Akhter Mukul, MR, *Role of the Bengali Intellectuals in 1971 Liberation War*, (In Bengali). (Dhaka: Agami Prakashani, 1978)
- Akhund, Iqbal, *Trial and Error*. (Oxford University Press, 2000)
- Memoirs of a Bystander: A Life in Diplomacy.* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998)
- Alam, Anwarul, *Myth, Reality and Rakkhi Bahini*. (Dhaka: Prothama Prokashan, 2014)
- Alamgir Mohiuddin, "Foreign Capital, Inflow, Savings and Economic Growth-A Case Study of Bangladesh." *Bangladesh Economic Review* 2: 577-598.(1974)
- Famine 1974: Political Economy of Mass Starvation in Bangladesh.* (Dhaka: Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS), 1977)
- Famine in South Asia.* (Cambridge (Mass.): Oelgeschlager, Guan and Hani Publishing, 1980)
- Alexandrov- Argentov, Alexander M., *Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva: Vospominaniia*. (Moscow: Mezhdunarodniie otnosheniia, 1994)
- Alexeyeva, Lyudmilla, *Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious and Human Rights*. (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1985)
- Ali, Maqsood, *East Bengal to Bangladesh, Dynamics and Perspectives*. (Dhaka: UPL, 2009)
- Ali, Mubarak, *In the Shadow of History*. (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1993)
- Ali, Muhammad Idris, *Bangladesher Upponnash o Shahitte Moddhobitter Protifolon*. (Dhaka: Bangla Academy, 1985)
- Ali, S. M, *After the Dark Night: Problems of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman*. (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1994)
- Ali, Tariq, *The Duel: Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power*. (London: Pocket Books, 2009)
- Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power?* (London: Jonathan Cape/ New York: William Morrow, 1970)
- Street Fighting Years: An Autobiography of the Sixties*. (Calcutta: Seagull, 2006)
- Altekar, A. S., *State and Government in Ancient India*. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977)
- Amjad, Rashid, *Private Industrial Investment in Pakistan 1960-1970*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982)
- Anderson, Benedict, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. 2nd ed. (New York: Verso, 1991)
- Anderson, Jack, and George Clifford, *The Anderson Papers: From the Files of America's Most Famous Investigative Reporter*. (New York: Random House, 1973)
- Anderton, Charles H. and Jurgen Brauer, *Economic Aspects of Genocides, Other Mass Atrocities, and Their Prevention*. (New York: OUP, 2016)
- Ansari, Sarah, *Life after Partition: Migration, Community and Strife in Sindh, 1947-1962*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005)
- Arif, Khalid Mahmud, *Working with Zia: Pakistan's Power Politics, 1977–1988*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995)
- Aristotle, "Politics." In *The Complete Works of Aristotle Volume 2*. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, 1986-2129. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Auspitz, Lee J., Stephen Marglin and Gustav Papenek, *History of Economic and Political Dominance of East Pakistan*. (OUP, 1971)
- Ayoob, Mohammad, *Bangladesh: A Struggle for Nationhood*. (New Delhi: Vikas, 1971)

- and K. Subrahmanyam, *The Liberation War*. (New Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1972)
- Azad, Lenin, *Bharotio Shamontontro o Mughol Amole Banglar Krishikathamo*. (Dhaka: UPL, 1989)
- , *Unoshottorer Gonoabhyutthan: ekti shomajtantrik bisleshon*, (Dhaka: Dhaka University Department of Sociology, 1993)
- Aziz, K. K., *Party Politics in Pakistan (1947-1958)*. (Islamabad: NCHCS, 1976)
- The Murder of History in Pakistan: A Critique of History Textbooks Used in Pakistan*. (Lahore: Vanguard Publications, 1993)
- Badiou, Alain. *Being and Event*. Translated by Oliver Feltham. New York: Continuum, 2005
- Badiou, Alain. *Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil*. Translated by Peter Hallward. New York: Verso, 2002.
- Badiou, Alain. *Handbook of Inaesthetics*. Translated by Alberto Toscano. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005.
- Badiou, Alain. *Manifesto for Philosophy*. Translated by Norman Madarasz. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992.
- Badiou, Alain. *Metapolitics*. Translated by Jason Barker. New York: Verso, 2005.
- Badiou, Alain, "On Parliamentary 'Democracy: ' the French Presidential Elections of 2002." In *Polemics*. Translated by Steve Corcoran, 75-97. New York: Verso, 2006.
- Badiou, Alain, "On September 11 2001: Philosophy and the 'War against Terrorism.'" In *Polemics*. Translated by Steve Corcoran, 15-35 . New York: Verso, 2006.
- Badiou, Alain, "Philosophy and politics." In *Infinite Thought*. Translated and Edited by Oliver Feltham and Justin Clemens, 52-59. New York: Continuum, 2005.
- Badiou, Alain, "Philosophy and 'the death of communism.'" In *Infinite Thought*. Translated and Edited by Oliver Feltham and Justin Clemens, 95-105. New York: Continuum, 2005.
- Badiou, Alain, "Philosophy and truth." In *Infinite Thought*. Translated and Edited by Oliver Feltham and Justin Clemens, 43-51. New York: Continuum, 2005.
- Badiou, Alain, "Politics as Truth Procedure." In *Theoretical Writings*. Edited and Translated by Ray Brassier and Albert Toscano, 155-166. New York: Continuum, 2004.
- Badiou, Alain, "The Cultural Revolution: The Last Revolution?" In *Polemics*. Translated by Steve Corcoran, 291-321. New York: Verso, 2006.
- Badiou, Alain, "The Law on the Islamic Headscarf" In *Polemics*. Translated by Steve Corcoran, 98-110. New York: Verso, 2006. 57
- Badiou, Alain, "The Paris Commune: A Political Declaration on Politics." In *Polemics*. Translated by Steve Corcoran, 257-290. New York: Verso, 2006.
- Badiou, Alain. *Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism*. Translated by Ray Brassier. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003.
- Badiou, Alain and Peter Hallward, "Politics and Philosophy: An Interview with Alain Badiou." *Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities* 3:3 (1998): 113-133.
- Balibar, Etienne, "The History of Truth: Alain Badiou in French Philosophy." In *Think Again: Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy*. Edited by Peter Hallward, 21-38. New York: Continuum, 2004.
- Baez, Joan. *And a Voice to Sing With: A Memoir*. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987)
- Bagchi, J., *The History and Culture of The Pālas of Bengal and Bihar, Cir. 750 A.D.-Cir. 1200 A.D.* (New Delhi: Abhinav publications, 1993)
- Bajwa, Farooq Naseem, *Pakistan and the West: The First Decade, 1947-1957*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996)

- Daughter of the East: An Autobiography, 2nd ed.* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2007)
- The Plunder of Pakistan.* (Karachi: People's Democratic Alliance, 1991)
- Bhutto, Fatima, *Songs of Blood and Sword.* (New Delhi: Penguin Viking, 2010)
- Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali, *A Great Tragedy.* (Karachi: Pakistan People's Party, 1971)
- My Pakistan.* (Lahore: Bhutto Legacy Foundation, 2011)
- My Dearest Daughter: A Letter from the Death Cell.* (Lahore: Classic, 1994)
- Black, Maggie, *A Cause for Our Times: Oxfam the First 50 Years.* (Oxford: Oxfam Professional, 1992)
- Blitz, Brad K. et al., *Statelessness and Citizenship: A Comparative Study on the Benefits of Nationality.* (London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011)
- Blood, Archer K., *The Cruel Birth of Bangladesh-Memoirs of an American Diplomat.* (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 2002)
- Borstelmann, Thomas, *The 1970s: A New Global History from Civil Rights to Economic Inequality.* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010)
- Bose, Sarmila, *Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War.* (London: Hurst, 2011)
- Bose, S. and A. Jalal, *Modern South Asia:History, Culturee, Political Economy.* 3rd edition, (London: Routledge, 2011)
- Bosteels, Bruno, "Post Maoism: Badiou and Politics." *Positions* 13:3 (Winter 2005): 575-635.
- Brass, Paul and Marcus F. Franda, *Radical Politics in South Asia.* (Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 1974)
- Brecher, Michael, *Nehru, A Political Biography.* (London: OUP, 1959)
- Brownmiller, Susan, *Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape.* (New York: Penguin Books Ltd, 1976)
- Brown, William A., *The Gilgit Rebellion.* Bethesda, (MD: IBEX, 1998)
- Brutents, KN, *National Liberation Revolution Today*, vol.1. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977)
- Bundy, William, *A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency.* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1998)
- Burke, Roland, *Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights.* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010)
- Burki, Shahid Javed, *Pakistan: A Nation in the Making.* Boulder: Westview Press.
- Callard, Keith, 1957. *Pakistan: A Political Study.* (New York: Macmillan,1986)
- Pakistan's Foreign Policy, An Appraisal.* (Bombay: APH, 1970)
- Campbell-Johnson, Alan, *Mission with Mountbatten*, 2nd ed. (London: R. Hale, 1972)
- Carchedi, G, *On the Economic Identification of Social Classes.* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1997)
- Chakrabarti, D. K., *Archaeological Geography of The Ganga Plain: The Lower and The Middle Ganga.* (Delhi: Permanent black, 2001)
- Chakrabarty, D. K., *India: An Archaeological History: Palaeolithic Beginnings to Early Historic Foundations.* (Oxford: Oxford university press, 2009)
- Chakravarty, SR and Virendra Narain, *Bangladesh: History and Culture.*(New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1986)

- Chamberlin, Paul Thomas, *The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Making of the Post–Cold War Order*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012)
- Chang, Jung, and Jon Halliday, *Mao: The Unknown Story*. (London: Vintage, 2006)
- Chatta, Ilyas, *Partition and Locality: Violence, Migration, and Development in Gujranwala and Sialkot, 1947-1961*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011)
- Chatterjee, Basant, *Inside Bangladesh Today: An Eyewitness Account*. (New Delhi: OUP, 1973)
- Chatterjee, Partha, *The Second Partition of Bengal*. Delhi: OUP, 1997
- Chatterjee, Partha, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse*. (London: 1986)
- The Nation and its Fragments*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994)
- Chatterjee, Pranab, *A Story of Ambivalent Modernization in Bangladesh and West Bengal: The Rise and Fall of Bengali Elitism in South Asia*. (New York: Peter Lang, 2010)
- Chatterji, Joya, *Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition, 1932-47*. (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 1995)
- Chaudhuri, B. B., *Peasant History of Late Precolonial and Colonial India*. Vol.8. (Delhi: Pearson Education India, 2008)
- Chaudhuri, Kalyan, *Genocide in Bangladesh*. (Bombay: Orient Longman, 1972)
- Chaudhuri, Rudra, *Forged in Crisis: India and the United States since 1947*. (London: Hurst, 2013)
- Chaurasia, R. S., *History of Medieval India: From 1000 A.D. to 1707 A.D.* (New Delhi, India: Atlantic Publishers & Distributors, 2002)
- Chowdhury, Afsan, *Bangladesh 1971*, 4 Vols. (Dhaka: Mowla Brothers, 2007)
- Cheng, Eileen Ka-May, *Historiography*. (London: Continuum, 2012)
- Chen, Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001)
- Chimene, Keitner, *Self-Determination: The Legacy of the French Revolution*. (London: OUP, 2000)
- Chopra, Pran, *India's Second Liberation*. (New Delhi: Vikas, 1974)
- Choudhury, AK, *The Independence of Bangladesh, a Historical Process*. (Dhaka, Bangladesh: Jatiyo Grantha Kendra, 1984)
- Choudhury, GH, *The Days of United Pakistan*. (London: C Hurst and Co., 1974)
- Chowdhury. G.W., *Pakistan's Relations with India, 1947-1966*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger., 1968)
- The Last Days of United Pakistan*. (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1974)
- India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Major Powers*. (London: Oxford University Press, 1975)
- Chowdhury, Subrata Roy, *The Genesis of Bangladesh*. (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1972)
- Clark, Katerina, and Michael Holquist. *Mikhail Bakhtin*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1984.
- Cloughley, Brian, *A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections*. (New York: Carrel Books, 2016)

- Cohen, Stephen P, *Arms and Politics in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan*. (London: Buffalo, 1973)
- Collins, Larry and Dominique Lapierre, *Freedom at Midnight*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975)
- Coll, Steve, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*. (New York: Penguin Books, 2004)
- Connelly, Matthew, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002)
- Costa, Benedict, *Dismemberment of Pakistan*. (Kalyani: Ludhiana, 1972)
- Creveld, Martin Van, *The Oxford History of Modern War*. (New York: OUP, 2000)
- Dahrendorf, R, *Class and Class Conflict in an Industrial Society*. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959)
- Dallek, Robert, *Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power*. (New York: HarperCollins, 2007)
- Darby, Philip, *British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947–1968*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973)
- Darwin, John, *Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World*. Basingstoke, (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 1988)
- The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830–1970*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)
- Datta, Antara, *Refugees and Borders in South Asia: The Great Displacement of 1971*. (London: Routledge, 2012)
- Datta-Ray, Sunanda, *Looking East to Look West: Lee Kuan Yew's Mission India*. New Delhi: Viking, 2010)
- Davis, JC, *When Men Revolt and Why*. (New York: The Free Press, 1971)
- Day, David, *The Great Betrayal: Britain, Australia and the Onset of the Pacific War, 1939–42*. (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1992)
- D'Costa, R, *The Role of Trade Union in Developing Countries: A Study on India, Pakistan and Ceylon*. (Louvain: The Institute of Economic Social and Political Research Press, 1963)
- Devji, Faisal, *Muslim Zion*. Cambridge, (MA: Harvard University Press, 2013)
- Dhar, P. N., *Indira Gandhi, the "Emergency" and Indian Democracy*. (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000)
- Dixit, J. N., *Liberation and Beyond: Indo-Bangladesh Relations*. New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1999)
- India and Pakistan in War and Peace*. (London: Routledge, 2002)
- Dockrill, Saki, *Britain's Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice between Europe and the World?* (London: Palgrave, 2002)
- Dowlah, Caf, *Privatization Experience in Bangladesh: A World Bank Study for the Period 1991-1996, Two Volumes*. (Dhaka: World Bank, Dhaka, 1997)
- The Bangladesh Political Economy: The Path ways to Nationhood and the Formative Years*. (Booksurge (Amazon), 2009)
- Eagleton, Terry, *Ideology: An Introduction*. (London: Verso, 1991)
- Eaton, R. M., *The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 1204-1760*. (Berkley : University of California Press, 1993)
- Edwardes, S. M. & Garrett, H. L. O., *Mughal Rule in India*. (New Delhi, India: Atlantic Publishers & Distributors, 1995)

- Edwards, Peter, and Gregory Pemberton, *Crises and Commitments: The Politics and Diplomacy of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts, 1948–1965*. (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2002)
- Elahi, Maudud, *Assignment Bangladesh'71*. (Dhaka: Momin Publications, 1999)
- Emerson, Caryl, and Gary Saul Morson. "Mikhail Bakhtin." *The Johns Hopkins Guide to Literary Theory and Criticism*. Eds. Michael Groden, Martin Kreiswirth and Imre Szeman. Second Edition 2005. The Johns Hopkins University Press. 25 Jan. 2006.
- Emerson, Ralph Waldo, "Uses of Great Men." in *The Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson*. (New York: Black's Readers Service, 1965)
- European Graduate School, "Alain Badiou: Biography," European Graduate School, <http://www.egs.edu/faculty/badiou.html> (accessed February 04, 2009).
- Evans, Harold, *My Paper Chase: True Stories of Vanished Times, An Autobiography*. (London: Abacus, 2009)
- Exley, Richard, and Exley, Helen, *The Testimony of Sixty on the Crisis in Bengal*. (Oxford: Oxfam, 1971)
- Faaland, Just, *Aid and Influence: The Case of Bangladesh*. (London: Macmillan, 1981)
- Faaland, Jt. and J.R. Parkinson, *Bangladesh: The Test Case of Development*. (Boulder (CO): Westview, 1976)
- Faiquzzaman, Mohammad, *Mujibnagar Sarkar o Bangladesher Muktijuddha*. (Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 2008)
- Farber, David, *Chicago '68*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998)
- The Sixties: From Memory to History*. (Charlotte: University of North Carolina Press, 1994)
- Farhad, Mohammad, *Unshottorer Gonoabhyuthan*, (Dhaka: Jatiya Shahitya Prokashoni, 1980)
- Farmer, Frank. "Introduction." *Landmark Essays on Bakhtin, Rhetoric, and Writing*. Ed. Frank Farmer. Mahwah: Hermagoras Press, 1998. xi-xxiii.
- Farooqui, M., *Pakistan Politics that Led to Break Up*. (Delhi: New Age, 1994)
- Feldman, David, *Unhappy East Pakistan: A Survey of Inter-Regional Inequality in Pakistan*. (St. Peter, Jersey, Isle de la Manche, 1971)
- Feldman, Herbert, *The End and the Beginning: Pakistan 1969–1971*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1975)
- Ferdous, Hasan, *Ekattor, Jekhan Theke Shuru*, (Dhaka: Shomoy Prokashon, 2016)
- Ferguson, Niall, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela, and Daniel J. Sargent, *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective*. Cambridge, (MA: Belknap Press, 2010)
- Franda, Marcus, *Bangladesh, the First Decade*. (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1982)
- Frank, Katherine, *Indira: The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi*. (London: Harper Collins Publishers Ltd, 2001)
- Fraser, Gordon, *Cosmic Anger: Abdus Salam-The First Muslim Nobel Scientist*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008)
- Gandhi, Indira, *India and Bangladesh: Selected Speeches and Statements*. (Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972)
- Ganguly, Sumit, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947*. (London: Columbia University Press, 2002)

- Gankovsky, Y.V. and Polonskaya, L.R. Gordon, *A History of Pakistan (1947-1958)*. (Lahore: People's Publishing House, 1964)
- Garthoff, Raymond, *Détente and Confrontation: American- Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*. Rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Press, 1994)
- Garver, John, *Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century*. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001)
- Gassert, Phillip, and Klimke, Martin, *Memories and Legacies of a Global Revolt*. (Washington, DC: German Historical Institute Supplement, 2009)
- Gates, Robert M, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War*. (New York: Touchstone, 1996)
- Gauhar, Altaf, *Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996)
- Gazdar, Mushtaq, *Pakistan Cinema, 1947-1997*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997)
- Gerine-Lajoie, Paul, *Dilemmas and Choices of International Development Cooperation*. (Ottawa: Canadian International Development Agency, 1975)
- Gerlach, Christian, *Extremely Violent Societies: Mass Violence in the Twentieth-Century World*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)
- Geyer, David C., and Selva, Douglas E., *Soviet- American Relations: The Détente Years, 1969– 1972*. (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2007)
- Ghazali, Abdus Sattar, *Islamic Pakistan: Illusion and Reality*. (Islamabad, Pakistan: National Book Club, 1999)
- Ghosh, Binoy, *Banglar Nobojagriti*. 2nd Edition. (Kolkata: Orient Longman, 1368)
- Ghosh, P., *Temple to Love: Architecture and Devotion in Seventeenth-Century Bengal*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005)
- Ghosh, Shyamali, *The Awami League 1949-1971*. (Dhaka: UPL, 2007)
- Giddens, A., *The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies*. (London: Hutchinson, 1973)
- Ginsberg, Allen, *Collected Poems 1947– 1997*. Reprint ed. (New York: Harper Perennial, 2007)
- Gitlin, Todd, *The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage*. Rev. ed. (New York: Bantam, 1993)
- Goldsworthy, David, *Losing the Blanket: Australia and the End of Britain's Empire*. (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2002)
- Goodnow, Henry F., *The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation*. (New Haven (CT): Yale University Press, 1964)
- Gopal, Sarvepalli, *Imperialists, Nationalists, Democrats: Collected Essays*. Ranikhet, (India: Permanent Black, 2013)
- Gordon, Leonard A., *Bengal: The Nationalist Movement 1876-1940*. (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1974)
- Gramsci, A., *Selection from the Prisoner Notebooks*. (New York: International Publisher's Co.,1971)
- Grare, Frederic, *Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict, 1979-1985: With an Afterword Covering Events from 1985-2001* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003)
- Guha, Ramachandra, *India after Gandhi: The History of the World's Largest Democracy*. (London: Macmillan, 2007)
- Guha, R, *Subaltern Studies*. 1st edition. (India: Oxford University Press, 1982)
- Gupta, Amit Das, *Handel, Hilfe, Hallstein- Doktrin: die bundesdeutsche Süd asienpolitik unter Adenauer und Erhard 1949 bis 1966*. Husum, (Germany: Matthieson, 2004)

- Gupta, Jyoti Sen, *History of Freedom Movement in Bangladesh, 1943-1972*. (Calcutta: Naya Prokash, 1974)
- Gupta, Vinod, *Anderson Papers, A Study of Nixon's Blackmail of India*. (Delhi: ISSD, 1972)
- Hack, Karl, *Defence and Decolonisation in Southeast Asia: Britain, Malaya and Singapore, 1941– 1968*. (London: Curzon, 2001)
- Hahnimaki, Jussi, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004)
- Haider, Mahmud S., *Resurrection of Bangladesh*. (Dhaka: National Book Center, 1983)
- Haldeman, H. R., *The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House, the Complete Multimedia Edition*. (Santa Monica, CA: Sony Electronic, 1994)
- Hallward, Peter, "Introduction: Consequences of Abstraction." In *Think Again: Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy*. Edited by Peter Hallward, 1-20. New York: Continuum, 2004.
- Hameed, A., *Lahore Lahore Aye*. (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2008)
- Hanif, Mohammad, *A Case of Exploding Mangoes*. (New York: Vintage Books, 2009)
- Hannan, Mohammad, *Political History of Bangladesh*. (Dhaka: Annannya, 2001)
- Bangladesher Chatro Andoloner Itihash, Vol. 1*, (Dhaka: Bhinnomot, 1984)
- Bangladesher Chatro Andoloner Itihash, Vol. 2*, (Dhaka: Wali Prokashoni, 1987)
- Bangladesher Chatro Andoloner Itihash, Vol. 3*, (Dhaka: Granthalok, 1990)
- Bangladesher Chatro Andoloner Itihash, Vol. 4*, (Dhaka: Granthalok, 1990)
- Haqqani, Hussain, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*. (Lahore: Vanguard, 2005)
- Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding*. (New York: Public Affairs, 2013)
- Harman, Chris, *The Fire Last Time: 1968 and After*. (London: Bookmarks, 1998)
- Haron, Sana, *Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007)
- Hasanat, Abdul, *The Ugliest Genocide in History: Being a Resume of Inhuman Atrocities in East Pakistan-now Bangladesh*. (Dhaka: Muktaadhara, 2007)
- Hasan, Mubashir, *The Mirage of Power: An Inquiry into the Bhutto Years, 1971-1977*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000)
- Hasan, Muidul, *Muldhara 71* (The Mainstream 71, in Bangla). (Dhaka: University Press Ltd, 1986)
- , *Upadhara Ekattor* (Dhaka, Prothoma, 2015)
- Hasan, Mushirul, *India Partitioned: Process Strategy and Mobilization*. (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985)
- Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, 1885-1930* (New Delhi, 1991)
- India's Partition: Process Strategy and Mobilization*. (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994)
- Legacy of a Divided Nation India's Muslims since Independence*. (Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1997)
- Hasan, Mueyedul, *Muldhara '71*. (Dhaka: University Press, 2008) Originally published in 1986.
- Hasan, M. & Gupta, N., *India's Colonial Encounter: Essays in Memory of Eric Stokes*. (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers & Distributors, 2004)
- Hasan, S. M., *Gaud and Hazrat Pandua: Romance in Brick and Stone*. (Dhaka: Islamic Foundation Bangladesh, 1987a)

- Muslim Monuments of Bangladesh*. 3rd ed. (Dhaka: Islamic Foundation Bangladesh, 1987b)
- Dacca, The City of Mosques*. (Dhaka: Islamic Foundation Bangladesh, 1981)
- Hasan, Zaheer, *The Separation of East Pakistan: The Rise and Realization of Bengali Muslim Nationalism*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994)
- Hasina, Sheikh, *Sheikh Mujibur Rahman: The Unfinished Memoirs*. (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 2012)
- Haque, E., *Excavation at Wari-Bateshwar: A Preliminary Study*. (Dhaka: The International Centre for Study of Bengal Art, 2001)
- Heitzman, James and Robert Worden, *Bangladesh: A Country Study*. (Washington: US Library of Congress, 1989)
- Hersh, Seymour, *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House*. (New York: Summit Books, 1983)
- Hirschkop, Ken. "Bakhtin in the sober light of day." *Bakhtin and Cultural Theory*. Eds. Ken Hirschkop and David Shepherd. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2001. 1-25.
- Hirschkop, Ken. *Mikhail Bakhtin: An Aesthetic for Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Holquist, Michael. *Dialogism: Bakhtin and His World, Second Edition*. Routledge, 2002.
- Holquist, Michael. "Introduction." *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*. By Mikhail Bakhtin. Eds. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986. ix-xxiii.
- Holquist, Michael (ed.). *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*. By Mikhail Bakhtin. Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1981.
- Hobsbawm, E.J., *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Program, Myth, Reality*. 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992)
- Hobsbawm, Eric, *The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991*. (London: Abacus, 1995)
- Hobsbawm, E. J., *On History*. (London: Abacus, 1998)
- Holland, Robert, *The Pursuit of Greatness: Britain and the World Role, 1900– 1970*. (London: Fontana, 1991)
- Hoque, Mofidul, *Bangladesher Muktisgadhana*, (Dhaka: Vidyaprakash, 2014)
- Hossain, Delwar, *Muktijudhhe Policer Bhumika (Role of Police in Bangladesh Liberation War. In Bangla)*. Vol.1. (Dhaka, Bangladesh: Police Liberation War Museum, 2017)
- Hossain, Kamal, *Bangladesh: Quest for Freedom and Justice*. (Dhaka: UPL, 2013)
- Hossain, Mokarrom, *From Protest to Freedom, The Birth of Bangladesh*. (Dhaka: Shahitya Prakash, 2010)
- Hossain, M. M., *Mahasthan: Anecdote to History*. (Dhaka: Dibyaprakash, 2006)

- Houtart, F., *Le Bangla Desh un an après / BANGLADESH ONE YEAR AFTER*. *Civilisations*, 22(3), 368-386. (1972)
- Hoxie, R., *Trade Unionism in the United States*. (New York: D Appleton and Co., 1920)
- Huda, M.N. *Hossain Shahid Sohrawardy: Kache Theke Dekha*, (Dhaka: Sahitya Praksh, 1993)
- Humphrey, Clare, *Privatization in Bangladesh: Economic Transition in a Poor Country*. (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1992)
- Hunter, W. W., *The Indian Mussalmani: Are They Bound in Conscience to Rebel Against the Queen?* (Calcutta: Comrade Publishers, 1945)
- Huntington, Samuel, *Political Order in Changing Societies*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968)
- Huq, A.K.F., *Bangladesher Rajnitite Buddhijibider Bhumika*, (Dhaka: Ananya, 1997)
- Huq, Abdul, *Char Doshoker Rajniti Porikroma*, (Dhaka, The University Press Limited, 1996)
- Ibrahim, Neelima, *Ami Birongana Bolchchi*. (Dhaka: Jagrity Prokhashoni, 1998)
- Iqbal, Khuram, *The Making of Pakistani Human Bombs*. (Lanham, Maryland Lexington Books, 2015)
- Iqbal, Muhammad, *Bal-i-Jabrial, in Kulliyat-i-Iqbal*. (Karachi: Al Muslim Publishers, 1994)
- Iriye, Akira, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002)
- Irwin, Ryan M, *Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012)
- Isaacson, Walter, *Kissinger: A Biography*. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005)
- Islam, Maidul, *Limits of Islamism*. (Cambridge University Press, 2015)
- Islam, Nurul, *Development Planning in Bangladesh: A Study in Political Economy*. (London: C. Hurst, 1977)
- Making of A Nation Bangladesh*. Dhaka: UPL, 2003)
- Islam, Rafiqul , *Shadhinota Sangrame Dhaka Vishya Vidyalaya*, (Dhaka: Agami Prokashoni, 2004)
- Islam, Rafiqul, *A Tale of Millions*. (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1981)
- Bangladesh Liberation Movement*. (Dhaka: UPL, 1987)
- Jackson, Robert, *South Asian Crisis: India- Pakistan- Bangladesh*. (London: Chatto & Windus, 1975)
- Jacob, J. 1998. *Surrender al Dhaka-Birth of a Nation*. Dhaka: University Press
- Jaffrelot, Christopher, *A History of Pakistan and its Origins*. (London: Anthem Press, 2004)
- Jahangir, Asma and Jilani, Hina, *Hudood Ordinances: A Divine Sanction? A Research Study of the Hudood Ordinances and Their Effect on the Disadvantaged Sections of Pakistan Society*. (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2003)
- Jahan, Rounaq, *Bangladesh Politics: Problems and Issues*. (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1987)
- Pakistan: Failure in National Integration*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972)
- Century of Genocide*. in Samuel Totten and William S Parsons ed. (New York: Routledge, 1997)
- Pakistan: Failure in National Integration*. (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1994)
- Jain, R. K., *Soviet South Asian Relations 1947– 78*. (New Delhi: Radiant, 1978)
- Jalal, Ayesha, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, Cambridge, (MA: Harvard University Press, 2014)

- The Sole Spokesman, Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985)
- Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam since 1850.* (London: Routledge, 2000)
- Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)
- The Pity of Partition: Manto's Life, Times, and Work India-Pakistan Divide.* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013)
- The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)
- Jalal, Hamid, and Khalid Hasan, *Politics of the People: Marching towards Democracy, January 1970– December 1971.* (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications, 1972)
- Jayakar, Pupul, *Indira Gandhi: A Biography.* Rev. ed. (New Delhi: Penguin, 1995)
- Jha, D. C., *Mahatma Gandhi: The Congress and Partition of India.* (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2004)
- Jisen, Ma, *The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China.* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2004)
- Jorg, Fisch, *A History of the Self-Determination of Peoples: The Domestication of an Illusion.* (Cambridge University Press, 2015)
- Joshi, S., *The Middle Class in Colonial India.* (Noida: Oxford University Press, India, 2010)
- Judt, Tony, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945.* (London: Pimlico, 2007)
- Kabir, Muhammad Ghulam, *Minority Politics in Bangladesh.* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1980)
- Kalam, Abdul, *Bangladesh: Internal Dynamics and External Linkages.* (Dhaka: UPL, 1996)
- Kapur, Asok, *Pakistan in Crisis.* (London: Routledge, 1991)
- Kapur, Devesh, *Diaspora, Development, and Democracy: The Domestic Impact of International Migration from India.* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010)
- Karim, A., *History of Bengal, Mughal Period.* (Rajshahi: Institute of Bangladesh Studies, University of Rajshahi, 1995)
- Karim, Sardar Fazlul, *Shei She Kaal.* (Dhaka: Papyrus, 2002)
- Karim, Sayyid A, *Sheikh Mujib: Triumph and Tragedy.* (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 2005)
- Katsiaficas, George, *The Imagination of the New Left: A Global Analysis of 1968.* (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 1987)
- Kavic, Lorne, *India's Quest for Security: Defence Policies, 1947– 1965.* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967)
- Kayastha, Ved P., *The Crisis in Indian Subcontinent and the Birth of Bangladesh.* (New York: Cornell University, 1972)
- Kelsen, Hans, *Pure Theory of Law.* Trans, from the second revised and enlarged German edition by Max Knight. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978)
- Khaliq, S.A., *Pakistan: Peace and War.* (London: Regency Press, 1978)
- Khan, Akbar Ali, *Discovery of Bangladesh, Explorations into Dynamics of a Hidden Nation.* (Dhaka: UPL, 2010)
- Khan, A. Majeed, *Twenty Great Bengalis.* (Dhaka: UPL, 2008)
- Khan, A. R., *The Economy of Bangladesh.* (London: Macmillan, 1972)
- and Mahbub Hossain, *The Strategy of Development in Bangladesh.* (London: Macmillan, 1989)

- Khan, Arshad Sami, *Three Presidents and an Aide: Life, Power and Politics*. (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2008)
- Khan, Asghar, *My Political Struggle*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008)
- Khan, Ayub, *Friend not Masters*. Karachi: OUP. (Dhaka: UPL, 2008) Originally published in 1967.
- Khan, Faruq Aziz, *Spring 1971: A Centre Stage Account of Bangladesh Liberation War*. 2nd ed. (Dhaka: University Press, 1998)
- Khan, Feroz H., *Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012)
- Khan, Gohar Ayub, *Glimpses into the Corridors of Power*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007)
- Khan, Gul Hassan, *Memoirs of Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993)
- Khan, Haider Ali , *Bangabandhu, Internationalism and Liberation*, forthcoming, (Dhaka: Anya Prakash, 2020a)
- Khan, Haider Ali , *When the Earth Trembled*, forthcoming, (Dhaka: Katha Prakash, 2020b)
- Khan, Haider Ali, *Ekattorer Dinguli: Probashe Alor Gaan(The Days of 1971: Songs of Light in Exile)*, (Dhaka: Prothoma Prokashoni, 2016)
- Khan, Haider Ali, “Sanskritik Dashotto(On Cultural Bondage)”, in *Jayaddhani(The Voice of Victory)*.(Dhaka: EPSU Ekushe Shonkolon, 1970)
- Khan, Haider Ali, *Notun Suryer Protikhsha(Waiting for a New Sun)*, (Dhaka: Dhaka College Shahitya Barshiki, 1971)
- Khan, Hamid, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*.(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007)
- Khan, Jahan Dad, *Pakistan Leadership Challenges*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999)
- Khan, Lal, *Pakistan’s Other Story: The 1968– 69 Revolution*. (Delhi: Aakar Books, 2009)
- Khan, M. Asghar, *We’ve learnt Nothing from History*.(Karachi: OUP, 2005)
- Khan, Mohammed Asghar, *Generals in Politics: Pakistan, 1958– 1982*. (New Delhi: Vikas, 1983)
- Khan, M. R., Rana, R. K., & Siddiq, A. B., *The Santals of Bangladesh, Parbatipur-Nawabganj, Dinazpur*. (in Bangla language) (Dhaka: Jahangirnagar University, 2012)
- The Khasia of Bangladesh, Jaintapur Sylhet*. (in Bangla language). (Dhaka: Jahangirnagar University, 2010)
- Khan, Rao Farman Ali, *How Pakistan Got Divided*. (Lahore: Jang, 1992)
- Khan, Roedad, *American Papers: Secret and Confidential India-Pakistan Bangladesh Documents, 1965-1973*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999)
- Pakistan-A Dream Gone Sour*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997)
- The British Papers*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002)
- Khan, Shuakat Hayat, *The Nation That Lost Its Soul: Memoirs of a Freedom Fighter*. (Lahore: Jang, 1995)
- Khan, Sultan M, *Memories and Reflections of a Pakistani Diplomat*. (London: Centre for Pakistan Studies, 1997)
- Khan, Yasmin, *The Great Partition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017)
- Khan, Zillur R., *Leadership in the Least Developed Nation-Bangladesh*. (Syracuse University, Maxwell School, 1983)

- Martial Law to Martial Law, Leadership Crisis in Bangladesh.* (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1984)
- The Third World Charismat: Sheikh Mujib and the Struggle for Freedom.* (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1996)
- and A.T.R. Rahman, *Autonomy and Constitution Making: The Case of Bangladesh.* (Dhaka: Green Book House, 1973)
- Khatib, A. L., *Who Killed Mujib?* (New Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1981)
- Khatun, H., *Iqlim Sonargaon: History, Jurisdiction, Monuments.* (Dhaka: Academic Press and Publishers, 2006)
- Khoka, Mominul Huq, *Astorage Smriti Shamujjal: Bangabondhu, Tanr Poribar o Ami,*(Dhaka: Shahitya Parakash,2000)
- Kiernan, Ben, *Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur.* (London: Yale University Press, 2007)
- Kimball, Jeffrey, *Nixon's Vietnam War.* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998)
- Kind, R. and Kayno, J., *The Middle Classes.* (London: Longman)
- Kissinger, Henry, *The White House Years.* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979)
- On China.* (London: Allen Lane, 2011)
- Klancher, Jon. "Bakhtin's Rhetoric." *Landmark Essays on Bakhtin, Rhetoric, and Writing.* Ed. Frank Farmer. Mahwah: Hermagoras Press, 1998. 23-32.
- Klimke, Martin, *Student Protests in West Germany and the United States in the Global Sixties.* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011)
- Klimke, Martin, and Joachim Scharloth, *1968 in Europe: A History of Protest and Activism.* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008)
- Kochaneck, Stanley A., *Patron-Client Politics and Business in Bangladesh.* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993)
- Krishnan, N., *No Way But Surrender: An Account of the Indo- Pakistan War in the Bay of Bengal, 1971.* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1980)
- Kulkarni, VB., *Pakistan: Origin and Relations with India.* (Dhaka: UPL, 1988)
- Kulke, H. & Rothermund, D., *A History of India.* (New York: Routledge, 1998)
- Kumaraswamy, P. R., *India's Israel Policy.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010)
- Kurlansky, Mark, *1968: The Year That Rocked the World.* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2004)
- Kux, Dennis, *India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, 1941– 1991.* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1992)
- The United States and Pakistan, 1947– 2000: Disenchanted Allies.* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001)
- Lal, P. C., *My Years with IAF.* (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1986)
- Laporte, Robert, *Power and Privilege- Influence and Decision-making in Pakistan.* (Delhi: OUP, 1976)
- Lewis, J. and Stephen, R., *Economic Policy and Industrial Growth in Pakistan.* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969)
- Levy, Adrian and Catherine Scott-Clark, *Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons.* (New York: Walker and Company, 2007)
- Lewis, David, *Bangladesh: Politics, Economy and Civil Society.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011)

- Liapunov, Vadim. *Toward a Philosophy of the Act*. By Mikhail Bakhtin. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993
- Lieven, Anatol, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*. (London: Allen Lane, 2011)
- Lifschultz, Lawrence, *Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution*. (London: Zed Press, 1979)
- Lochwood, D., *The Black Coated Worker*. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1958)
- Lodge, David. *After Bakhtin*, (London: Routledge, 1990)
- Luthi, Lorenz, *The Sino- Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008)
- MacFarquhar, Roderick, and Michael Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006)
- Macmillan, Margaret, *Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World*. (New York: Random House, 2007)
- Mahmood, Safdar, *A Political Study of Pakistan*. (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1972)
- Pakistan Divided*. (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1984)
- Pakistan: Political Roots and Development 1947-1999*. (OUP, 2000)
- The Crisis in East Pakistan*. (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1971)
- Mahmud, Anu, *Ekush theke Shadhinota*, (Dhaka: Jhingephul, 2009)
- Mahmud, Nazim, *Memoirs of 1971* (In Bangla). (Dhaka: Mukhtadhara, 1990)
- Malhotra, Inder, *Indira Gandhi: A Personal and Political Biography*. (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1989)
- Malik, Amita, *The Year of the Vulture*. (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972)
- Malloch- Brown, Mark, *The Unfinished Global Revolution: The Limits of Nations and the Pursuit of a New Politics*. (London: Allen Lane, 2011)
- Mamoon, Muntasir, *Beerangana 71*. (Dhaka: Subarna, 2013)
- The Vanquished Generals and the Liberation War of Bangladesh*. Translation, Kushal Ibrahim. (Dhaka: Somoy Prokashon, 2000)
- Maniruzzaman, Talukder, *Group Politics and Political Change*. (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1982)
- The Politics of Development: The Case of Pakistan (1947-1958)*. (Dacca: Green Book House, 1971)
- Radical Politics and the Emergence of Bangladesh*. (Dhaka: Bangladesh Books, 1975)
- Group Interests and Political Change: Studies of Pakistan and Bangladesh*. (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1980)
- The Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath*. (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1988)
- Mansergh, Nicholas, *The Transfer of Power, 1947*. Vol. XI. (London: The Mountbatten Viceroyalty, 1981)
- Marker, Jamsheed, *Quiet Diplomacy: Memoirs of an Ambassador of Pakistan*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010)
- Marwick, Arthur, *The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, c.1958– c.1974*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998)
- Marx, Karl, *Capital*. Vol.3. (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1959)
- Marx, Karl, and Frederick Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*. (Cacutta: Radical Book Club, 1972)
- Mascarenhas, Anthony, *The Rape of Bangladesh*. (New Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1971)
- Bangladesh: A Legacy of Blood*. (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1986)
- Matta, B. A. K., *Sher Shah Suri: A Fresh Perspective*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005)

- Mayer, Frederick W., *Narrative Politics: Stories and Collective Action* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014)
- Mazari, Sherbaz, *A Journey of Disillusionment, 3rd ed.* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006)
- Mazower, Mark, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century.* (London: Allen Lane, 1998)
Governing the World: The History of an Idea. (London: Allen Lane, 2012)
No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009)
- McMahon, Robert, *Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994)
- McWhinney, Edward, *Self-Determination of Peoples and Plural-Ethnic States in Contemporary International Law.* (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007)
- Mian, Manik Tofazzal Hossain, *Pakistani Rajnitir Bish Bochhor,* (Dhaka: Bangladesh Books International, 1981)
- Mian, Wazed, *Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibke Ghirey Kichhu katha (Some talks on Sheikh Mujib).* (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 2000)
- Milam, William B., *Bangladesh and Pakistan: Flirting with Failure in South Asia.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009)
- Miller, Norman and Roderick Aya, *National Liberation: Revolution in the Third World.* (New York: Free Press, 1971)
- Mills, C. W., *White Collar.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951)
- Mir, Farina, *The Social Space of Language: Vernacular Culture in British Colonial Punjab.* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010)
- Misra, B. B., *The Bureaucracy in India: A Historical Analysis of Development up to 1947.* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1980)
- Mitha, Aboobaker Osman, *Unlikely Beginnings: A Soldier's Life.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003)
- Mitra, Ashok, *A Prattler's Tale: Bengal, Marxism, Governance.* (Kolkata: Samya, 2007)
- Mohiuddin, Niaz, *Pakistan: A Global Studies Handbook.* (Santa Barbara (CA): ABC-Clio, 2007)
- Mookherjee, Nayanika, *The Spectral Wound: Sexual Violence, Public Memory and the Bangladesh War of 1971.* (Durham: Duke University Press)
- Moore, R. J., *Escape from Empire: The Attlee Government and the Indian Problem.* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983)
Making the New Commonwealth. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983)
- Moraes, Dom, *The Tempest Within: An Account of East Pakistan.* (New Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1971)
- Morson, Gary Saul, and Caryl Emerson. *Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics.* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990.
- Mostafa, Golam, *National Interest and Foreign Policy: Bangladesh's Relations with Soviet Union and Its Successor States.* (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1995)
- Moyn, Samuel, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History.* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010)
- Muhith, A. M. A., *Bangladesh: Emergence of a Nation.* (Dhaka: University Press Limited., 1992)

- Bangladesh Jati Rastrer Udvab (Emergence of Bangladesh Nation State)*. (Dhaka: Agamee Prakashani, 1996)
- American Response to Bangladesh Liberation War*. (Dhaka: University Press, 1996)
- History of Bangladesh*. (Dhaka: UPL, 2016)
- Mukherjee, Anil, *Shadhin Bangladeshe Shongramer Potobhumi*, (Dhaka: Jatiya Shahitya Prokashoni, 1980)
- Mukul, M.R. Akhter, *Bhasha Andolon Theke Shadhinota*, (Dhaka: Sagar Publishers, 1999)
- Mukul, M. R. Akhter, *Ami Bijov Dekhechi (I have seen Victory)*. (Dhaka: Sagar Publishers, 1996)
- Mukul, M. R. Akhter. *Abba Huzurer Deshe 2 Vols.* (Dhaka:Sagar Publishers, 1987)
- Murshid, Golam, *Hajar Bochorer Bangali Sanskriti*,(Dhaka: Abosor,2006)
- Musharraf, Pervez, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir*. (London: Simon and Schuster, 2006)
- Musshid, T.M., *The Sacred and the Secular: Bengal Muslim Discourse, 1871-1977*. (Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1995)
- Muthiah, S., *Born to Dare: The Life of Lt. Gen. Inderjit Singh Gill, PVSM, MC*. New Delhi: Penguin, 2008)
- Naik, J. A., *India, Russia, China, and Bangladesh*. (New Delhi: S. Chand, 1972)
- Nanda, S. M., *The Man Who Bombed Karachi: A Memoir*. (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2004)
- Nasim, A. S. M., *Bangladesh Fights for Independence*. (Dhaka: Columbia Prokashini, 2002)
- Nasr, Vali, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996)
- The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat*. (New York: Doubleday, 2013)
- Nawaz, Shuja, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008)
- Nehru, B. K., *Nice Guys Finish Second: Memoirs*. (New Delhi: Penguin, 1997)
- Nehru, Jawaharlal, *The Discovery of India*. (Calcutta. Meridian Books Limited, 1946)
- Neier, Aryeh, *The International Human Rights Movement: A History*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012)
- Niazi, A. A. K., *The Betrayal of East Pakistan*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998)
- Nicols, Beverley, 1944. *Verdict on India*. London: Jonathan Cape.
- Nixon, Richard. *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*. (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978)
- Noorani, A. G., *Brezhnev Plan for Asian Security: Russia in Asia*. (Bombay: Jaico, 1975)
- Novak, J. J., *Bangladesh: Reflections on Water*. (Bloomington (Indiana): Indiana University Press, 1993)
- Novick, Peter, *The Holocaust in American Life*. (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1999)
- O'Dell, Chris, *Miss O'Dell: Hard Days and Long Nights with the Beatles, the Stones, Bob Dylan, and Eric Clapton*. (New York: Touchstone, 2009)
- O'Donnel, Charles Petter, *Bangladesh: Biography of A Muslim Nation*. (London: Westview Press, 1984)
- Olzak, Susan, *Ethnic and Nationalist Social Movements*. (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004)
- Oppenheim, Lassa Francis, *International Law, A Treatise*, Vol. 1. (London: The Project of Gutenberg EBook of International Law, 1998)
- Palit, DK, *The Lightening Campaign*. (New Delhi: Thomson Press, 1972)
- Palmer, Norman D, *The Indian Political System*. (NY: Houghton, 1971)

- Pandey, B. N., *The Break-up of British India*. (New York and London: Macmillan and St. Martin's Press, 1969)
- Pantsov, Alexander V., and Steven I. Levine, *Mao: The Real Story*. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2012)
- Patel, I. G., *Glimpses of Indian Economic Policy: An Insider's View*. (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002)
- Payne, Robert, *Massacre*. (New York: Macmillan, 1972)
The Tortured and the Demure. (Bombay: Inca Publishers, 1975)
- Pemberton, Gregory, *All the Way: Australia's Road to Vietnam*. (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1987)
- Pike, Francis, *Empires at War: A Short History of Modern Asia since World War II*. (London: IB Tauris and Co. Ltd., 2011)
- Pirzada, S., *Foundations of Pakistan: All-India Muslim League Documents 1906-1947*. Vol. 2. (Karachi: National Publishing House, 1970)
- Poulantzas, N., *Political Power and Social Classes*. (London: New Left Books, 1973)
Classes in Contemporary Capitalism. (London: New Left Books, 1975)
- Prasad, H. Y. Sharada, *The Book I Won't Be Writing and Other Essays*. (New Delhi: Chronicle Books, 2003)
- Prasad, S. N., *The India- Pakistan War of 1971*. (New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, 1992)
- Prashad, Vijay, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World*. (New York: New Press, 2007)
- Quader, Rozina, *Dhakar Shanskritik Andolon: 1958-1971* (Dhaka: Dhaka University Department of History, M. Phil. Thesis, 2005)
- Qiu, Jin, *The Culture of Power: The Lin Biao Incident in the Cultural Revolution*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999)
- Qureshi, Anwar Iqbal, *Bangladesh: Its Dark Past and Dim Future*. (Lahore: Aziz Book Depot, 1973)
- Qureshi, Ishtiaq Hussain, *A Short History of Pakistan*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967)
- Qureshi, I. H., *The Administration of the Sultanate of Delhi*. (New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint, corporation., 1971)
- Radchenko, Sergey, *Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino- Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962–1967*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009)
- Raghavan, Srinath, *1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh*. (Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 2013)
War and Peace in Modern India: A Strategic History of the Nehru Years. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010)
- Rahman, Atiur and others, *Bhasha Andoloner Artho-Shamajik Potbhumii*. (Dhaka: UPL, 2000)
- Rahman, Atiur, and Azad Lenin, *Bhasha Andoloner Potbhumii*. (Dhaka: UPL, 1990)
- Rahman, A., Chowdhury, F., and Azad, L., *Socio-Economic Perspective of the War of Liberation*. (Dhaka. BIDS, 1995)
- Rahman, Hasan Hafizur, *Bangladesher Shadheenota Juddho: Dolilpatra*, Vols1-3. (Dhaka: Haqqani Publishers, 2011)
- Rahman, M. Attiqur, *Back to the Pavilion*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005)
- Rahman Chandan, Azadur, *The Killers and Collaborators of 71* (In Bengali). (Dhaka: Jatiya Sahitya Prakash, 2009)
- Rahman, Khalilur, *Purbapor 1971, Pakistani Shena Gahvar Theke* (Before and After 1971: From the Depths of the Pakistani Military). (Dhaka: Sahitya Prakash, 2005)

- Rahman, Muhammad Anisur, *My Story of 1971: Through the Holocaust That Created Bangladesh*. (Dhaka: Liberation War Museum, 2001)
- Rahman, Mizanur, *Emergence of a New Nation in a Multi- Polar World*. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1978)
- Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur, *The Unfinished Memoirs*. (New Delhi: Viking, 2012)
- Rahman, Z, *The Speeches of Sheikh Mujib in Pakistan Parliament*. (Dhaka: Hakkani Publishers, 1990)
- Rainer- Horn, Gerd, *The Spirit of '68: Rebellion in Western Europe and North America, 1956–1976*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007)
- Rajgopal, P. V., *The British, the Bandits and the Bordermen: From the Diaries and Articles of K. F. Rustamji*. (New Delhi: Wisdom Tree, 2009)
- Rakove, Robert B., *Kennedy, Johnson and the Nonaligned World*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013)
- Rashid, Ahmed, *Descent into Chaos: The US and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*. (New York: Viking, 2008)
- Ravallion, M., *Markets and Famines*. (Dhaka: Oxford University Press, 1990)
- Ray, J. K., *Democracy and Nationalism on Trial: A Study of East Pakistan*. (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1968)
- Raza, Rafi, *Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan, 1976-1977*. (Dhaka: Dhaka University Press, 1997)
- Reidel, Bruce, *Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad*. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011)
- Reynolds, David, *Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century*. 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 2000)
- Reza, Rafi, *Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan, 1967– 1977*. (Dhaka: University Press, 1997)
- Riaz, Ali, *Bangladesh A Political History Since Independence*, I.B. (New York :Tauris & Co. Ltd: 2016)
- Rizvi, Hasan Aksari, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan*. (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1974)
- Internal Strife and External Intervention: India's Role in the Civil War in East Pakistan (Bangladesh)*. (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1981)
- Roberts, K., Cook, F.G., Clark, S.C., and Semreonnoff, F., *The Fragmentary Class Structure*. (London: Heinemann, 1977)
- Robertson, Geoffrey, *Crimes against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice*. (New York: New Press, 2000)
- Rosneau, JN, *World Politics: An Introduction*. (Delhi: Free Press, 1976)
- Ross, Kristin, *May '68 and Its Afterlives*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002)
- Rowbotham, Sheila, *Promise of a Dream: Remembering the Sixties*. (London: Verso, 2001)
- Rubinstein, Alvin, *Moscow's Third World Strategy*. (NY: Princeton, 1990)
- Safiullah, KM, *Bangladesh at War*. (Dhaka: Agamee Prakashani, 1989)
- Saikia, Yasmin, *Women, War and the Making of Bangladesh: Remembering 1971*. (New Delhi: Women Unlimited, 2011)
- Sailer, Erna, *Ambassador Erna Sailer's Report on the Mission of High-Level United Nations Consultants to Bangladesh*. (New York: United Nations, 1972)
- Salik, Siddiq, *Witness to Surrender*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977)

- Salim, Ahmad, *Blood Beaten Track: Sheikh Mujib's Nine Months in Pakistan Jail* (Sheikh Mujib Bandi Jibon in Bengali, Translation - Mofidul Huq). (Dhaka: Sahitya Prakash, 1998)
- Samad, Abdus, *History of Liberation War of Bangladesh*. (Dhaka: Aparajeyo Bangla Prakashani, 2019)
- Sargent, Daniel J. Forthcoming. *A Superpower Adrift: History, Strategy, and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Sarkar, M.ed. 2008. *Bangabondhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman: Jibon o Rajniti*. 2 vols. Dhaka: The Bangla Academy.
- Sarkar, Jatin, *Pakistaner Janmamrittu-darshan*, Dhaka: Jatiya Shahitya Prakash, 2007
- Sastri, H., *Nalanda and its Epigraphic Material*. (New Delhi: Sri Satguru publications, 1986)
- Sayeed, Khalid B. 1967. *The Political System of Pakistan*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- , 1960. *Pakistan: The Formative Phase*. Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House.
- Schabas, William. 2000. *Genocide in International Law the Crimes of Crimes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schanberg, Sydney H. 1971. *Pakistan Divided*. Foreign Affairs. Reprint in Bangladesh Documents, Vol. II. (2002). Edited by Singh S. Kumar et al. Dhaka: University Press Limited.
- Schandel, Willaim van, *A History of Bangladesh*. (Cambridge (London): Cambridge University Press, 2009)
- Schmidt, K. J., *An Atlas and the Survey of South Asian History*. (New York: Sharpe, 1955)
- Schroeder, Paul W., *Systems, Stability and Statecraft: Essays on the International History of Modern Europe*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004)
- Schuster, Charles I. "Mikhail Bakhtin as Rhetorical Theorist." *Landmark Essays on Bakhtin, Rhetoric, and Writing*. Ed. Frank Farmer. Mahwah: Hermagoras Press, 1998. 1-14.
- Sen, Amartya, *Poverty and Famines: An Essay in Entitlement and Deprivation*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981)
- Sen, Mohit, *A Traveller and the Road: The Journey of an Indian Communist*. (New Delhi: Rupa, 2003)
- Sen, Rangalal, *Political Elites in Bangladesh*. (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1986)
- Sengupta, Joyti, *History of Freedom Movement in Bangladesh 1943-1973*. (Calcutta: Naya Prokash, 1974)
- Shamsul Arefin, ASM, *Muktijuddher Prekkapote Bektir Obosthan*, (In Bangla). (Dhaka: UPL, 1995)
- Shankar, Ravi, *Raga Mala: An Autobiography*. (New York: Welcome Rain, 1999)
- Shelly, Mizanur Rahman, *The Emergence of a New Nation in a Multi-Polar World: Bangladesh*. (Dhaka: UPL, 1979)
- Shrivastava, C. P., *Lal Bahadur Shastri: A Life of Truth in Politics*. (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995)
- Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008)
- Siddiq, Ayesha, *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy*. (London: Pluto Press, 2007)
- Siddiqui, AR, *East Pakistan - the Endgame: An Onlooker's Journal 1969-1971*. (London: Oxford University Press (OUP), 2004)

- Siddiqui, Kalim, *Conflict, Crisis and War in Pakistan*. (London: Macmillan, 1972)
- Siddiqui, Kamal, *Bangladesher Bhumi Shongskarer Rajnoitik Orthoniti*. (Dhaka: BIDS, 1981)
- Singh, Anita Inder, *The Limits of British Influence: South Asia and the Anglo-American Relationship 1947–56*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993)
- Singh, Depinder, *Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw: Soldiering with Dignity*. Dehradun, India: Natraj.
- Singh, Jaswant. 2009. *Jinnah India-Partition Independence*. (Delhi: Rupa, 2002)
- Singh S. Kumar, *Bangladesh Documents: Volume One*. (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1999)
- Bangladesh Documents: Volume Two*. (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 2002)
- Singh, Sukhwant, *India's Wars since Independence: The Liberation of Bangladesh*. (New Delhi: Lancer, 1980)
- Sircar, D. C., *Studies in The Political and Administrative Systems in Ancient and Medieval India*. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1974)
- Sisson, Richard and Leo E. Rose, *War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990)
- Smith, Anthony D., *National Identity*. (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991)
- Sobhan, Rehman, *The Crisis of External Dependence*. (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1993)
- Untranquil Recollections: The Years of Fulfilment*. (New Delhi: Sage, 2016)
- and Muzaffar Ahmad, *Public Enterprise in Intermediate Regime*. (Dhaka: Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, 1980)
- Sustaining democracy in Bangladesh: The political legacy of Tajuddin Ahmad. (Dhaka: Dec. 2019)
- Sodhi, H. S., "*Operation Windfall*": *Emergence of Bangladesh*. (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1980)
- Sounes, Howard, *Down the Highway: The Life of Bob Dylan*. (London: Blackswan Books, 2002)
- Subramaniam, Arjun, *India's Wars: A Military History, 1947-1971*, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2017)
- Stewart, C., *The History of Bengal: From the First Mohammedan Invasion until the Virtual Conquest of that Country by The English, A.D. 1757*. (London: Black, Parry & Company, 1813)
- Suri, Jeremi, *The Global Revolutions of 1968*. (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007)
- Henry Kissinger and the American Century*. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2007)
- Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of the Détente*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003)
- Suskind, Ron, *The Way of the World: A Story of Truth and Hope in an Age of Extremism*. (New York: HarperCollins, 2008)
- Syed, Anwar. H., *The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto*. (London: Macmillan Press Limited, 1992)
- Tagore, Rabindranath. *Rabindra Rochonaboli*.
- Talbot, Ian, *Divided Cities: Partition and Its Aftermath in Lahore and Amritsar, 1947–1957*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006)
- Pakistan: A Modern History*. (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998)
- Shinder Thandi, *People on the Move: Punjabi Colonial, and Post-Colonial Migrations*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2004)

- Tan, Tai Yong and Gyanesh Kudasiya, *The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia*. (London: Routledge, 2000)
- Tannenbaum, F., *A Philosophy of Labour*. (New York: A. Knopf, 1958)
- Teiwes, Frederick C., and Warren Sun, *The Tragedy of Lin Biao: Riding the Tiger during the Cultural Revolution, 1966–1971*. (London: Hurst, 1996)
- Tepper, Elliot L., *Bengal and Bangladesh: Politics and Culture on the Golden Delta*. (Asian Studies Center: Michigan State University, 1990)
- Thant, U., *View from the UN*. (New York: Doubleday, 1978)
- Thomas, Raju G. C., *Indian Security Policy*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986)
- Tinker, Hugh, *India and Pakistan: A Political Analysis*. (New York: Pareger, 1962)
- South Asia: A Short History*. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990)
- Toor, Saadia, *The State of Islam: Culture and Cold War Politics in Pakistan*. (London: Pluto Press, 2011)
- Topolski, Jerzy, *Historiography between Modernism and Postmodernism*. (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2011)
- Trachtenberg, Marc, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999)
- Travalyon, GO, *Life and Letters of Lord Macaulay*. (London: OUP, 1878)
- Trofimov, Yaroslav, *The Siege of Mecca: The 1979 Uprising at Islam's Holiest Shrine*. (New York: Doubleday, 2007)
- Uddin, Sufia M., *Constructing Bangladesh: Religion, Ethnicity, and Language in an Islamic Nation*. (North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2006)
- Umar, Badruddin, *Language Movement in East Bengal*. (Dhaka: Jatiya Grontha Prakashan, 1995)
- The Emergence of Bangladesh*. 2 Vols. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006)
- Bharotio Jatio Andolon*. (Dhaka: Naoraj Kitabistan, 1987)
- Van Schendel, Willem, *A History of Bangladesh*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)
- Varma, S.P. and Virendra Narain, *Pakistan Political System in Crisis: Emergence of Bangladesh*. (Jaipur: University of Bangladesh, 1972) (Jaipur: University of Rajasthan, 1972)
- Verma, Ashok Kalyan, *Bridge on the River Meghna: The Dash to Dhaka*. (New Delhi: Knowledge World Publishers, 2009)
- Vice, Sue. *Introducing Bakhtin*. Manchester University Press, 1997.
- Voigt, Johannes H., *Die Indienpolitik der DDR: von den Anfängen bis zur Anerkennung (1952–1972)*. (Cologne: Böhlau, 2008)
- Von Vorys, Karl, *Political Development in Pakistan*. (London: Princeton, 1965)
- Walzer, Michael, *The Paradox of Liberation*. (Yale University Press, 2016)
- Webb, S. and Webb, B., *The History of Trade Unionism*. (London: Green and Co., 1920)
- Wenqian, Gao, *Zhou Enlai: The Last Perfect Revolutionary*. (New York: Public Affairs, 2007)
- Westad, Odd Arne, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)
- Restless Empire: China and the World since 1750*. (London: Bodley Head, 2012)

- Wheeler, Nicholas, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000)
- Wilcox, Wayne, A., *The Emergence of Bangladesh*. (Washington D.C. : American Enterprise Institute, 1973)
- Williams, Rushbrook, *The East Pakistan Tragedy*. (London: Tom Stacy, 1971)
- Wilson, Heather A., *International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990)
- Wolin, Richard, *The Wind from the East: French Intellectuals, the Cultural Revolution, and the Legacy of the 1960s*. Princeton, (NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010)
- Wolpert, Stanley, *Roots of Confrontation in South Asia*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982)
- Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993)
- Jinnah of Pakistan*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984)
- Wright, Denis, *Bangladesh: Origins and Indian Ocean Relations*. (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1988)
- Yasmin, Saikia, *Women, War, and the Making of Bangladesh: Remembering 1971*. (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2011)
- Yunus, Mohd, *Bhutto and the Breakup of Pakistan*. (Karachi: OUP, 2011)
- Zaheer, Hasan, *The Separation of East Pakistan: The Rise and Realization of Bengali Muslim Nationalism*. (Dhaka: University Press, 2001)
- Zaheed, Abdullah, Ekti Jatir Jonno .(Dhaka: Shomoy,2019)
- Zamindar, Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali, *The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia: Refugees, Boundaries, Histories*. (New York, Columbia University Press, 2007)
- Ziring, Lawrence, *The Ayub Khan Era-Politics in Pakistan, 1958-1969*. (Syracuse (NY): Syracuse University Press, 1971)
- Bangladesh: From Mujib to Ershad-an interpretative Study*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994)
- Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998)
- Zumwalt, Elmo, *On Watch: A Memoir*. (New York: Quadrangle, 1976)

Book Chapters

- Ahmed, Kamal Uddin, "United Front." In *Banglapedia: National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh*, edited by Sirajul Islam. Second Edition. (Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 2012)
- Ahsan, S. M. K., "Prehistory." In *Banglapedia: National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh*. (Dhaka, 2003) Accessed on July 28, 2017.
- Blench, R., "Re-evaluating the linguistic prehistory of South Asia." In Osada, T. & Uesugi, A. *Occasional Paper 3: Linguistics, Archaeology and the Human Past*. 159-178 (Kyoto: Indus project, Research Institute for Humanity and Nature, 2008)
- Bose, Sugata, "Instruments and Idioms of Colonial and National Development," in *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge*, ed. Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998)
- Chottopoddhay, Partho, "Bhumika: Nimnborger Itihashchorchar Itihash." In *Nimnborger Itihash..* Edited by Goutom Bhodro and Partho Chottopoddhay. (Kolkata: Anando Publishers, 1998)

- Chowdhury, A. M., "Somapura Mahavihara." In *Banglapedia: National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh*. (Dhaka, 2015a) Accessed on Aug. 9, 2017.
- "Husain Shah." In *Banglapedia: National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh*. (Dhaka, 2015b) Accessed on Aug. 17, 2017.
- Chowdhury, Iftekhar Ahmed, "Bangladesh: Opportunities and Challenges." In *A Resurgent China: South Asian Perspectives*, edited by S. D. Muni and Tan Tai Yong, chapter 3. (New Delhi: Routledge India, 2012)
- Chowdhury, Tawfiq Elahi and Stephen Haggblade, "Dynamics and Politics of Policy Change." In *Out of the Shadow of Famine*. Edited by Raisuddin Ahmed, Steven Haggblade, and Tawfiq-e-Elahi Chowdhury. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000)
- Clay, E., "Poverty, Food Insecurity, and Public Policy in Bangladesh." In *Food Policy Issues in Low Income Countries*. Edited by E. J. Clay, R. Chambers, H. Singer, and M. Lipton. World Bank Staff Working Paper 473. (Washington D. C.: World Bank, 1981)
- Gadgil, M., Joshi, N., Manoharan, S., Patil, S. & Prasad, U. V. S., "Peopling of India." In eds.) *The Indian Human Heritage*, edited by Balasubramanian, D. & Rao, N., 100-129 (Hyderabad: Universities Press, 1998)
- Gordon, Leonard A., "Divided Bengal: Problems of Nationalism and Identity in the 1947 Partition." In Mashirul Hasan (ed.), *India's Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization*. (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994)
- Gupta, Amit Das, "Divided Nations: India and Germany." In *India in the World since 1947: National and Transnational Perspectives*, edited by Andreas Hilger and Corinna R. Unger, 300– 25. (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2012)
- "India and Ostpolitik." In *Ostpolitik, 1969– 1974: European and Global Responses*, edited by Carole Fink and Bernd Schaeffer, chapter 8. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009)
- Hasan, Mushirul, "Congress Muslims and Indian Nationalism, Dilemma and Decline 1029-34." In *Smuggling and Empire: Indian National Congress 1885-1985*. edited by Jim Masselos. (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987)
- Islam, Nurul, "Aid Requirements and Donor Preferences." In *Aid and Influence: A Case of Bangladesh*. Edited by J. Faaland, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981)
- Jahan, S. H., "Bhitargarh." In *Banglapedia: National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh*. (Dhaka, 2015) Accessed on July 3, 2017.
- "Prehistoric Archaeology." In "Bangladesh: An Overview." In Schug, G. R. & Walimbe, S.R. (eds.) *A Companion to South Asia in the Past*. 401- 411 (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2016)
- Karim, Najmul A. K., "Muslim Obhijat o Moddhobitto" In *AK Najmul Karim Memorial Book*. (Dhaka: Dhaka University Social Sciences Department, 1984)
- Keys, Barbara, "Anti- Torture Politics: Amnesty International, the Greek Junta, and the Origins of the Human Rights 'Boom' in the United States." In *The Human Rights Revolution: An International History*, edited by Akira Iriye, Petra Goedde, and William I. Hitchcock, 201– 21. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012)
- Mallick, A.R. and S. Anwar Husain, "Political Basis of Bengali Nationalism." In *History of Bangladesh*. Vol. 1, edited by Sirajul Islam. (Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 1992)
- McMahon, Robert, "The Danger of Geopolitical Fantasies: Nixon, Kissinger and the South Asia Crisis of 1971." In *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969– 1977*, edited

- by Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston, 249– 68. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008)
- Morgan, Michael Cotey, “The Seventies and the Rebirth of Human Rights.” In *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective*, edited by Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela, and Daniel J. Sargent, 237– 50. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2010)
- Moses, A. Dirk, “The United Nations, Humanitarianism, and Human Rights: War Crimes/Genocide Trials for Pakistani Soldiers in Bangladesh, 1971– 1974.” In *Human Rights in the Twentieth Century*, edited by StefanLudwig Hoffmann, 258– 79. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011)
- Nathans, Benjamin, “Soviet Rights- Talk in the Post- Stalin Era.” In *Human Rights in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Stefan- Ludwig Hoffmann, 166– 90. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011)
- Parkinson, J., "Food Aid." In *Aid and Influence: A Case of Bangladesh*. Edited by J. Faaland. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981)
- Poulantzas, N., “The New Petty Bourgeoisie.” In *Class and Class Structure*. (London: A. Hunt, Lawrence and Wishart, 1977)
- Rashid, M. H., “Mainamati.” In *Banglapedia: National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh* (Dhaka, 2015) Accessed on July 3, 2017.
- Salahuddin, Ghazi, “Pakistan: The Year of Change.” In *Memories and Legacies of a Global Revolt*, edited by Phillip Gassert and Martin Klimke, 95– 98. (Washington, DC: German Historical Institute Supplement, 2009)
- Small, John, “From Pakistan to Bangladesh, 1969– 1972: Perspective of a Canadian Envoy.” In “*Special Trust and Confidence*”: *Envoy Essays in Canadian Diplomacy*, edited by David Reece, 209– 38. (Ottawa: Carlton University Press, 1996)
- Sobhan, Rehman, “Economic Basis of Bengali Nationalism.” In *History of Bangladesh 1704-1971*. Edited by Sirajul Islam. (Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 1997)
- Stern, Joshep, "Growth, Development and Regional Equity in Pakistan." In Walter P Falcon and Gustav F Rapenek edited, *Development Policy II-The Pakistani Experience*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971)
- Rahman, Atiur, “*Oshohojogir Dinguli*.” In *Muktijuddher Prostutiporbo*. Dhaka: Shahitto Prokash.
- Spivak, G. 1986. “Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography.” In *Subaltern Studies*, Vol. IV. Edited by Ranajit Guha. (India: Oxford University Press, 1998)
- Waiz, R., “Khanqah.”, In: *Banglapedia: National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh* (Dhaka, 2015) Accessed September 9, 2017.

Articles

- Abdullah, M. Niaz. 2006. "Educational Disparity in East Pakistan, 1947-71." in the *IAHA Proceedings* 458-84.
- Abdullah, A.A. 1971. “Land Reform and Agrarian Change in Bangladesh.” *The Bangladesh Development Studies*, Vol. IV, No.1.
- Agrawal, S., Srivastava, S. K., Borkar, M. & Chaudhuri, T. K. 2008. “Genetic Affinities of North and Northeastern Populations of India: Inference from HLA-Based Study”. *Tissue Antigens* 72:120 - 130.
- Ahsan, S. A. and B. Chakma. 1989. "Problems of National Integration in Bangladesh: The Chittagong Hill Tracts." *Asian Survey* 29, no. 10: 959-970.

Ahmed, Feroz. 1971. "The Second Cyclone." *Pakistan Forum* 1, no. 4: 4-9.

Akhter, Shaheen, Suraiya Begum, Meghna Guhathakurta, Hameeda Hossain and Sultana Kamal, editors. *Rising from the Ashes: Women's Narratives of 1971*. Translated by Niaz Zaman. 2013.

Akter, J., Sarker, M. H., Popescu, I. & Roelvink, D. 2016. "Evolution of The Bengal Delta and its Prevailing Processes." *Journal of Coastal Research* 32, no.5, 1212-1226.
<https://doi.org/10.2112/JCOASTRES-D-14-00232.1>.

Alamgir, K. 2015. "Bridges and Culverts in Medieval Bengal." *Journal of Bengal Art* 20, 251-268.

-----2011. "Gateways in Sultanate Architecture of Bengal." *Journal of Bengal Art* 16, 241-260.

Alavi, Hamza. 1972. "State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh." *New Left Review* I.

Alfram, Henrik. 2009. "Ignoring Executions and Torture: Impunity for Bangladesh's Security Forces." *Human Rights Watch* 9.

Ali, Kamran Asdar. 2005. "The Strength of the Street Meets the Strength of the State." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 37: 99-100.

Al-Mujahid, Sharif. 1971. "Pakistan: First General Elections." *Asian Survey* XI, no. 2: 159-71.

Andrew, Arthur. 1972. "Canada and Asia: The Shifting Power Balance." *Pacific Affairs* 45, no. 3: 407.

ASIL (American Society of International Law). 1972. "Bangladesh Emerges from India-Pakistan Conflict." *International Legal Materials* 11, no. 1: 119-125.

Auspitz, J., Lee, Stephen Marglin, and Gustav Papanek. 1971. "Ripon Papers: History of Economic and Political Domination of East Pakistan." Reprint in *Bangladesh Documents*. 1999.1: 3-9.

Azad, L. 1993. "The Mass Uprising in 1969: A Sociological Analysis." Dhaka: Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis

Aziz, Farida. "The Pakistan Crisis 1971." PhD diss., King's College London, 1988.

Azmi, Razi. 2016. "Sikdar, Samiullah and Sarbahra: Epilogue." *New Age* (February) 4.

Baxter, Craig. 1971. "Pakistan Votes-1970." *Asian Survey* 11, no. 3: 197-218.

Banerjee, S., Roy, S. K. & Talukder, B. 1992. "Prehistoric Fauna Excavated From Hatikra District, Birbhum, West Bengal, India." *Records of the zoological survey of India* 90, vol. 1-4, 105-109.

-----1982. "Bangladesh at Ten: An Appraisal of Political Development." *The World Today* 38, no. 2: 73-80.

Beauvoir, Simone de. *The Second Sex*. Translated by Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany Chevallier, 1949.

Beissinger, Mark R. "Soviet Empire as 'Family Resemblance.'" *Slavic Review* 65, no. 2: 294-303.

- Benvenuti, Andrea. 2006. "Australian Reactions to Britain's Declining Presence in Southeast Asia, 1955– 63." *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 34, no. 3: 407– 29.
- Bergman, David. 2016. "The Politics of Bangladesh Genocide Debate." *New York Times*, April 5.
- Bhat, M. A. 2015. "Position of Women in the Indian Society." *International Journal of Humanities, Social Sciences and Education* 2, no.5, 1-7.
- Blair, Harry W. 1971. "Sheikh Mujib and Déjà vu in East Bengal: The Tragedies of March 25." *Economic and Political Weekly* 6, no. 52: 2555-2562.
- . 1978. "Rural Development, Class Structure, and Bureaucracy in Bangladesh." *World Development* 6, no. 1: 65-82.
- Bossard, James H.S. "War and the Family." *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1941, pp. 330-344.
- Brands, William J. (1971). "Pakistan Disintegration." *The World Today* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London). August 27, no. 8: 320.
- Buchanan, Tom. 2002. "'The Truth Will Set You Free': The Making of Amnesty International." *Journal of Contemporary History* 37, no. 4: 575– 97.
- Budhraj, Vijay Sen. 1973. "Moscow and the Birth of Bangladesh." *Asian Survey* XIII, no. 5: 484.
- Burke, Roland. 2008. "From Individual Rights to National Development: The First UN International Conference on Human Rights, Tehran 1968." *Journal of World History* 19, no. 3: 283– 84.
- Burke, S. M. (1973). "The Post-War Diplomacy of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971." *Asian Survey* 131, no 11: 1036-1049.
- Burki Shahid Javed. (1972). "Ayub's Fall: A Socio-Economic Explanation." *Asian Survey* 12, no. 3: 201-212.
- Chakma Bhumitra. 2010. "Structural Roots of Violence in the Chittagong Hill Tracts." *Economic and Political Weekly* 85: 19-21.
- Chakraborty, Dipesh. "Minority Histories, Subaltern Pasts." *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol 33, No. 9, 1998, pp. 473+475-479.
- Chancellor, Renate and Shari Lee. "Storytelling, Oral History, and Building the Library Community." *Storytelling, Self, Society*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2016, pp. 39-54.
- Chopra, Pran. 1971. "East Bengal: A Crisis for India." *The World Today* 27, no. 9, 372–379.
- Chowdhury, A. M. 2011. "Reflections on Islamisation in Bengal." *Bangladesh e-Journal of Sociology* 8, no.1, 45-50.
- Choudhury, GW. 1972. "Bangladesh: Why it Happened?" *International Affairs* 48: 248.
- Cole, G. D. H. 1950. *The Conception of the Middle Class*. British Journal of Sociology, Vol.1.

- Costanzo, D. Thierry. 2004. "Past and Present Perceptions of Bangladesh." *Orient Moderno*, Nouva serie. Anno 23, 84, no. 1: 51–69.
- Danhui, Li. 2009. "Mao Zedong's World Revolution Ideals and Sino- Indian Relations: Decoding Mao's Talk with the Delegation of the Communist Party of India (Leftists) on 13 December 1967." Paper presented at the panel "The Sino- Indian Border Clashes and the Sino- Soviet Split: New Evidence from Chinese Archives," Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, May 18.
- Dahiya, MS. 1972. "India-Pakistan in Soviet Foreign Policy." *Foreign Affairs Reports* 21, no. 9: 195.
- Davis, Coralynn V. "Talking Tools, Suffering Servants, and Defecating Men: The Power of Storytelling in Maithil Women's Tales." *The Journal of American Folklore*, Vol. 122, No. 485, 2009, pp. 267-296.
- Debnath, Angela. 2011. "British Perceptions of the East Pakistan Crisis 1971: 'Hideous Atrocities on Both Sides'?" *Journal of Genocide Research* 13, no. 4: 421– 50.
- Dobell, W. M. 1969. "Ayub Khan as President of Pakistan." *Pacific Affairs* 42, no. 3: 294-310.
- Dowlah, Caf. 1998. "Benefits of Privatization: Evidence from State-owned Enterprises in Bangladesh During 1991-96." *The Asia-Pacific Development Journal* (December).
- , 2006. "Politics and Economics of Food and Famine in Bangladesh in the Early 1970s: With Special Reference to Amartya Sen's Interpretation of the 1974 Famine." *National Journal of Social Welfare* 15: 344-356.
- , 2014. "Jumma insurgency in Chittagong Hills Tracts: How Serious is the Threat to Bangladesh's National Integration and What Can Be Done?" *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 24, no. 5: 773-794.
- Dunbar, David. 1972. "Pakistan: The Failure of Political Negotiations." *Asian Survey* 12, no 5: 444–461.
- Fox, Jon E. and Cynthia Miller-Idriss. "Everyday nationhood." *Ethnicities*, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2008, pp. 536-563.
- Franda, Marcus. 1981. "Ziaur Rahman and Bangladeshi Nationalism." *Economic and Political Weekly* 16: 357-380.
- , 1982b. "Bangladesh at Ten: An Appraisal of a Decade of Political Development." *The World Today* 38, no. 2: 73-80.
- Garlough, Christine Lynn. "On the Political Uses of Folklore: Performance and Grassroots Feminist Activism in India." *The Journal of American Folklore*, Vol. 21, No. 480, 2008, pp. 167-191.

- Gankovsky, Yuri V. 1974. "The Social Structure of Society in the People's Republic of Bangladesh." *Asian Survey* 3: 220-230.
- Gauhar, Altaf. 1985. "Pakistan: Ayub Khan's Abdication." *Third World Quarterly* 7, no. 1: 102-131.
- Giri, A. 1994. "Concept, History and the Challenge of Description" In *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. XXIX, No.6.
- Goldstein, Lyle J. 2001. "Return to Zhenbao Island: Who Started Shooting and Why It Matters." *China Quarterly* no. 168: 985– 97.
- Haider, Zaglul. 2005. "Unfolding Canada-Bangladesh Relations." *Asian Survey* DOI: 10.1525/as.2005.45.2.322.
- Hasan, Sabiha. 1983. "Foreign Policy of Bangladesh-1." *Pakistan Horizon* 36, no. 3: 65–80.
- Hassan, Maidul. 1986. "Muldhara '71." Dhaka: University Press Limited
- Heerspink, Dawn. "'No Man's Land': Fairy Tales, Gender, Socialization, Satire, and Trauma During the First and Second World Wars." *Grand Valley Journal of History*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2011.
- Hess, Gary. 2007. "Grand Strategy and Regional Conflict: Nixon, Kissinger and the South Asia Crisis." *Diplomatic History* 31, no. 5: 959– 63.
- Higgins, Noelle. 2004. "The Application of International Humanitarian Law to Wars of National Liberation." *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* (April).
- Hossain, Mohammed Delwar. 2010. "Framing the Liberation War of Bangladesh in the U.S. and the U.K. Media: A Content Analysis of The New York Times and The Times (London)." MA thesis, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale.
- Hossain, Mokerrom. 2009. "Bangladesh War of Independence: A Moral Issue." *Economic and Political Weekly* 44, no. 5: 26-29.
- Hossain, M. 1979. "Nature of State Power in Bangladesh," *Journal of Social Science Studies* 5.
- Hoque, M. M., Ahsan, S. M. K. & Rahman, S. S. M. 1996. "Pre-Muslim Settlement and Chronology of Savar Region." *Pratnatattva* 3, 10-11.
- Huq, Abul Fazl. 1973. "Constitution Making in Bangladesh." *Pacific Affairs* 46, no 1: 59–76.
- Islam, Serajul Syed. 1985. "The Role of the State in the Economic Development of Bangladesh during the Mujib Regime (1972-1975)." *The Journal of Developing Areas* 19, no. 2: 185-208.
- Issacs, Harold R. 1975. "Nationality: End of the Road?" *Foreign Affairs* 53, no. 3: 432–449.
- Iyer, G. S. 2009. "'Mao's Smile' Revisited: Some Observations." Paper no. 413 Chennai Centre for China Studies, www.c3sindia.org/india/1068.
- Jahan, Rounaq. 1973. "Bangladesh in 1972: Nation Building in a New State." *Asian Survey* 13, no. 2: 199-210.
- , 1974. "Bangladesh in 1973: Management of Factional Politics." *Asian Survey* 14, no. 2: 125-135.
- Jalal, Ayesha. 1995. "Conjuring Pakistan: History as Official Imagining." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 27, no. 1: 73-89.

- , 1985. "Inheriting the Raj: Jinnah and the Governor-Generalship Issue." *Modern Asian Studies* 19: 29-53.
- , 1989. "Towards the Baghdad Pact: South Asia and Middle East Defence War," *International History Review* 11, no. 3.
- Jalib, Habib. 1994. "Khatrey Mein Islam Nahin" (Islam Is Not in Danger)." In Charoon Janab Sunata. Lahore: Al Ahmad Publications.
- Jones, Matthew. 2002. "A Decision Delayed: Britain's Withdrawal from South East Asia Reconsidered, 1961– 1968." *English Historical Review* 117, no. 472: 569– 95.
- Jones, WH Morris. 1972. "Pakistan Post Mortem and the Roots of Bangladesh." *Political Quarterly*, London 43: 190.
- Johnson, G. 1973. "Partition, Agitation and Congress: Bengal 1904 to 1908." *Modern Asian studies* 7, no.3, 533-588. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X0000531X>.
- Khan, A. R. 1974. "Bangladesh Economic Policies since Independence." *South Asian Review* (October) 8: 13–32.
- Khan, Ayub. 1961. "Essentials of Pakistan's Foreign Policy." *Pakistan Horizon* Vol. XIV. (November) 4: 266-67.
- Khan, Enayetullah. 1973. "65 Million Collaborators?" *Weekly Holiday* (May) 3.
- Khan, Omar Hayyat. 2005. "Instruments of Influence: Canada and Arms Export to South Asia, 1947– 1971." MA thesis, Carleton University, Ottawa.
- Khan, Zillur R. 1976. "Leadership, Parties and Politics in Bangladesh." *The Western Political Quarterly* 29, no. 1: 102-125.
- Klatt, W. 1972. "The Indian Subcontinent after the War." *The World Today* 28, no. 3: 108-116.
- Kochaneck, Stanley A. 2000. "Governance, Patronage Politics, and Democratic Transition in Bangladesh." *Asian Survey* 40, no. 3: 530-550.
- Kumar, Satish. 1975. "The Evolution of India's Policy Towards Bangladesh in 1971." *Asian Survey* 15, no. 6: 488-498.
- Kuukkanen, Jouni-Matti. "Why We Need To Move from Truth-Functionality to Performativity in Historiography." *History and Theory*, Vol. 53, No. 2, 2015, pp. 226-243.
- Laporte, Robert Jr. 1972. "Pakistan in 1971: The Disintegration of a Nation." *Asian Survey* 12, no. 20: 97-108.
- Levy, Daniel, and Natan Sznaider. 2004. "The Institutionalization of Cosmopolitan Morality: The Holocaust and Human Rights." *Journal of Human Rights* 3, no. 2: 143– 57.
- Lifschultz, Lawrence. 1974. "Bangladesh: A State of Siege." *Far Eastern Economic Review* (August) 30.
- , and Kai Bird, 1979. "Bangladesh: Anatomy of a Coup." *Economic and Political Quarterly* 14, no. 50: 2059-2068.
- Little, Wendell E. 1980. "Wars of National Liberation-Insurgency." *Air University Review*.
- Ludden, David. 2003. "Who Declared the Independence of Bangladesh?" *Frontline* 20: 15.
- Lynd, Staughton. "Oral History from Below." *The Oral History Review*, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1993, pp. 1-8.

- Lyon, Peter. 1972. "Bangladesh." *World Survey* 49: 19.
- Madan, Tanvi. 2012. "With an Eye to the East: The China Factor and the US– India Relationship, 1949– 1979." PhD diss., University of Texas, Austin.
- Manchanda, Rita. "Gender Conflict and Displacement: Contesting 'Infantilization' of Forced Migrant Women." *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 39, No. 37, 2004, pp. 41179-4186
- Maniruzzaman, Talukder. 1971. "Crises in Political Development and the Collapse of the Ayub Regime in Pakistan." *The Journal of Developing Areas* 5, no. 2: 221-238.
- . 1975. "Bangladesh in 1974: Economic Crises and Political Polarization." *Asian Survey* 15, no. 2: 117–128.
- Mastny, Vojtech. 2010. "The Soviet Union's Partnership with India." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 12, no. 3: 52– 56.
- Mathieu, G. K. 1976. "Palace Revolution Continued." *Economic and Political Weekly* 11, no. 17: 623–627.
- Mathur, P. C. 1977. "Theories of Nation-Building in the Indian Sub-Continent: A Political Analysis." *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 38, no. 4: 435-443.
- McDougall, Derek. 1997. "Australia and the British Military Withdrawal from East of Suez." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 51, no. 2: 183– 94.
- McHenry, D. and K. Bird. 1977. "Food Bungle in Bangladesh." *Foreign Policy* 27: 72–88.
- Mookherjee, Nayanika. 2012. "The Absent Piece of Skin: Gendered, Racialized, and Territorial Inscriptions of Sexual Violence during the Bangladesh War." *Modern Asian Studies* 46, no. 6: 1572– 1601.
- . 2011. "Mobilising Images: Encounters of 'Forced' Migrants and the Bangladesh War of 1971." *Mobilities* 6, no. 3: 399– 414.
- Moore, R. J. 1983. "Jinnah and the Pakistan Demand." *Modern Asian Studies* 17, no. 4: 529-569.
- Mukherji, Partha N. 1974. "The Great Migration of 1971." *Economic and Political Weekly* 9, no. 11: 449-51.
- Mukherjee, R. 2009. "Mobility in the Bay of Bengal World: Medieval Raiders, Traders, States and the Slaves." *Indian Historical Review* 36, no.1, 109-129.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/037698360903600107>.
- Mustafa, Gulam. 2010. "Alliance Politics in Pakistan: A Study of the United Front." *Journal of History and Culture* 31, no. 1. www.foxirsoftware.com> ,
- Nag, Sagal. 2006. "Two Nations and a Dead Body." *Economic and Political Weekly* 41, no. 50: 5183-5190.
- O'Connell, J. T. 2011. "Chaitanya Vaishnava Devotion (Bhakti) and Ethics as Socially Integrative in Sultanate Bengal." *Bangladesh e-Journal of Sociology* 8, no.1, 51-63.
- Oren, Stephen. 1976. "After the Bangladesh Coups." *The World Today* 32, no. 1: 18-24.
- Osmany, Shireen Hasan. *Bangladeshi Nationalism: History of Dialectics and Dimensions*. The University Press Limited, 1992.

- Owen, John. E. 1972. "The Background of Bangladesh." *Politico* 37, no. 1: 172-181.
- Palmer, Norman D. 1973. "South Asia and the Great Powers." *Orbis*, Vol. XVII, no. 3: 997.
- Palomka, Peter. 1974. "Indonesia's Future and South-East Asia." *Adelphi Papers*, London, *The International Institute for Strategic Studies*, 18-35.
- Papenek, Gustav F. 1970. "The Location of Industry." *The Pakistan Development Review* X. no. 3.
- Parthasarathi, Ashok. 2011. "Forty Years of the Indo- Soviet Treaty: A Historic Landmark at the Global Level." *Mainstream* 49, no. 34. [www.mainstreamweekly.net /article2951.html](http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article2951.html).
- Perushek, D. 1993. "Subaltern Consciousness and Historiography of Indian Rebellion of 1857". In *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. XXVII, No.37.
- Pilkington, Richard. 2011. "In the National Interest? Canada and the East Pakistan Crisis of 1971." *Journal of Genocide Research* 13, no. 4: 451– 74.
- Prakash, Gyan.1990. "Writing Post-Orientalist Histories of the Third World", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol.32, No.2(April 1990):383-408
- Prakash, Gyan. "Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism." *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 99, No. 5., 1994, pp. 1475-1490.
- Puri, Balraj. 1971. "Bangladesh Bungled." *Economic and Political Weekly* 6, no. 30/32: 1517-1520.
- Qureshi, Khalida. 1963. "The Soviet Union, India and Pakistan." *Pakistan Horizon* 17, no. 4: 244.
- Rashid, Harun- or. 1995. "British Perspectives, Pressures and Publicity Regarding Bangladesh, 1971." *Contemporary South Asia* 4, no. 2: 139– 49.
- Rashiduzzaman, M. 1972. "Leadership, Strategies and Tactics of the Bangladesh Movement." *Asian Survey* 12, no. 3: 185–200.
- , 1979. "Bangladesh in 1978: Search for Political Party." *Asian Survey* 19 (February), no. 2:191-197.
- Rehman, A. 1968. "East and West Pakistan: A Problem in Political Economy of Regional Planning." *Centre for International Affairs* Harvard University.
- Rothschild, E. 1976. "Food Politics." *Foreign Affairs* 54: 285–307.
- Roy, Choudhury S. 2012. "Gaur: The Medieval City of Bengal." *Pratna Samiksha: A Journal of archaeology* Special Issue, vol. 3, 1450-1565 (Kolkata: Centre for Archaeological Studies and Training, Eastern India)
- Roy, J. S. 2002. "Prehistoric Tools from Chaklapunji: An Analysis Based on Typological Comparison." *Pratnatattva* 8, 43-48.
- Sakharov, Andreii D. Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom. New York: Norton, [1968]. Originally published in the *New York Times*, 22 July 1968.
- Samaddar, Ranabir. 1997. "Interpretations of the Bangladesh War." *India International Center Quarterly* 24, no. 2/3: 219-227.

Sangster, Joan. "Telling our stories: Feminist debate and the use of oral history." *Women's History Review*, 2006

Sengupta, Jayanta. "Nation on a Platter: the Culture and Politics of Food and Cuisine in Colonial Bengal." *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 1, 2010, pp. 81-98.

Shepler, Susan. "The Real and Symbolic Importance of Food in War: Hunger Pains and Big Men's Bellies in Sierra Leone." *Africa Today*, Vol. 58, No. 2, 2011, pp. 43-56.

Siddiq, A. B. & Habib, A. 2016. "Ethno-Archaeological Notes on Hunter-Gatherer Munda People in Tropical Rainforests of North-Eastern Bangladesh." *Artuklu Human and Social Science Journal* 1, no.1, 13-21. <http://dergipark.gov.tr/download/article-file/281772>

Sieg, Kent G. "Lt. Gen. (Ret.) AAK Niazi, the Betrayal of East Pakistan." *Indian Journal of Asian Affairs* (June) 15, no. 1: 153-156.

Silva, Mario 2013. "Bangladesh: War Crimes Trials." *International Journal of Rights and Security* 3, no. 1: 62-73.

Simon, Sheldon 1973. "China, the Soviet Union, and the Subcontinental Balance." *Asian Survey* 13, no. 7: 647-658.

Smith, Simon C. 2010. "Coming Down on the Winning Side: Britain and the South Asia Crisis, 1971." *Contemporary British History* 24, no. 4: 451– 70.

Sobhan, Rehman. 1979. "Politics of Food and Famine in Bangladesh." *Economic and Political Weekly* 14, no. 48: 1973-1980.

-----, 1971. "Negotiating for Bangladesh: A Participant's View." *South Asian Review* 4, no. 4: 315– 26.

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. "Can the Subaltern Speak?" *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, eds. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, 1988.

Subrahmanyam, K. 1972. "Bangladesh and India's National Security: Options for India." *Foreign Affairs Reports* 21, no. 1.

Suri, Jeremi. 2009. "The Rise and Fall of an International Counterculture, 1960– 1975." *American Historical Review* 114, no. 1: 45– 68.

Tayeeb, Muhammad A. 1978. "The Dilemmas of Independence." *Asian Affairs* 5, no. 3: 165-178.

Tepper, Elliot L. 1973. "Pakistan and the Consequences of Bangladesh." *Pacific Affairs* 45, no 4: 573-581.

Thebaud, Françoise. "Understanding twentieth-century wars through women and gender: forty years of historiography." *Clio (English edition)*, No. 39, 2014, pp. 152-178.

- Thomas, Raju G, C. 1996. "Competing Nationalisms: Secessionist Movements and the State." *Harvard International Review* 18, no. 3: 12-15.
- Thornton, Thomas P. "The New Phase in U.S.-Pakistani Relations." *Foreign Affairs* 68, no. 3: 142-143, 148-149, 152.
- Umar, Badruddin. 1972. "The Proposed Constitution: A Fundamental Measure Against Socialism, Democracy, Nationalism and Secularism." *Weekly Holiday* (October) 22.
- . 2004. "Declaration of Independence." *Weekly Holiday* (July) 16.
- Van der Kroef, Justus M. 1974. "The Burdens of Independence." *Asian Affairs* 1, no. 6: 377-389.
- Van Hollen, Christopher. 1980. "The Tilt Policy Revisited: Nixon- Kissinger Geopolitics and South Asia." *Asian Survey* 20, no. 4: 339- 61.
- Volsky, D. 1971. "Now that the Guns Are Silent." *New Times* 52.
- Warner, Geoffrey. 2005. "Review Article: Nixon, Kissinger and the Breakup of Pakistan, 1971." *International Affairs* 81, no. 5: 1097-1118.
- . 2005. "Nixon, Kissinger and the Breakup of Pakistan, 1971." *International Affairs* 81, no. 5: 1097- 118.
- Wilcox, Wayne. 1973. "American Policy Towards South Asia." *Asian Affairs* LX: 134.
- Wolpert, Stanley. 1987. "Superpower Politics and South Asia." *Harvard International Review* 9, no. 6: 4-7.
- Ziring, Lawrence. 1974. "Militarism in Pakistan: The Yahya Khan Interregnum." *Asian Affairs* 1, no. 6: 407-420.
- . 1976. "Changing Alignments in South Asia." *Asian Survey* 3, no. 5: 326-341.
- . 1991. "Pakistan in 1990: The Fall of Benazir Bhutto." *Asian Survey* 31, no. 2: 115-116, 119.

Reports and Official Records

- Amnesty International. 1974. *Amnesty International Annual Report, 1973-74*. London: Amnesty International.
- Archives of Parties and Mass Organizations of the Former German Democratic Republic in the Federal Archives [Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv] (SAPMO), Berlin.
- Bangladesh Documents*, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, Government of India, 1971.
- Bangladesh Documents*. 2 vols. New Delhi: Government of India, 1972.
- Bangladesher Shadhinata Juddho: Dalil Patro*. 15 vols. Dhaka: Ministry of Information, Government of People's Republic of Bangladesh, 1985.
- Bangladesh Liberation War Documents*, Vol. I-XVI, Dhaka, Ministry of Information, GOB, 1982-1983.
- BBS (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics). 1978. *Monthly Statistical Bulletin*. Dhaka: Government Press.
- BPC (Bangladesh Planning Commission). 1973. *Annual Plan 1973-74*. Dhaka: Bangladesh Government Press.
- Cold War International History Project Bulletin. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1992-.
- Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates*, Vol. II-V, 1952-1956.
- Current Digest of Soviet Press*, 23(39), 1971.
- Declaration of Independence by Bangabandhu: The Historic High Court Verdict, Dhaka.

- Franda, Marcus. 1972. "Population Politics in South Asia: Population Pressures and the Beginning of Bangladesh." *American Universities Field Staff Reports, South Asia Series* 16 (May).
- GOB (Government of Bangladesh). 1979. *Flow of External Resources into Bangladesh*. Dhaka: Ministry of Finance.
- . 1982. *Bangladesher Shadhinota Juddho Dolilpotro (Documents of the Bangladesh Independence War), Sixteen Volumes*. Dhaka: Information Ministry.
- . 2015. *The Bangladesh Constitution*. Dhaka: Government Printing Press.
- GOP (Government of Pakistan). 1971. *White Paper on the Crisis of East Pakistan*. Islamabad: Government Printing Press.
- Government of India. *The Years of Endeavour: Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi, August 1969– August 1972*. New Delhi: Publications Division, 1975.
- Gupta, P. C. D., "Excavations at Pandu Rajar Dhibi." *Archaeological Survey of India*. http://asi.nic.in/asi_books/42371.pdf
- Hamoodur Rehman Commission. *Report of the Hamoodur Rehman Commission of Inquiry into the 1971 War, as Declassified by the Government of Pakistan*. Lahore: Vanguard, [2000?].
- Historic 7 March Speech, The Department of Films and Publications, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh.
- Hughes, Thomas L. 1969. "Pakistan: Economic Disparity and Political Discontent." US State Department research memorandum. FCO 37/471, AMDA, P.12.
- Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Ottawa.
- Masson, Edward S., Robert Dorfman, and Stephen Marglin. 1971. "Harvard Papers: Conflict in East Pakistan: Background and Prospects." Reprint in *Bangladesh Documents*. 1999. I: 9-15.
- "Message from NV Podgorny to the President of Pakistan" *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 4 May 1971, Vol. XXIII, No. 14.
- Ministry of Defense Report*, GOI, 1971-72, New Delhi, 1972.
- Ministry of Finance. *Economic Survey 1971– 72*. New Delhi: Government of India, 1972.
- National Archives of Australia (NAA), Canberra.
- National Archives of India (NAI), New Delhi.
- Nixon Presidential Materials, Yorba Linda, California.
- Oxfam Archives, Oxford.
- Pakistan Defence Ministry Order, Official Order No. 4/8/52/543 P.S. 1/K/3659 D-Ko).
- Political Archive of the Office for Foreign Affairs [Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes] (PAAA), Berlin.
- Political Archive of the Office for Foreign Affairs Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Former GDR [Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Bestand: Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten (der ehemaligen DDR)], (PAAA- MfAA), Berlin.
- PPC (Pakistan Planning Commission). 1968. *The Mid-Plan Review of the Third Five Year Plan (1965-70)*. Karachi: Government Printing Press.
- Proceedings of Lok Sabha*, 27-31 March 1971, New Delhi, Lok Sabha Secretariat, 5th Series, Vol. 1.
- Proclamation of Independence of Bangladesh, Mujibnagar, 1971.

- Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations concerning the implementation of General Assembly Resolution 2700 (XXVI) and Security Council Resolution 307 (1971): UN Doc. A/8662/Add.3, 11 August 1972.
- Resolutions of All-India Muslim League*, December 1938 to March 1940, Party Central Office, Delhi, 1940.
- Robert S. McNamara, "Before the Subcommittee on Department of Defence Appropriations of the Senate Committee on Appropriations on August 4, 1965", *Department of State Bulletin*, Washington, 1965.
- Russian Government Archive of Contemporary History [Rossiiskii Arkhiv Sotsialno-politicheskoi Istorii] (RGANI), Moscow.
- Section 3(2)(a) of the *International Crimes Tribunal Act*, 1973.
- Section on South Asia in President Nixon's Foreign Policy Report sent to Congress on 9 February 1972, *Foreign Policy Affairs Reports*, Vo. XXI, p. 28
- The Declaration of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948.
- The Indian Council of World Affairs, *How Pakistan Violated Human Rights in Bangladesh*, New Delhi, 1972.
- The National Archives (TNA), Kew, London.
- The Salient Extracts from the *Legal Framework Order, 1970*. President's Order No. 2. of 1970 (*Gazette of Pakistan Extraordinary*, 30 March 1970).
- The US Defence Intelligence Agency, *Report on Washington in winter is 10 hours behind Bangladesh*, Washington, 26 March 1971.
- UN General Assembly Documents, A-8580, S-10443, 12 December 1971.
- United Nations Archives (UNA), New York City.
- UN Press Release*, IHA-1, 21 June 1971.
- UN Security Council Official Records, Documents, S-10419.
- US Congress Record, Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1971.
- US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969– 1976. Vol. 11: South Asia Crisis, 1971. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2005. [http:// history.state.gov/historicaldocuments /frus1969 -76v11](http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v11).
- Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969– 1976. Vol. E-7: Documents on South Asia, 1969– 1972. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2005. [http:// history.state.gov /historicaldocuments /frus1969 -76ve07](http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve07).
- Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969– 1976. Vol. E-13: Documents on China, 1969– 1972. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2005. [http:// history.state.gov/historicaldocuments /frus1969 -76ve13](http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve13).
- Foreign Relations of the United States 1969– 1976. Vol. 17: China 1969– 1972. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2005. [http://history.state .gov/historicaldocuments /frus1969 -76v17](http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17)
- US Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Building for Peace. A Report to the Congress of Richard Nixon, Washington, GPO, 1971.
- US National Archives and Records Administration (USNA), College Park, Maryland.
- White Paper on the Crisis in East Pakistan*, Islamabad, GOI, August 1971.
- World Bank. 1972a. *Restructuring the Economy of Bangladesh*. Volume I: The Main Report. Washington D. C.: South Asia Department.

- . 1972b. *Restructuring the Economy of Bangladesh*. Volume II: Notes on the Revival of Economic Activity in the Major Sectors. Washington D. C.: South Asia Department.
- . 1975. *Bangladesh: The Current Economic Situation and Short-term Outlook*. Washington D.C.: South Asia Region.
- . 1976. *Bangladesh: Current Economic Performance and Short-term Prospects*. Washington D.C.: South Asia Programs Department.
- World Bank Papers, Center for the Advanced Study of India (CASI), University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.

Newspapers, Periodicals and Magazines

Amrita Bazar Patrika, Anandabazar, Asian Recorder, Bangladesh Quarterly, Banglar Bani, Business News, Christian Science Monitor, Daily Asian Age, Daily Ittefaq, Daily Jonokontho, Daily Pakistan, Daily Purbadesh, Daily Sun, Daily Telegraph, Dhaka Courier, Dhaka Tribune, Evening Standard, Evening Star, Forbes, Foreign Affairs Reports, Globe and Mail, Hindustan Standard, Hindustan Times, Independent Observer, Indian Express, Indonesia Observer, Indonesian Raya, International Herald Tribune, International Tribune, Kibler (Periodical), La Nacion, Le Monde, London Times, Monthly Agrapathik, Morning Herald, Morning News, Nanyang Siang Pau, New Statesman, New York Times, Newsweek (Magazine), Ottawa Citizen, Pakistan Horizon, Paris Le Monde, Peking Review, Pradva, Soviet Review, Sunday Times, Bangkok World, Call, Dacca Gazette Extraordinary, The Daily Azad, The Daily Bangla, Daily Dawn, The Daily Pakistan, Sangram, Daily Star, Daily Telegraph, Djakarta Times, Economist, Financial Times, Guardian. Hindustan Times, Holiday Independent, Guardian, Pakistan Times, Patriot, People, Portsmouth Herald, Statesman, Straits Echo, Straits Times, Times of India, Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, Time (Magazine), Times of India, United Asia, Utusan, Vancouver Sun

Manuscript Sources, Important Memoirs etc.

Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi (NMML)
 Jayaprakash Narayan Papers
 P. N. Haksar Papers
 R. K. Nehru Papers
 T. N. Kaul Papers
 T. T. Krishnamachari Papers
 Russian Archive: Diplomatic Documents of USSR 1960-72
 The Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation Russian Foreign Ministry Archives, Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (AVPRF)
 Chernyaev, A.S., Translated by Anna Melyakova (Entries for March 1 and March 8 translated by Grant Fellows), *Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev 1972*, National Security Archive, 2012.

Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1975, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971*, ed. Louis J. Smith, Washington, DC, 2005. Retrieved from: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v11> and <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e7/index.htm>

Department of State, *Foreign Relations*, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, South Asia, 1969-1972, "Intelligence Information Cable, DOI December 12, 1971," Retrieved from: <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e7txt/50163.htm>

Dobrynin, Anatoliĭ Fedorovich, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to American's Six Cold War Presidents (1962-1986)*. New York: Times Books, Random House, 1995.

Keefer, Edward C., David C. Geyer, Douglas Eugene. Selvage, Henry Kissinger, Anatoliĭ Fedorovich Dobrynin, United States. Department of State. Office of the Historian, and Russia . Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del. Istoriko-dokumental'nyi departament. *Soviet-American Relations : The Détente Years, 1969-1972*. Department of State Publication ; No. 11438. Washington, D.C.: Dept. of State Publication, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs : U.S. G.P.O. : For Sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O., 2007.

National Archives (UK), "Exchange of information on China between United Kingdom and Soviet Union" (Government Papers, The National Archives, Kew, 1971). Accessed [May 14, 2018]. http://www.archivesdirect.amdigital.co.uk/du.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/FCO_21_819

National Archives (UK), "Relations between Pakistan and Bangla Desh" (Government Papers, The National Archives, Kew, 1971). Accessed [May 14, 2018]. http://www.archivesdirect.amdigital.co.uk/du.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/FCO_37_901

The Tilt: The U.S. and the South Asian Crisis of 1971, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 79, Gandhi, Sajit, ed. December 16, 2002. Retrieved from: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/#docs>

Podgorny, NV. "An Appeal to the President of Pakistan from NV Podgorny," published in *Pravda*, April 4, 1971, translated by Grant Fellows, 2018.

Pakistan Papers
FRUS 1947-1972

Interviews /conversations

Rehman Sobhan, Dhaka
Mofidul Hoque, Dhaka
Matiur Rahman, Dhaka
Masud Reza Sobhan, Dhaka
Hasan Ferdous, Dhaka and NYC
Khurshid Alam Khan, Toronto
Monzurul Huq, Dhaka and Tokyo
Hasan Ferdous, New York
M. M. Akash, Dhaka
Abul Barkat, Dhaka

Zaidi Sattar, Dhaka
Sadiq Ahmed, Dhaka
M.G. Quibria, Manila and Boston
Bamandas Basu, Boston
Gulshan Ara, Storrs, Ct. and NYC
Saad Andaleeb, Dhaka
Anisuzzaman, Dhaka
Abul M. A. Muhith, Dhaka
Abdul Momen, Dhaka, Boston and NYC
Mahmud Ali, Dhaka
Anwar Hossain, Dhaka
Mohammad Irfan, San Francisco
Purabi Basu, Denver
Jyotiprakash Dutta, Denver
Subas Chakravarty, New Delhi.
A. K. Damodaran, New Delhi.
P. N. Dhar, New Delhi.
Kamal Hossain, Dhaka.
Amirul Islam, Dhaka.
Enayetullah Khan, Dhaka
Afsan Chowdhury, Dhaka
Abul Hasib Khan, Dhaka
Kamrul Ahsan Khan Khasru, Dhaka
Fuad Alam, Dhaka
Sheikh Fazal Imam, Spain
Abu Hasan, London
Abdul Gaffar Choudhury, London
Ali Riaz, Illinois
Brajesh Mishra, New Delhi.
K. Subrahmanyam, New Delhi.
Amartya Sen, Cambridge, Ma.
Nurul Amin, Toronto
TaHER Shah, Dhaka
Akhter Ahmed, Dhaka, Denver, Washington DC
Nurul Islam, Washington DC
A.R. Khan, Riverside, Ca, and Long Island
Nini Wahed, NYC
Abdul Kazi, Kent and Baltimore
Sultan Salhuddin Ahmed, Miami, Fa.
Urmi Shahabuddin, Toronto
Bipul Kamal, Vancouver
Shuravi Chanda, Sydney, Australia
Zafir Hussain, Sydney, Australia
Gautam Bose, Ithaca, LA and Sydney
Nazrul Islam, UNDESA, NYC
Binayak Sen, BIDS, Dhaka

Mustafizur Rahman, CPD, Dhaka
Shubhashish Gangopadhyay, IDF, New Delhi
Anushree Sinha, NCAER, New Delhi
Yechury Sitaram, CPI-M, New Delhi
Parkash Chander, ISI, New Delhi
Haibul Huq Khandaker, NUS, Singapore
Arindam Dasgupta, Nanyang University, Singapore
Vikram Rana, ADB, Manila
M.G. Quibria, ADB, Manila
Shahdeen Malik, Boston and Dhaka
Badal Khan, Dhaka